МІНІСТЕРСТВО ОСВІТИ І НАУКИ УКРАЇНИ
РІВНЕНСЬКИЙ ДЕРЖАВНИЙ ГУМАНІТАРНИЙ УНІВЕРСИТЕТ
ФІЛОЛОГІЧНИЙ ФАКУЛЬТЕТ
КАФЕДРА РОМАНО-ГЕРМАНСЬКОЇ ФІЛОЛОГІЇ

АКТУАЛЬНІ НАПРЯМИ СУЧАСНОЇ ЛІНГВІСТИКИ

(назва навчальної дисципліни)

МЕТОДИЧНІ РЕКОМЕНДАЦІЇ ДО ПРАКТИЧНИХ ЗАНЯТЬ
навчальної дисципліни
підготовки Магістрів
(назва освітньо-наукового рівня)
спеціальність 035 Філологія
(шифр і назва спеціальності)
спеціалізація 035.04 Германські мови та літератури (переклад включно)
(шифр і назва спеціалізації)
(шифр за ОП – ОК05)

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ЗМІСТ

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ВСТУП

Програма вивчення навчальної дисципліни «Актуальні напрями сучасної лінгвістики» складена відповідно до освітньої програми підготовки магістра за спеціальністю 035 Філологія.

Предметом вивчення навчальної дисципліни є мова як людський засіб спілкування, структура мови, закономірності функціонування всіх мов світу в статиці й динаміці, в їх теперішньому й минулому, в усіх їх взаємозв'язках та взаємодії з іншими соціальними феноменами (суспільством, свідомістю, культурою тощо).

Міждисциплінарні зв'язки. Акцентуючи увагу на взаємозв'язках та взаємодії мови з соціальними феноменами, курс розглядає питання, пов'язані з філософією (лінгвофілософія), логікою (логічний аналіз мови), етнографією (етнолінгвістика), історією (порівняльно-історичне мовознавство), соціологією (соціолінгвістика), психологією (психолінгвістика, когнітивна лінгвістика), географією (ареальна лінгвістика, лінгвогеографія), культурологією (міжкультурна комунікація, комунікативна лінгвістика, лінгвокультурологія).

1. ОПИС НАВЧАЛЬНОЇ ДИСЦИПЛІНИ

1.1. Мета викладання навчальної дисципліни «Актуальні напрями сучасної лінгвістики». Запропонований курс має підсумковий характер. Він узагальнює дані попередньо вивчених лінгвістичних дисциплін і дає їм теоретичне обґрунтування. Курс ставить за мету розширити загальнолінгвістичну підготовку словесника, а також поглибити теоретичний і професійний рівень студента-філолога як майбутнього дослідника мови.

1.2. Основними завданнями вивчення дисципліни «Актуальні напрями сучасної лінгвістики» є ознайомлення випускників із найважливішими напрямами мовознавчої науки, актуальними ідеями та проблемами сучасного мовознавства, що має розширити лінгвістичну підготовку філолога.

1.3. Згідно з вимогами освітньої програми студенти повинні:

знати: проблематику сучасних лінгвістичних напрямів та теорій, основні лінгвістичні напрями (зіставно-типологічне мовознавство, етнолінгвістика та соціолінгвістика, функціональна та комунікативна лінгвістика, когнітивна лінгвістика та ін.), сучасні лінгвістичні теорії (функціональні та когнітивні теорії мови);

вміти: чітко розрізняти специфіку та проблеми різних напрямів мовознавства, їх представників, логічно та аргументовано викладати проблематику сучасних напрямів розвитку лінгвістики, уміло й доречно використовувати основні лінгвістичні поняття, визначати цілі, зміст, принципи дослідження мовних фактів у межах проблематики теорії мовознавства, застосовувати системний підхід, інтегруючи знання з інших дисциплін, під час проведення наукових досліджень мови. **Програмні результати**: а) знання сучасних методів обробки і систематизації інформації в галузі професійної діяльності; б) знання найновіших теоретичних знань у галузі мовознавства; в) знання наукових парадигм сучасної лінгвістики; г) уміння здобувати декларативні знання з друкованих джерел, здійснювати самостійний науковий пошук, аналізувати передовий досвід.

Програма розрахована на 16 годин практичних занять.

2. ПРОГРАМА НАВЧАЛЬНОЇ ДИСЦИПЛІНИ «АКТУАЛЬНІ НАПРЯМИ СУЧАСНОЇ ЛІНГВІСТИКИ»

Змістовий модуль 1. Сучасні лінгвістичні напрями.
Тема 1. Зіставно-типологічне мовознавство.
Тема 2. Етнолінгвістика та соціолінгвістика.
Тема 3. Комунікативна лінгвістика.
Тема 4. Функціональна лінгвістика.
Тема 5. Когнітивна лінгвістика.

Змістовий модуль 2. Сучасні лінгвістичні теорії.
Тема 6. Функціональні теорії мови.
Тема 7. Когнітивні теорії мови.

3. ТЕМИ ПРАКТИЧНИХ ЗАНЯТЬ

№ з/п	Назва теми	Кількість годин
1.	Зіставне мовознавство. Лінгвістична типологія. Лінгвістичні універсалії. Ареальна лінгвістика.	2
2.	Етнолінгвістика. Соціолінгвістика. Лінгвокультурологія. Міжкультурна комунікація.	2
3.	Комунікативна лінгвістика. Лінгвопрагматика. Теорія мовленнєвих актів. Дискурсивний аналіз.	2
4	Функціоналізм. Напрями в межах функціоналізму. Функціоналізм і пояснення. Поняття *функція*. Функціональна лінгвістика.	2
5.	Когнітивна лінгвістика. Основні поняття когнітивної лінгвістики. Лінгвоконцептологія. Психолінгвістика.	2
6.	Функціональний синтаксис А. Мартіне. Функціональна граматика М. Галлідея. Функціональна граматика С. Діка. Лексико-функціональний синтаксис Дж. Бреснан. Функціоналізм Т. Гівона. Теорія функціональної граматики О.В. Бондарка. Теорія «Смисл ↔ Текст» І.О. Мельчука. Теорія референційно-рольової граматики Р. Ван Валіна. Теорія функціонального синтаксису А. Мустайокі.	2
7.	Теорія концептуальної метафори Дж. Лакоффа, М. Джонсона. Теорія когнітивної граматики Р. Ленекера. Теорія концептуальної інтеграції Ж. Фоконьє, М. Тернера. Теорія фреймів Ч. Філлмора. Граматика конструкцій А. Голдберг.	2
8.	Індивідуальне науково-дослідне завдання.	2
	Разом	16

4. ПРАКТИЧНІ ЗАНЯТТЯ

SEMINAR 1

CONTRASTIVE AND TYPOLOGICAL LINGUISTICS

Task I.

1.1. Comparative-Historical Linguistics.
1.2. Areal Linguistics.
1.3. Contrastive Linguistics.
1.4. Typological Linguistics.

Task II.

1. Watch Handke J. *Language Universals*. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9nLL9CVGGM4&list=PL853CF986474D4193&index=10 and be ready to discuss it.

2. Handke J. *Structural Typology*. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ka5oH7gHOlw&list=PL853CF986474D4193&index=7 and be ready to discuss it.

3. Read the article *Contrastive Linguistics: Theories and Methods* by *Volker Gast* and be ready to discuss it.

4. Prepare for Test 1.

References:

1. Алефиренко Н.Ф. Современные проблемы науки о языке. Москва: Флинта: Наука, 2005. С. 340–360.

2. Гак В.Г. О контрастивной лингвистике. *Новое в зарубежной лингвистике. Контрастивная лингвистика* Общ. ред. и вступ. ст. В. Г. Гака. Москва: Прогресс, 1989. Вып. XXV. С. 5–17.

3. Кочерган М.П. Основи зіставного мовознавства. Київ: Академія, 2006. С. 7–23; 40–75.

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5. Шарафутдинова Н.С. Лингвистическая типология и языковые ареалы. Ульяновск: УлГТУ, 2009. С. 5–17.

6. Finegan E. Language: Its Structure and Use. Boston: Thomson Learning, Inc., 2008. P. 214–246.

7. Ping Ke. Contrastive Linguistics. Peking: Peking University Press and Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd., 2019. 210 p.

8. The Linguistics Encyclopedia. K. Malkmjær (ed.). London & New York: Routledge, 2002. P. 319–331.

SEMINAR 2

ETHNOLINGUISTICS AND SOCIOLINGUISTICS

Task I.

2.1. Ethnolinguistics
2.2. Linguistic Anthropology
2.3. Anthropological Linguistics
2.4. Cultural Linguistics
2.5. Sociolinguistics

Task II.

1. Watch *What is Ethnolinguistics?* Available at: https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=JgcCWQf08nA and be ready to discuss it.

2. Watch Hilpert M. *Sociolinguistics – the study of variation in language*. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eYIyMCoIA ZY; Rampton B. *Sociolinguistics*. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=42Q6-pQXkzU and be ready to discuss it.

3. Read the article *Cultural Linguistics and Linguistic Relativity* by *Farzad Sharifian* and be ready to discuss it.

4. Prepare for Test 2.

References:

1. Алефиренко Н.Ф. Современные проблемы науки о языке. Москва: Флинта: Наука, 2005. С. 239–276.

2. Герд А.С. Введение в этнолингвистику. СПб.: Изд-во С.-Петерб. ун-та, 2005. С. 3–16.

3. Кочерган М.П. Загальне мовознавство. Київ: Академія, 2003. С. 297–332.

4. Красных В.В. Этнопсихолингвистика и лингвокультурология. Москва: Гнозис, 2002. С. 9–27.

5. Маслова В.А. Лингвокультурология. Москва: Академия, 2001. С. 30–58.

6. Селіванова О.О. Актуальні напрями сучасної лінгвістики (аналітичний огляд). Київ: Фітосоціоцентр, 1999. С. 55–62.

7. Швейцер А.Д. Современная социолингвистика. Теория, проблемы, методы. Москва: Книжный дом «ЛИБРОКОМ», 2012. С. 57–87.

8. Cultural Linguistics and World Englishes. M. Sadeghpour, F. Sharafian (eds). Singapore: Springer, 2021. 399 p.

9. Finegan E. Language: Its Structure and Use. Boston: Thomson Learning, Inc., 2008. P. 346–390; 452–457.

10. Poluzhyn M.M. Lecture Notes on Historiography of Linguistics. Vinnytsia: Foliant, 2004. P. 183–194.

SEMINAR 3

COMMUNICATIVE LINGUISTICS

Task I.

3.1. Communicative Linguistics. General Outline.

3.2. Factors and Constraints of a Communicative Event.

3.3. Theory of Speech Acts.

3.4. Discourse Analysis.

Task II.

1. Watch *Hilpert M. Speech acts and conversational maxims.* Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SMaNGweLPyo and be ready to discuss it.

2. Watch *What is Discourse Analysis?* Available at: https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=EUeA0PEF_g4 and be ready to discuss it.

3. Read the article *Critical Discourse Analysis* by *Theo van Leeuwen* and be ready to discuss it.

4. Prepare for Test 3.

References:

1. Алефиренко Н.Ф. Современные проблемы науки о языке. Москва: Флинта: Наука, 2005. С. 200–230.

2. Бацевич Ф.С. Основи комунікативної лінгвістики. Київ: Академія, 2004. С. 7–25.

3. Кочерган М.П. Загальне мовознавство. Київ: Академія, 2003. С. 162–167.

4. Селіванова О.О. Актуальні напрями сучасної лінгвістики (аналітичний огляд). Київ: Фітосоціоцентр, 1999. С. 126–142.

5. Finegan E. Language: Its Structure and Use. Boston: Thomson Learning, Inc., 2008. P. 281–311.

6. Poluzhyn M.M. Lecture Notes on Historiography of Linguistics. Vinnytsia: Foliant, 2004. P. 144–153; 173–182.

SEMINAR 4

FUNCTIONAL LINGUISTICS

Task I.

4.1. Functional Linguistics. General Outline.

4.2. The Basic Tenets of Functionalism.

4.3. The Notion of Function.

Task II.

1. Watch Struck P. *Functionalism*. Available at: https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=1tOZK1v0WmE and be ready to discuss it.

2. Read the article *Functional Linguistics* by *Kirsten Malmkjær* and make a paragraph outline of its content.

3. Prepare for Test 4.

References:

1. Кочерган М.П. Загальне мовознавство. Київ: Академія, 2003. С. 158–160.

2. Селіванова О.О. Актуальні напрями сучасної лінгвістики (аналітичний огляд). Київ: Фітосоціоцентр, 1999. С. 88–106.

3. Halliday M.A.K. An Introduction to Functional Grammar. New York: Hodder Arnold, 2004. 689 p.

4. Nichols J. Functional Theories of Grammar. *Annual Review of Anthropology*. # 13. 1984. P. 97–103.

5. Poluzhyn M.M. Lecture Notes on Historiography of Linguistics. Vinnytsia: Foliant, 2004. P. 163–167.

SEMINAR 5

COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS

Task I.

5.1. Cognitive Linguistics: Historical Outline.

5.2. Three Main Approaches to Cognitive Linguistics.

5.3. Basic Concepts of Cognitive Linguistics.

5.4. Prototypicality and Idealized Cognitive Models.

Task II.

1. Watch Hilpert M. *A Course in Cognitive Linguistics: Introduction.* Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WeH3C39Dawg and be ready to discuss it.

2. Review Hilferty J. *Cognitive linguistics: an introductory sketch*. Available at: http://lingua.fil.es/~hilferty/coglx.pdf and be ready to discuss it.

3. Read the article *Cognitive Linguistics* by *Leonard Talmy* and make a paragraph outline of its content.

4. Prepare for Test 5.

References:

1. Алефиренко Н.Ф. Современные проблемы науки о языке. Москва: Флинта: Наука, 2005. С. 174–200.

2. Кочерган М.П. Загальне мовознавство. Київ: Академія, 2003. С. 146–158.

3. Селіванова О.О. Актуальні напрями сучасної лінгвістики (аналітичний огляд). Київ: Фітосоціоцентр, 1999. С. 65–88.

4. Evans V., Green M. Cognitive Linguistics. New York: Routledge, 2018. 830 p.

5. Poluzhyn M.M. Lecture Notes on Historiography of Linguistics. Vinnytsia: Foliant, 2004. P. 195–204.

SEMINAR 6

FUNCTIONAL LINGUISTICS THEORIES

Task I.

6.1. Functionalism of the Prague School.
6.2. André Martinet's Functional Syntax.
6.3. Simon Dik's Functional Grammar.
6.4. Michael Halliday's Systemic Functional Grammar.
6.5. Role and Reference Grammar (R. Van Valin).
6.6. Theory of Functional Grammar (A.V. Bondarko).
6.7. Talmy Givón's Functional Grammar.
6.8. Theory of Lexical Functional Grammar.
6.9. Theory of Functional Syntax (A. Mustajoki).

Task II.

1. Watch *Role and Reference Grammar*. Available at: https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=8yTOaH0PzZY and be ready to discuss it.

2. Read the article *From meaning to form: An alternative model of functional syntax* by *Arto Mustajoki* and be ready to discuss it.

3. Prepare for Test 6.

References:

1. Современная американская лингвистика: Фундаментальные направления / Под ред. А.А. Кибрика, И.М. Кобозевой и И.А. Секериной. Москва: Едиториал УРСС, 2002. С. 340–389.

2. Austin P.K. Lexical functional grammar. *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*. 2001. P. 8748–8754.

3. Bresnan J. Lexical-functional syntax. Oxford: Blackwell Publ., 2001. 446 p.

4. Dalrymple M. Lexical functional grammar. New York: Academic Press, 2001. 486 p.

5. Falk Y.N. Lexical-functional grammar: An introduction to parallel constraint-based syntax. Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Information, 2001. 237 p.

6. Mustajoki A. From meaning to form: An alternative model of functional syntax. *Russian Language Journal*. Vol. 57. 2007. P. 3–28.

7. Nichols J. Functional Theories of Grammar. *Annual Review of Anthropology*. # 13. 1984. P. 104–115.

8. Van Valin R., Jr. A concise introduction to Role and Reference Grammar. *FLUMINENSIA*. 2000. Br. 1-2. P. 47-78.

SEMINAR 7

COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS THEORIES

Task I.

7.1. Cognitive Grammar Theory (R. Langacker).

7.2. Conceptual Metaphor Theory (G. Lakoff & M. Johnson).

7.3. Conceptual Integration Theory (G. Fauconnier & M. Turner).

Task II.

1. Watch *Hilpert M. A Course in Cognitive Linguistics: Metaphor*. Available at: https://www.youtube.com /watch?v=R0BYLpwSM6E and be ready to discuss it.

2. Watch *Hilpert M. A Course in Cognitive Linguistics: Cognitive Grammar*. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= dDfX3971Z_A and be ready to discuss it.

3. Watch *Hilpert M. A Course in Cognitive Linguistics: Conceptual Integration*. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ae8n0248rm E and be ready to discuss it.

4. Read the article *Metaphor and Conceptual Blending* by *S. Coulson* and be ready to discuss it.

5. Prepare for Test 7.

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5. ІНДИВІДУАЛЬНІ ЗАВДАННЯ

Індивідуальне науково-дослідне завдання виконується у формі доповіді. Доповідь – робота, в якій висвітлюється тема завдання, даються висновки, пропозиції. Представлення доповіді передбачає усне (публічне) виголошення та обговорення. Мова виголошення – англійська. Обсяг доповіді – 10-12 сторінок.

Структура тексту доповіді

Зміст – структурування тексту.

Вступ – зазначаються підстави, причини, проблемна ситуація, що зумовили необхідність написання доповіді.

Основна частина – аналізується сучасний стан проблеми, наводяться аргументи, обґрунтовується основна ідея.

Підсумкова частина – містить висновки, рекомендації, пропозиції.

Список використаної літератури – публікації переважно останніх 5-10 років.

Вимоги до оформлення доповіді

Титульний лист містить таку інформацію: назва закладу вищої освіти, назва кафедри, назва теми доповіді; прізвище, ім'я, по батькові здобувача вищої освіти, курс, група; назва спеціальності, спеціалізації; місто, рік.

Аркуш формату А4, надрукованих через 1,5 інтервалу, шрифт Times New Roman 14, абзац – 1,25 см.

Поля сторінок: верхнє – 20 мм, нижнє – 20 мм, праве – 20 мм, ліве – 20 мм.

Рівняння тексту – по ширині сторінки, без переносів.

Заголовки структурних частин: ЗМІСТ, ВСТУП, ОСНОВНА ЧАСТИНА, ПІДСУМКОВА ЧАСТИНА, СПИСОК ВИКОРИСТАНОЇ ЛІТЕРАТУРИ друкують великими літерами симетрично до тексту.

Рукопис повен бути послідовно пронумерований (номер сторінки – внизу, по центру).

Оцінка індивідуальних завдань

Індивідуальне науково-дослідне завдання оцінюється в 25 балів: 15 балів – оформлення доповіді, 10 балів – презентація та захист доповіді.

Теми індивідуальних завдань

1. Універсологія. Проблема універсалій у мовознавстві.
2. Контрастивні дослідження: сучасні тенденції та перспективи.
3. Сучасна мова і культура: проблеми взаємодії.
4. Буття людини в сучасній культурі і мові.
5. Стереотип у контексті сучасних лінгвістичних досліджень.
6. Національно-культурна специфіка побудови дискурсу.
7. Коди культури в контексті етнопсихолінгвістики та лінгвокультурології.
8. Проблема мови і влади. Політична лінгвістика.
9. Проблема соціальної диференціації мови.
10. Сучасна мовна політика і мовне будівництво.
11. Теорія функціонального синтаксису в аспекті генеративізму.
12. Проблеми моделювання комунікації.
13. Засвоєння мови: проблеми і перспективи.
14. Проблема концепту в сучасній лінгвістиці.
15. Проблема структур репрезентації знань. Когнітивне моделювання.
16. Когнітивна лінгвістика та лінгвоконцептологія в Україні.
17. Проблеми когнітивної поетики.
18. Тенденції та перспективи розвитку теорії мовленнєвих актів.
19. Сучасні теорії референції.
20. Проблеми сучасної інтерлінгвістики.
21. Прикладні напрями сучасної комп'ютерної лінгвістики.
22. Корпусна лінгвістика: тенденції та перспективи.
23. Сучасна судова (кримінальна) лінгвістика.

6. СХЕМА НАРАХУВАННЯ БАЛІВ

<table>
<tr><td colspan="8">Поточне тестування та самостійна робота</td><td>Сума</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="5">Змістовий модуль 1</td><td colspan="2">Змістовий модуль 2</td><td>ІНДЗ</td><td rowspan="4">100</td></tr>
<tr><td>Т1</td><td>Т2</td><td>Т3</td><td>Т4</td><td>Т5</td><td>Т6</td><td>Т7</td><td rowspan="3">25</td></tr>
<tr><td>5</td><td>5</td><td>5</td><td>5</td><td>5</td><td>5</td><td>5</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="5">Модульний контроль – 20</td><td colspan="2">Модульний контроль – 20</td></tr>
</table>

№	Вид навчальної діяльності	Оціночні бали	Кількість балів
Т1	Робота на лекційних заняттях	5	5
Т2	Виконання завдань під час практичних занять	5	5
Т3	Виконання завдань самостійної роботи	5	5
Т4	Робота на лекційних заняттях	5	5
Т5	Виконання завдань під час практичних занять	5	5
Модульний контроль: Тест		20	20
Т6	Виконання завдань самостійної роботи	5	5
Т7	Виконання завдань самостійної роботи	5	5
Модульний контроль: Тест		20	20
ІНДЗ: Доповідь на тему		25	25
Разом		100	

7. ДОДАТКИ

СТАТТІ ДО ПРАКТИЧНИХ ЗАНЯТЬ

Practical class 1

Contrastive Linguistics: Theories and Methods
Volker Gast, 2009 | JENA (GERMANY)

The subject matter of contrastive linguistics

Narrowly defined, contrastive linguistics can be regarded as a branch of comparative linguistics that is concerned with pairs of languages which are 'socio-culturally linked'. Two languages can be said to be socio-culturally linked when (i) they are used by a considerable number of bi- or multilingual speakers, and/or (ii) a substantial amount of 'linguistic output' (text, oral discourse) is translated from one language into the other. According to this definition, contrastive linguistics deals with pairs of languages such as Spanish and Basque, but not with Latin and (the Australian language) Dyirbal, as there is no socio-cultural link between these languages. More broadly defined, the term 'contrastive linguistics' is also sometimes used for comparative studies of (small) groups (rather than just pairs) of languages, and does not require a socio-cultural link between the languages investigated. On this view, contrastive linguistics is a special case of linguistic typology and is distinguished from other types of typological approaches by a small sample size and a high degree of granularity. Accordingly, any pair or group of languages (even Latin and Dyirbal) can be subject to a contrastive analysis.

Historical remarks

The programme of contrastive linguistics was instigated by Charles Carpenter Fries from the University of Michigan in the 1940s. Fries (1945: 9) contended that «[t]he most effective materials [in foreign language teaching] are those that are based upon a scientific description of the language to be learned, carefully compared with a parallel description of the native language of the learner». Some years later, this project was put into practice by Fries' colleague Robert Lado (1957). The assumption that foreign language teaching can be improved by comparing the learner's native language with the language to be learned came to be known as the

«Contrastive Hypothesis». Its main assumptions can be summarized as follows (cf. König & Gast 2009: 1):

- First language acquisition and foreign language learning differ fundamentally, especially in those cases where the foreign language is learnt later than a mother tongue and on the basis of the full mastery of that mother tongue.
- Every language has its own specific structure. Similarities between the two languages will cause no difficulties ('positive transfer'), but differences will, due to 'negative transfer' (or 'interference'). The student's learning task can therefore roughly be defined as the sum of the differences between the two languages.
- A systematic comparison between mother tongue and foreign language to be learnt will reveal both similarities and contrasts.
- On the basis of such a comparison it will be possible to predict or even rank learning difficulties and to develop strategies (teaching materials, teaching techniques, etc.) for making foreign language teaching more efficient.

The contrastive hypothesis in the form summarized above soon turned out to be too optimistic. It was too undifferentiated in many respects and neglected important parameters of second language acquisition (e.g. natural vs. mediated, sequential vs. simultaneous, second vs. third language, etc.). Moreover, the contrastive programme lacked a solid foundation in learning psychology and was never even put on a reasonable empirical basis, insofar as the intention of producing comprehensive comparisons of language pairs was never convincingly realized. The enterprise of improving foreign language teaching on the basis of pairwise language comparison was therefore abandoned before long, even though a certain plausibility of at least some of the basic assumptions made by early contrastive linguistics can hardly be denied (cf. Kortmann 1998).

New impetus was given to pairwise language comparison in a number of publications from the 1970s and 1980s that did not primarily pursue didactic purposes (e.g. König 1971, Rohdenburg 1974, Plank 1984). These authors regarded contrastive linguistics as a «limiting case of typological comparison» (König 1996: 51) which was characterized by a small sample size and a high degree of granularity. This typologically oriented approach culminated in John Hawkins' (1986) monograph *A Comparative Typology of English and German – Unifying the Contrasts*. It was one of Hawkins' primary objectives to discover correlations between properties of specific grammatical subsystems (especially syntax and morphology), with the ultimate goal of 'unifying the contrasts'. Moreover, Hawkins aimed at providing explanations for the correlations he observed and related his contrastive analyses to theories of language processing (e.g. Hawkins 1992).

Even though Hawkins' hypotheses and generalizations met with criticism (e.g. Kortmann & Meyer 1992, Rohdenburg 1992), they provided important insights and helped establish contrastive linguistics as a type of language comparison that was interesting and worthwhile in itself, without pursuing any specific objectives related to second language acquisition or other linguistic applications.

The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a certain diversification in the field of contrastive linguistics insofar as new topics came into the focus of attention (e.g. pragmatics and discourse studies, cf. House & Blum-Kulka 1986, Oleksy 1989), and new empirical methods were introduced, especially corpus-based ones (cf. Section 4). The availability of specialized corpora (parallel corpora and learner corpora) also led to a renewal of the link between contrastive linguistics and linguistic applications, e.g. insofar as insights gained from (quantitative) contrastive analyses turned out to be useful for translation studies (see e.g. Johansson 1998a, Doherty 2001).

Most studies published under the label of 'contrastive linguistics' in the first decade of the third millennium follow the spirit of the characterization given in Section 1, i.e. they pursue a basically theoretical (rather than applied) interest but deal with pairs of languages that are 'socio-culturally linked'. In fact, the majority of articles published in the journal *Languages in Contrast*, which was launched by the John Benjamins Publishing Company in 1998, deals with European languages, especially Germanic and Romance ones. As far as the topics investigated are concerned, there is a preponderance of discourse-related studies, which may be due to the corpus-based methodology applied in most cases. Recently, structural aspects of contrastive comparison have been brought back into the focus of attention, e.g. by König & Gast (2009), who provide a comprehensive comparison of English and German grammar.

Ways of comparing languages

Establishing comparability

Just like linguistic typology, contrastive linguistics has to face the problem of «comparability of incommensurable systems» (Haspelmath 2010: 664). However, unlike linguistic typology, contrastive linguistics can tackle this problem in a data-driven way. As it deals with pairs (or groups) of languages that are socio-culturally linked, it can rely on a substantial amount of bilingual output (translations, parallel corpora). The 'hypothesis of inter-lingual comparability' is thus not a heuristic move but a fact of life reflected in the language of (ideally) balanced and fully proficient bilingual speakers. Note that 'comparability' does of course not mean 'equivalence': It is part of a contrastive analysis to determine the degree of equivalence

between (comparable) categories from different languages ('non-equivalence', 'partial equivalence', 'near equivalence'). Still, contrastive analysis, just like linguistic typology, has to rely on 'comparative concepts', i.e. «concepts created by comparative linguists for the specific purpose of cross-linguistic comparison. Comparative concepts are universally applicable, and they are defined on the basis of other universally applicable concepts: universal conceptual-semantic concepts, universal formal concepts, general formal concepts, and other comparative concepts» (Haspelmath 2010: 665). The exact way in which comparability is established depends on the type of phenomenon under comparison. We can distinguish broadly between three ways of carrying out contrastive analyses: (i) comparison based on form, (ii) comparison based on the mapping from form to function and (iii) comparison across functional domains.

Comparison based on form: Consonant inventories

A typical example of comparison based on form alone is provided by contrastive analyses in the domain of phonology. Let us consider the consonant inventories of English and German for illustration. A framework of comparison is provided by a classical structuralist analysis which is based on articulatory features of typical allophones instantiating the relevant phonemes ('place of articulation', 'manner of articulation' and 'voicing'). Both the English phoneme /l/$_E$ and the German one /l/$_G$ can thus be regarded as instantiating the comparative concept 'voiced alveolar lateral'. There are two basic types of relationships between such pairs of consonants: **near equivalence** and **non-equivalence**. The latter relationship is uninteresting in most cases – as the majority of pairs of consonants are obviously non-equivalent, say Engl. /p/$_E$ and Germ. /k/$_G$ – but there is a special case of non-equivalence that is highly relevant to contrastive studies, i.e. **partial equivalence**. In the case of near equivalence two phonemes have a similar distribution and, depending on the context, (more or less) identical phonetic realizations. This applies, for instance, to the alveolar nasals of English and German (/n/$_E$ and /n/$_G$). The relationship between these phonemes is one of near equivalence (rather than 'full equivalence') because phonemes (as well as linguistic categories in general) are defined only relative to linguistic systems. This means that phonemes from different linguistic systems can never be fully equivalent. A relationship of partial equivalence obtains when two phonemes are phonetically and distributionally similar but not (near) equivalent. For instance, the voiced alveolar lateral of English and its German counterpart have a similar distribution but (partially) different phonetic realizations, as Engl. /l/$_E$, unlike German /l/$_G$, is velarized in a

syllable-final position. If phonemes are regarded as sets of allophones, /l/$_E$ and /l/$_G$ can be said to overlap but not to be co-extensive. The difference between near equivalence and partial equivalence is a gradual one. Partial equivalence can be assumed when the inter-lingual identification of two categories leads to considerable deviations from the target system in one of the languages involved. For example, if the voiced alveolar lateral of English is identified with the one of German, the pronunciation will be non-target-like in specific contexts (e.g. *[fɪl] instead of [fɪɫ]). Such 'erroneous' inter-lingual identification of categories from different languages leads to interference. The relationship between the categories involved can be called **pseudo-equivalence**; it holds between a pair of categories as conceived by an (unbalanced) bilingual speaker.

Comparison based on form and function

Most parameters of comparison investigated in contrastive studies are not purely formal but concern the mapping between form and function. As is well known from typological studies, this mapping is typically (perhaps universally) many-to-many, i.e. each ontological category can be expressed using various linguistic categories, and each linguistic category covers a certain range of functions. Still, the mapping from function to form is not entirely arbitrary. Roughly speaking, the domains of meaning covered by a given linguistic category must be semantically similar. In the 'semantic map' approach developed in linguistic typology (e.g. Haspelmath 1997, van der Auwera & Plungian 1998), semantic similarity is represented as proximity in an *n*-dimensional space. Such cross-linguistic models of form-function mapping can also serve as comparative concepts in contrastive analyses.

Comparison across functional domains

In specific cases, a given comparative concept can be used to make generalizations across functional domains. A relevant example is provided by the two phenomena of relative clause formation and Wh-question formation in English and German (cf. Hawkins 1986). From a functional point of view, these operations must be kept apart (nominal modification vs. elicitation of a value in an open proposition). However, in English and German both operations can be described in terms of the same comparative concept, i.e. 'extraction'. They differ only in terms of the (external) distribution of the relevant clauses (nominal modifier vs. interrogative main clause). As Hawkins (1986) has shown, the operation of extraction is subject

to different restrictions in English and German: English allows extractions out of finite complement clauses and non- finite adverbial clauses, though not out of finite adverbial clauses. By contrast, German does not allow extractions out of finite or adverbial clauses at all (i.e. extractions are only possible out of non-finite complement clauses).

The use of corpora in contrastive linguistics

As has been pointed out, bilingual output plays an important role in contrastive linguistics in at least two respects: First, it provides a basis of comparison, or at least justifies the assumption of comparability; second, it constitutes the material on which contrastive generalizations are based. The existence of bilingual output is therefore regarded as a central feature of contrastive linguistics, not least because it distinguishes this discipline from other types of comparative studies, especially typological ones. Two major types of bilingual output can be distinguished: (i) data sets which instantiate each of the linguistic systems in ways that do not differ substantially from output produced by native speakers of the relevant languages ('balanced bilingual output'); and (ii) data sets which are characterized by deviance from relevant output produced by native speakers in one of the languages involved ('unbalanced bilingual output'). Balanced bilingual output is represented by (high quality) translations and parallel corpora based on such translations. Unbalanced bilingual output is represented by the non-target-like language of second language learners. Such data has also been collected in large samples of texts in the form of 'learner corpora'. Each type of resource can be used for different purposes. Parallel corpora are typically used for quantitatively oriented (often distributional) studies of specific linguistic features in discourse. The results obtained in such studies are often relevant to translation studies (cf. Doherty 2001). In recent years, parallel corpora have played a prominent role in contrastive linguistics based in Scandinavian countries (e.g. Aijmer et al. 1996, Johansson 1998b). It is also in this research context that extensive parallel corpora have been compiled, e.g. the English-Norwegian Parallel Corpus, which was assembled between 1994 and 1997 at the University of Oslo. This corpus contains (pairs of) texts that have been translated in both directions, i.e. there are English originals with Norwegian translations and vice versa. Such 'bidirectional' corpora allow for the investigation of rather subtle questions concerning the theory and practice of translation, e.g. 'hidden' interference phenomena and translation norms. While parallel corpora provide (balanced) bilingual output, learner corpora are 'bilingual' in a different way: they contain only data from one language, which is, however, produced by second language

learners and consequently exhibits features of the leaner's L1. One of the most comprehensive learner corpora available – the International Corpus of Learner English (ICLE) – has been compiled at the Université Catholique de Louvain under the coordination of S. Granger (cf. Granger 1998). It contains more than 3 million words produced by native speakers of more than twenty different languages. Even though the computerized analysis of interlanguage need not pursue a didactic purpose, it obviously lends itself to several pedagogical applications and has in fact become a central component of technology-enhanced learning in recent years.

Practical class 2

Cultural Linguistics and Linguistic Relativity
Farzad Sharifian, 2017 | MELBOURNE (AUSTRALIA)

1. Introduction

Linguistic relativity is commonly defined as 'the claim that the *words* your language gives you determine and *limit* what it is possible for you to think' (Leavitt, 2015, p. 19; see also Wolff and Holmes, 2011). This strong view of the relationship between language and thought has sparked a significant amount of theoretical debate and empirical research over the past 60 years. However, there is no consensus about whether or not the proponents of linguistic relativity, in particular Edward Sapir and Benjamin Whorf, held such a strong view regarding the influence of language on thought. Leavitt, for example, notes that none of the actual proponents of linguistic relativity made such claim; on the contrary, no language, they insisted, puts limits on what it is possible to conceptualize – while they continued to demonstrate a seductive power of established language patterns to offer easy-to-follow mental paths. (Leavitt, 2015, p. 19) Leavitt (2015, p. 25) admits, however, that '[b]oth Whorf and Sapir indulged in some language that sounds highly deterministic, and it is these passages that are the most frequently quoted.' In this article, I will examine these passages and attempt to shed some light on the kinds of claims that they give rise to. I will then outline what makes Cultural Linguistics distinct from linguistic relativity. This discussion will be more intelligible if the reader has a basic understanding of the nature of Culture Linguistics from the beginning. I will therefore begin by giving an overview of the development of Cultural Linguistics, and clarifying and exemplifying some of its basic tools.

2. Cultural Linguistics

Cultural Linguistics is a discipline with multidisciplinary origins that explores the relationship between language and cultural conceptualisations (Sharifian, 2011, 2014, 2015). In particular, Cultural Linguistics explores the features of human languages that encode culturally constructed conceptualisations of human experience. Cultural Linguistics offers both a theoretical framework and an analytical framework for investigating the cultural conceptualisations that underlie the use of human languages. Cultural Linguistics has drawn on several other disciplines and subdisciplines to develop its theoretical basis. In particular, the notion of

cultural cognition has afforded an integrated understanding of the concepts of 'cognition' and 'culture' as they relate to language (e.g., Sharifian, 2008, 2011). This notion offers a multidisciplinary understanding of cognition that moves beyond the level of the individual mind and its associated notions, such as 'mental representation' (e.g., Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Sutton, 2005, 2006; Wilson, 2005). Cultural cognition is a form of *enactive cognition* (Stewart et al., 2011) that is formed as a result of interactions between individuals across time and space (see also Cowley and Vallée-Tourangeau, 2013). Crucially, cultural cognition is not equally shared by speakers across a speech community, but is a form of (heterogeneously) *distributed cognition* (Hutchins, 1994). Speakers show variations and differences in their access to and internalisation of cultural cognition. Also, cultural cognition is dynamic in that it is constantly being negotiated and renegotiated across generations and through contact with other speech communities. This understanding of cultural cognition is entirely different from the essentialised notion of 'culture' that is often associated with linguistic relativity.

The study of cultural cognition has some parallels in several subfields of cognitive sciences. For example, scholars working in the area of complex science, often under the rubric of Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS), have been seeking to explain how relationships between parts, or agents, give rise to the collective behaviours of a system or group (e.g., Holland, 1995; Waldrop, 1992). Similarly, Cultural Linguistics explores cultural cognition as a complex adaptive system that emerges from the interactions between agents (members of a speech community) across time and space.

Cultural conceptualisations and their realisation in language are at the heart of cultural cognition. Language plays a dual role in relation to cultural cognition: on the one hand, linguistic interactions are crucial to the development of cultural cognition, as they provide a space for speakers to construct and co-construct meanings about their experiences. On the other hand, many aspects of language structure and language use draw on, and often reflect, cultural cognition. Thus, the study of language itself is of key significance to our understanding of cultural cognition.

As a central aspect of cultural cognition, language serves as a 'collective memory bank' (wa Thiong'o, 1986) of the cultural cognition of a speech community. Many aspects of language are shaped by the cultural cognition that has prevailed at different stages in the history of a speech community. In other words, these aspects can leave traces in subsequent linguistic practice. In this sense language can be viewed as a primary mechanism for 'storing' and communicating cultural cognition, acting both

as a memory bank and a fluid vehicle for the (re-)transmission of cultural cognition.

The process of constructing meaning during communicative interactions relies on many factors, such as the contextual resources available to the speakers. However, part of the process of meaning-making relies on the conceptualisations which, on a moment-by-moment basis, structure meaning for individual speakers, and which those speakers often assume to be shared. Linguistic interactions lead to, and in turn rely on, conceptual processes such as a) *schematisation*, or abstracting conceptual schemas from experience, b) *categorisation*, or assigning experiences of various kinds to our pre-established cognitive categories, and c) *conceptual mapping*, or mapping between different conceptual domains. Where the experien- tial basis for our linguistic interaction is cultural (rather than idiosyncratic and individual, or universal), *cultural schemas*, *cultural categories*, and *cultural mappings* (cultural metaphors) are formed. These may collectively be referred to as *cultural conceptualisations* (Sharifian, 2011). Many features of language index are entrenched in cultural conceptualisations. As such, notions such as cultural schema, cultural category, and cultural metaphor provide fruitful analytical tools for examining features of language that instantiate culturally constructed conceptualisations of experience. Thus, the recognition of cultural conceptualisations and their relationship to language in general together offer the analytical framework for Cultural Lin- guistics which, in turn, is based theoretically on the construct of cultural cognition.

Various features and levels of language, from morphosyntactic features to pragmatic and semantic meanings, may be embedded in cultural conceptualisations in the form of cultural schemas, cultural categories, and cultural metaphors.

2.1. Examples of cultural conceptualisations

In this section, to offer a better understanding of the analytical tools of Cultural Linguistics, I provide examples of cultural conceptualisations from research on Aboriginal English, a variety of English spoken by Aboriginal Australians. In this variety, everyday words such as ‘family’, ‘home’, and ‘sorry’ evoke cultural schemas and categories among Aboriginal English speakers that generally characterise Aboriginal cultural experiences. The cultural conceptualisations entrenched in these words stand in contrast to those that inform the same terms as they are used by Anglo-Australians (Malcolm and Sharifian, 2002; Sharifian, 2005). The word ‘family’, for instance, is associated with categories in Aboriginal English that move far

beyond what is described as the ‘nuclear’ family in Anglo-Australian culture. A person who comes into frequent contact with an Aboriginal person may be referred to using a kinship term such as ‘brother’ or ‘cousin’ or ‘cousin brother’ (Malcolm and Sharifian, 2007, p. 381). The word ‘mum’ may also be used to refer to people who are referred to as ‘aunt’ in Anglo-Australian culture. Such usage of kin terms does not stop at the level of categorisation but usually evokes schemas associated with certain rights and ob- ligations between those involved. The word ‘home’ in Aboriginal English evokes categories that are usually based far more on family relationships than the possession of or attitudes toward a particular building, which often characterise the con- ceptualisation of ‘home’ for an Anglo-Australian nuclear family. For instance, an Aboriginal English speaker may refer to their grandparents’ place as ‘home’.

Another example is the use of the word ‘sorry’ in Aboriginal English to mean ‘sorrowful’, ‘mourning’, and/or ‘empathy/ worry/care for other people’. But this word can also be used in Aboriginal English to refer to special mourning rituals performed only by Aboriginal people. When Aboriginal Australians nativised English, they needed a word to refer to these culture-specific rituals and adopted the English word ‘sorry’ for that purpose. Take the following example: sometimes Kardiya [i.e., non-Aboriginal] people, they feel sorry for Yapa [i.e., Aboriginal] people when they’re in Sorry and that means that they share their sorrows with us and that’s really good.

In this excerpt, the first use of the term ‘sorry’ means ‘sorrowful’ and suggests sharing the mourning, whereas the second usage refers to the rituals performed when a death has occurred. So the whole passage could be paraphrased as ‘sometimes non-Aboriginal people feel empathy for Aboriginal people and share their grief when they are mourning a death with their own special rituals.’ It should be noted that in writing some Aboriginal people capitalise the word ‘sorry’ in the latter context to mark its specific meaning. In this sense, the word is usually used within the construction ‘in Sorry’, which is not common in Australian English. In Australian English, on the other hand, the word ‘sorry’ can sometimes be used to express sympathy, but is predominantly used to express various forms of apology, which in some cases carry legal implications. In Aboriginal English the speech act of ‘apology’ may be enacted through non-linguistic means, such as silence. Since silence, according to Anglo- Australian cultural conceptualisations, is often used to indicate defiance, hostility, and refusal to accept responsibility or to express remorse, it is easy to see how misunderstandings might arise between members of the two speech communities when an ‘apology’ is enacted.

As an example of cultural metaphor, in Aboriginal English a speaker may state that 'This land is me'. This statement, which, particularly from an Anglo-Australian perspective, seems fanciful or rhetorical, in fact expresses the Aboriginal conceptualisations of ANCESTOR BEINGS ARE PART OF THE LAND and I AM PART OF ANCESTOR BEINGS, with the resulting conceptualisation of I AM PART OF THE LAND. According to the worldview of the Dreamtime, Ancestor Beings took the form of stones, trees, and the like after the Creation. Therefore, they are now considered to be part of the land, and since, according to the same worldview, an Aboriginal person is an extension of his/her Ancestor Beings, the land is conceptualised as embodying itself in the person. The following excerpt from an Aboriginal English speaker further elaborates on Aboriginal conceptualisations of the land: *You see my people see land ownership as being totally different to the English way of ownership because we, ours used to be really the land owns us and it still is that to us. You know the land ah, grows all of us up and it really does, no human is older than the land itself it just isn't and no living marsupial is as old as the land itself. Everything that's been and gone with life in the flesh has died but the land is still here.*

As reflected above, the Aboriginal conceptualisation of the relationship between people and the land is that 'the land owns us' and 'the land grows us up'. The general underlying conceptualisation here is that of LAND AS PROGENITOR, whereas the dominant understanding from the perspective of Anglo-Australians is rather 'land is a possession that can be bought and sold'. Another closely related Aboriginal conceptualisation of the land is that of LAND AS A HUMAN BEING, which is reflected in the following excerpt from an Aboriginal Elder: *If you look at the land and you watch the land talk to you boy you know you won't starve, you won't go thirsty, you know it's there to show you. It's talking to you all the time, every time a blossom blooms, every time different colouration and that come on your plants and your trees and that you look at it and you start to understand it and you say 'now what's it doing that for', 'why is it goin' like that' and then you watch it next time it comes around and then and then the penny drops you know then 'oh so that's what that's happened' there with that see so it's things like this that people have got to start to understand about, um about our people and their lifestyle.*

In the above, one sees that the speaker characterises the land as being able to talk to people, care for them, and provide for them. The land does this, for example, by giving people clues through natural events, such as the blooming of blossoms and colour changes in plants. This characterisation of the land is consistent with the conceptualisation of LAND AS CLOSE KIN,

in particular as a mother or father. While all these notions reflect a different worldview, and as such are foreign to Anglo- Australian English, none is unintelligible to the respectful listener. If Anglo-Australians have the opportunity to have these meanings explained to them, they may well change their understanding of what is being communicated when they engage with Aboriginal interlocutors. This is one example of how cultural meanings can be negotiated across speech communities. Against this sketch of the scope of Cultural Linguistics, the following section begins by presenting an account of linguistic relativity in which several quotes from its pioneers will be examined. It then elaborates on the points that distinguish Cultural Linguistics from linguistic relativity.

3. Linguistic relativity

The foundation for what would come to be known as 'linguistic relativity' was set by Franz Uri Boas, and later elaborated upon by his students Sapir and Whorf (see Leavitt, 2015). Discussions of linguistic relativity and in particular the views of Boas, Sapir, and Whorf are often discussed in reference to particular publications, as different writings of these scholars appear to reflect slightly different viewpoints in relation to the exact nature of the relationship between language and culture. In the following sections, I will closely examine the ideas and writings of these scholars that have most frequently been cited as providing the cornerstones of linguistic relativity.

3.1. *Franz Boas*

Boas' interest in linguistics was in line with the Humboldtian tradition, as he was interested in discovering how languages of the world reflect and encode their speakers' distinctive views of the world. For Boas, different languages categorise experience differently, and the words of human languages reflect cultural interests. He theorised that grammatical categories, on the other hand, tend to bring certain aspects of human experiences to their speakers' attention, a thesis that is now known as 'thinking for speaking' (Slobin, 1996). This view does not suggest human thought is limited by the language of the thinker, rather that it is simply a matter of attention and *attending to*. That is, Boas understands grammatical categories as a means of directing attention in principled ways. As Leavitt (2015, p. 25) puts it, Boas' view 'in no way limits or restricts or determines what can be thought'. In fact, while Boas stressed the value of having access to the knowledge of languages in conducting ethnology and ethnography, he

argued that '[i]t does not seem likely . that there is any direct link between the culture of a tribe and the language they speak, except in so far as the form of the language will be moulded by the state of culture, but not in so far as a certain state of culture is conditioned by morphological traits of the language' (1995, p. 23). This statement by Boas suggests the view that culture can shape the form of language, if required, but morphological traits of a language cannot condition culture. That is, for Boas the direction of influence is one way: from culture to language and not the other way around.

3.2. *Edward Sapir*

Edward Sapir followed the tradition established by Boas and has become known as one of the most influential pioneers of anthropological linguistics in North America. Like Boas, Sapir strongly believed in using language-internal tools for the description of grammatical categories of languages, and was wary about imposing Western grammatical categories (Leavitt, 2015). Sapir's view regarding the relationship between language, culture, and environment is best reflected in the following excerpt from his article *Language and Environment*: *It is the vocabulary of a language that most clearly reflects the physical and social environment of its speakers. The complete vocabulary of a language may indeed be looked upon as a complex inventory of all the ideas, interests, and occupations that take up the attention of the community, and were such a complete thesaurus of the language of a tribe at our disposal, we might to a large extent infer the character of the physical environment and the characteristics of the culture of the people making use of it* (Sapir, 1912, p. 228).

Here Sapir views the lexicon as reflecting the physical, social, and cultural traits of the speakers, a point which is underlined by his use of the metaphors of an 'inventory' and a 'thesaurus' in reference to language. However, in his article *Language*, published in 1933, Sapir maintains that there can be no exact correlation between cultural traits and linguistic structure because they change at difference paces chronologically. He notes: *It is only very rarely, as a matter of fact, that it can be pointed out how a cultural trait has had some influence on the fundamental structure of a language. To a certain extent this lack of correspondence may be due to the fact that lin- guistic changes do not proceed at the same rate as most cultural changes, which are on the whole far more rapid* (Sapir, 1933/1995, p. 59).

On the other hand, Sapir observes that the lexicon *does* reflect the culture of speakers, which is consistent with the view he discusses in

Language and Environment (Sapir, 1912). He notes: 'Vocabulary is a very sensitive index of the culture of a people and changes to the meaning, loss of old words, the creation and borrowing of new ones are all dependent on the history of culture itself' (Sapir, 1933/1995, p. 59).

Sapir's often publicised view regarding the relationship between language and thought, known as 'linguistic determinism', is based on the following excerpt from an article published in 1929.

Language is a guide to 'social reality'. Though language is not ordinarily thought of as of essential interest to the students of social science, it powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes. Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the 'real world' is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group. We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation (Sapir, 1929, pp. 209–210).

This excerpt has been widely interpreted to suggest that the structure of language influences, or even determines, how speakers perceive and conceptualise the world. The relevant questions at this point would be a) what is the scope of this influence, that is, which features of language take part in this direction of influence, and on which aspects of thinking/thought is the influence exerted, and b) is this influence marginal, that is, do features of language simply draw the attention of speakers to certain aspects of experience, or does language structure directly determine the structure of our thinking? The opening of such a field of study is exactly what Sapir's (1929) article achieved. Over the years it has generated a panoply of questions and hypotheses posed by scholars from different schools of thought and a broad spectrum of disciplines. As a result, much research has been oriented toward exploring, defending, or refuting what are known as the 'weak' to 'strong' versions of the linguistic determinism hypothesis (see Wolff and Holmes, 2011). Indeed, the range of hypotheses generated according to different versions of linguistic determinism have produced a myriad of empirical studies in various disciplines, including cognitive psychology. Some of these studies have found evidence to reject the hypothesis while others have supported some form of the hypothesis. The differences in the results of empirical research on linguistic relativity can

partly be accounted for by researchers' different interpretations of the notions of 'language' and 'thought'.

It is important to note here that Sapir did not write his article primarily to outline his view of the relationship between language and thought. His main intention was to express his views on a major debate taking place at the time, namely, whether linguistics could be considered a science. Hence, the title he chose for his article was *The Status of Linguistics as a Science* rather than *On Language and Thought*. Sapir emphasised the connection between linguistics and other scientific disciplines and argued that linguists inevitably share some of their interests with scholars in various other disciplines. This is reflected in the following excerpt from the same article:

It is the main purpose of this paper, however, not to insist on what linguistics has already accomplished, but rather to point out some of the connections between linguistics and other scientific disciplines, and above all to raise the question in what sense linguistics can be called a 'science'. It is difficult for a modern linguist to confine himself to his traditional subject matter. Unless he is somewhat unimaginative, he cannot but share in some or all of the mutual interests which tie up linguistics with anthropology and culture history, with sociology, with psychology, with phi- losophy, and, more remotely, with physics and physiology (Sapir, 1929, p. 209).

Cultural Linguistics is at the forefront of this trend to forge connections between linguistics and scientific disciplines. However, this approach was still undeveloped in 1929, making Sapir's approach extremely forward thinking. Regardless of the credibility attributed to the thesis of linguistic determinism, Sapir deserves a great deal of credit for putting forward such an insightful vision of language and thought at such an early stage in the history of linguistics.

3.3. *Benjamin Lee Whorf*

Whorf, Sapir's student, appears to subscribe to the thesis of linguistic determinism, which is reflected in the use of part of the Sapir excerpt above in his own article, *The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behaviour to Language.* In this article, Whorf makes an attempt to 'discover' what he calls the 'habitual thought' or 'thought world' of the Hopi people, as encoded in the Hopi language. The thesis of linguistic determinism in this article is reflected in Whorf's use of the expression 'our linguistically determined thought world' (Whorf, 1941/1956, p. 154). In another article entitled *Science and Linguistics*, Whorf makes his linguistic deterministic position clearer, as follows:

We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our mindsdand this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds. We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this waydan agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns of our language. The agreement is, of course, an implicit and unstated one, BUT ITS TERMS ARE ABSOLUTELY OBLIGATORY; we cannot talk at all except by subscribing to the organization and classification of data which the agreement decrees (Whorf, 1940, pp. 213–14; his emphasis).

This excerpt suggests that language presents to us pre-established categories and that we organise our experience in our minds using those categories. It is important to note that 'organisation' and 'categorisation' of experience are not necessarily the same as 'perception'. Also note that Whorf argues that 'we cannot talk ..', which is not the same as 'we cannot think', although he refers to 'the linguistic systems in our mind'. Thus, this excerpt still leaves what is meant by 'absolutely obligatory' open to discussion. Cognitive perception, categorisation, organisation, and verbal production are not exactly the same thing. My aim here is not to defend Whorf's view but to indicate how different researchers attempting to investigate linguistic relativity empirically could come up with totally different hypotheses depending on the exact signification that is attached to the terms used in excerpts such as the one above. In another article entitled *An American Indian Model of the Universe*, Whorf explores the relationship between language and conceptualisations, which is not dissimilar to the fundamental view sub- scribed to by many linguists today (see Palmer, 1996). That is, he assumes languages reflect systems of conceptualisations of experience, which may be entrenched in their worldview. However, Whorf uses a different set of terms, such as 'configuration' for 'conceptualisation' and 'metaphysics' for 'worldview'. Whorf observes that the Hopi language does not rely on conceptualisations of time and space, as, for example, English does (See Brown, 2015; Sinha and Bernárdez, 2015). Although English conceptualises time in many different ways, the conceptual mapping TIME IS MONEY, reflected in expressions such as 'saving time' and 'spending time', is a product of conditions of work in which constant application of effort increased effi- ciency. This view was entirely absent from the Hopi that Whorf studied. Whorf simply observes that the Hopi language does not rely on the abstract notions of time and

space and their associated conceptualisations. He notes: *Just as it is possible to have any number of geometries other than the Euclidean which give an equally perfect account of space configurations, so it is possible to have descriptions of the universe, all equally valid, that do not contain our familiar contrasts of time and space* (Whorf, 1950, p. 67).

Whorf acknowledges that this lack of reliance on space and time is not a cognitive constraint imposed by the Hopi lan- guage on their speakers, as the language accommodates alternative conceptualisations (which he calls 'concepts and ab- stractions'). He notes: *At the same time new concepts and abstractions flow into the picture, taking up the task of describing the universe without reference to such time or space – abstractions for which our language lacks adequate terms* (Whorf, 1950, p. 68)

In general, it appears that Whorf's account of the Hopi language as it is presented in the above-mentioned article was simply an attempt to show that different languages may rely on different conceptual systems, and that these con- ceptualisations *may* be (but will not always be) consistent with *an* underlying worldview associated with the language. Whether or not this worldview is a carry-over from an earlier time or is the worldview held by the current speakers of the language is another issue and one which is just as important as identifying and analysing the features of the language, a topic that I return to later in this article. Whorf observes that conceptualisations that are encoded in language *reflect* the model that a particular *worldview* imposes upon *the universe*. This does not necessarily suggest that it is the *language* that imposes this frame of thinking onto *the speaker*. In this article Whorf does not once refer to a 'speaker', but rather elaborates on the features of the Hopi language and discusses them in relation to the Hopi worldview (which he calls their 'metaphysics').

Throughout this article Whorf presents examples from the Hopi language to argue that a deep understanding of certain features of the Hopi language requires an understanding of the worldview associated with the language. In presenting one example, he notes that '[w]ithout knowing the underlying Hopian metaphysics it would be impossible to understand how the same suffix may denote starting or stopping' (Whorf, 1950, p. 71). The view that a complete examination of the internal mechanism of certain features of some languages requires an understanding of the culture and the worldview underlying the language (past, present, or both) is a position that is now broadly accepted by many anthropological linguists.

Let us consider an example of the morphosyntax of a language encoding certain aspects of a speech community's cultural conceptualisations and worldview. Murrinh-Patha, an Australian Aboriginal language, uses ten noun classes, which are reflective of the Murrinh-Patha

cultural classification (Street, 1987; Walsh, 1993). These classes are identified through noun-class markers appearing before the noun. The following list includes the class markers and the definition of each category (Walsh, 1993, p. 110):

1. *kardu*: Aboriginal people and human spirits
2. *ku*: non-Aboriginal people and all other animates and their products
3. *kura*: potable fluid (e.g., fresh water) and collective terms for fresh water (e.g., 'rain', 'river')
4. *mi*: flowers and fruits of plants and any vegetable foods; also faeces
5. *thamul*: spears
6. *thu*: offensive weapons (defensive weapons belong to *nanthi*), thunder and lightning, playing cards
7. *thungku*: fire and things associated with fire
8. *da*: place and season (e.g., dry grass time)
9. *murrinh*: speech and language and associated concepts such as song and news
10. *nanthi*: a residual category including whatever does not fit into the other nine categories.

The above categorisation is not inflexible and allows for multiple memberships. That is, depending on the function of an entity at the time, it may be categorised into one or another class. For instance, a boomerang may be categorised as *nanthi* when it is used as a back-scratcher and *thu* when it is used as an offensive weapon (Walsh, 1993). Also, in the Aboriginal worldview associated with this language (the Dreamtime Creation stories), when the Ancestor beings turn into animals in their journey of creating nature, this transformation is signalled by a switch from one noun class to another. This system of noun classification is entrenched in the Murrinh-Patha worldview. However, a very important question is whether or not this worldview is current in the minds of the speakers of the language, or whether it is an ancient worldview 'frozen' in the features of the language, with no parallel conscious awareness in the minds of contemporary speakers of the conceptualisations once attached to these features, which may well be the case.

I now return to the main argument and by way of appraisal see two approaches at work. The first approach attempts to explore conceptualisations that are encoded in languages and then separately to examine the worldview of their speakers, past, present, or both, to see if there are parallels. The second approach is directed at extracting the worldview of speakers from the features of the language they speak. The

latter is very problematic. Languages may include features that reflect conceptualisations that do not have active referents in the minds of their contemporary speakers. From the perspective of Cultural Linguistics, in many cases certain features of languages serve as 'archives' for conceptualisations that may no longer be active in the current cultural cognition of a speech community.

4. Cultural Linguistics and linguistic relativity

One difficulty with the project of linguistic relativity is its monolithic and essentialised notion of 'culture'. It is this assumption that leads it to try to advance a theory clarifying the relationship between language, culture, and thought. When it comes to comparing Cultural Linguistics and linguistic relativity, Cultural Linguistics offers a theoretical framework and an analytical framework, rather than a claim to a 'theory', a 'theory complex' (Lee, 1996), or a 'hypothesis' regarding the rela- tionship between language and thought. As discussed earlier, Cultural Linguistics employs analytical tools such as 'cultural schema', 'cultural category', and 'cultural metaphor', while its theoretical framework elaborates on the notion of *cultural cognition*, which moves beyond 'between the ear' cognitive processing (see Frank, 2015) to explore a level of cognition that emerges from the interactions between the members of a speech community across time and space. As a theoretical framework, Cultural Linguistics also provides a broad explanation of the relationship between cultural cognition, language, and cultural conceptualisations. Unlike some discussions of linguistic relativity, Cultural Linguistics does not deal with the abstract notion of 'culture' but instead focuses on exploring *cultural conceptualisations.*

Indeed, one of the biggest challenges that linguistic relativity has faced is its terminological imprecision. As discussed earlier, in various accounts of linguistic relativity 'culture' is used in the sense of 'worldview', but so is the term 'metaphysics'. The word 'configuration' has also been used in the sense of 'conceptualisation'. Lucy (1997, p. 295) maintains that true accounts of linguistic relativity acknowledge 'a distinctive role for language structure in interpreting experience and influencing thought'. However, Lucy's use of the word 'interpreting' may itself be interpreted in various ways. For example, is it intended to capture the notion of the 'perception', the 'organisation', or the 'conceptualisation' of experience, or all three? Even the term 'language' has often been loosely defined in the accounts of linguistic relativists, which has made the position sus- ceptible to various readings. Cultural Linguistics subscribes to a view of language that comprises all levels, from syntax to semantic and pragmatic meaning, as

well as discourse structure, and seeks to examine how they may be associated with certain cultural conceptualisations.

The question of terminological imprecision has also had an impact on empirical studies carried out on linguistic relativity. Leavitt (2015) notes that during the 1950s and 1960s a number of psychologists took an interest in empirically examining what became known as the 'Sapir-Whorf hypothesis'. He observes that these scholars reduced 'language' to vocabulary, ignoring grammatical categories, and reduced 'thought' to cognitive processes such as memory and recognition, without addressing the construal of the world, or what Cultural Linguistics calls 'conceptualisations of experience'. Leavitt (2015, p. 26) then notes that '[n]ot surprisingly, the findings of most psychologists in this domain in the 1950s and 1960s were either ambiguous or clearly negative'.

Cultural Linguistics rejects the simplistic view that it is possible to extract the culture/worldview/thought patterns of a speech community by analysing the features of the language they speak, a view that some attribute to linguistic relativity. As mentioned earlier, from a Cultural Linguistics perspective, many features of languages present 'archives' of conceptualisations that may have been 'active' at some stage in the 'collective cultural cognition' of the relevant speech community. Their presence in the speech of their speakers is *not* necessarily evidence that they form an active part of the speakers' system of cultural conceptualisations. Cultural Linguistics does not readily generate testable hypotheses; rather, its analytical tools have the potential to be useful in interpreting the results of certain empirical studies. For example, one empirical study explored the schemas that Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal educators bring to the task of comprehending oral narratives produced by Aboriginal children (Sharifian et al., 2004, 2005). The findings of the study suggested that some non-Aboriginal teachers appeared to rely on their own individual and cultural schemas, which appeared to differ from those that were associated with the original stories as told by the Aboriginal children themselves. As a result, in their attempts to comprehend the texts, the non-Aboriginal teachers produced information that had not been present in the original narratives. On the other hand, recollections of Aboriginal participants revealed they were relying on Aboriginal cultural schemas, for example by elaborating on the cultural schemas reflected in the original narratives to assist the comprehension of the non-Aboriginal listener. Overall, the findings suggested that cultural schemas influence the interpretation of stories written by and for children and that there will be commonalities of interpretation between children from one cultural group that might make no sense to members of another.

4.1. *Linguistic relativity and distribution*

Perhaps the most significant point of discrepancy between Cultural Linguistics and linguistic relativity is how they view knowledge of language and culture, whether or not it is viewed as evenly distributed among the members of a speech com- munity. The versions of linguistic relativity discussed in this article appear to treat notions of language, culture, thought pat- terns, and worldview as if they are homogeneously shared by the members of a particular speech community. This is reflected, for example, in the use of the expression 'the culture of a people' (Sapir, 1933/1995, p. 59). In fact, it is this essentialist use of the term 'culture' that has made this term unpopular among many contemporary scholars. As Atkinson (2015, p. 424) puts it, '[i]n the very field which innovated the concept in fact – anthropology – culture has been "half-abandoned".'

Cultural Linguistics, on the other hand, avoids the 'culture' problem by drawing on conceptual tools from several disciplines, such as distributed cognition and complexity science, to offer more dynamic views of language and cultural cognition. Thus, Cultural Linguistics views cultural cognition, cultural conceptualisations, and language as *heterogeneously distributed* across the minds of the members of a speech community. Linguistic interactions between speakers from the same speech community often reveal differences in the degree to which speakers draw on a particular cultural schema. Such patterns of heterogeneously distributed cultural schemas often provide an explanatory mechanism, for example, for what is perceived as an impolite linguistic move by one interlocutor but not by the other (see Sharifian and Tayebi, in press).

Furthermore, such an account of language and cultural conceptualisations does not view speakers as being 'imprisoned' in the elements of their language and culture. While it is true that some speakers may never acknowledge alternative interpretations, others adjust to the dissonance of interactions that fail due to a mismatch of conceptualisations by enlarging their interpretative (and even behavioural) repertoire. As Frank (2015, p. 493) puts it, 'the paradigm emerging from research in Cultural Linguistics draws on a highly nuanced multidisciplinarily informed approach that allows for a greater appreciation of individual choices and the motivations behind these choices as they coalesce into and around "cultural conceptualizations".' In short, Cultural Linguistics treats language and cultural cognition as dynamic systems that interact with each other in complex ways.

5. Concluding remarks

In conclusion, what Cultural Linguistics and linguistic relativity seem to share is the ultimate aim of arriving at a better understanding of the relationship between language and cognition. While the forefathers of linguistic relativity may not have agreed, for many contemporary proponents of linguistic relativity, cognition can be equated with 'thinking'. For Cultural Linguistics, however, cognition means 'conceptualisation'.

Cultural Linguistics and linguistic relativity, however, serve two almost distinct purposes. Regardless of its different in- carnations, linguistic relativity has generated a number of hypotheses about the relationship between thought and language. Wolff and Holmes (2011) present the following diagram in which they have captured various classes and subclasses of hypotheses regarding how language may affect thought.

Wolff and Holmes (2011) review the empirical research on these hypotheses (see also Everett, 2013) and conclude that while we do not find support for the idea that language determines the basic categories of thought or that it overwrites pre-existing conceptual distinctions, we do find support for the proposal that language can make some distinctions difficult to avoid, as well as for the proposal that language can augment certain types of thinking. Further, we highlight recent evidence suggesting that language may induce a relatively schematic mode of thinking. Although the literature on linguistic relativity remains contentious, there is growing support for the view that language has a profound effect on thought (Wolff and Holmes, 2011, p. 253).

In this excerpt, the words 'thinking' and 'thought' have been used almost interchangeably. This suggests that scholars who engage in empirically examining the various hypotheses associated with linguistic relativity mostly focus on the effect of language on thinking, which captures many cognitive *processes*. On the other hand, Cultural Linguistics focuses on exploring the relationship between language and cultural conceptualisations, offering a theoretical as well as an analytical framework. For Cultural Linguistics, meaning is largely a matter of conceptualisation, and many conceptualisations are culturally constructed.

Practical class 3
Critical Discourse Analysis
Theo van Leeuwen, 2006 | CARDIFF (UK)

Critical discourse analysis is founded on the insight that text and talk play a key role in maintaining and legitimating inequality, injustice, and oppression in society. It employs discourse analysis to show how this is done, and it seeks to spread awareness of this aspect of language use in society, and to argue explicitly for change on the basis of its findings. Critical discourse analysis is not associated with a specific school of linguistics or discourse analysis. Many have followed Fairclough (1989) in drawing primarily on the systemic-functional linguistics of Halliday (1989). According to Halliday, the resources of language simultaneously fulfill three major functions: the ideational function of constructing representations of the world; the interpersonal function of constituting social interactions; and the textual function of creating cohesively structured texts and communicative events. This suits the purposes of critical discourse analysis, which engages both with the way language is used to construct and disseminate discourses – ideologically specific representations of some aspect of the world – and with the way language is used to enact hegemonic genres – specific ways of using language to achieve purposes of social domination. Fairclough (1993: 134; 2000: 14, see also van Leeuwen, 2005) added styles – uses of language to construct and enact social identities. But many critical discourse analysts use other methods, including, for instance, argumentation strategies (e.g. Wodak and Matouschek, 1993), narrative analysis (see e.g. Mumby, 1993), forms of conversation analysis that go beyond the constraints stipulated by proponents such as Schlegoff (1997) and link conversational data to their wider social context (e.g. Ehrlich, 1998), and more. While Fairclough and others (e.g. van Leeuwen, 1996) have adapted and elaborated systemic-functional linguistics for purposes of critical discourse analysis, van Dijk (e.g. 1993a) and others have demonstrated that a much wider range of methods can usefully be applied in critical discourse analysis, arguing for a multidisciplinary approach which «chooses and elaborates theories, methods and empirical work as a function of their relevance for the realization of socio-political goals» (1993a: 252). The methodological diversity of critical discourse analysis is well demonstrated in the pages of Discourse and Society, which has been the key journal for critical discourse analysis over the past 17 years. Critical discourse analysts engage not only with a range of discourse analytical paradigms, but also with critical social theory. In more recent work social theory may even dominate over discourse analysis. Fairclough in particular

has consistently explored ways of grounding critical discourse analysis in critical social theory (see Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1997). Strongly influenced by Marx and Gramsci, Fairclough's work also engages with Foucault, Bourdieu, Habermas, Harvey, and Giddens, to mention just a few names. But, again, there is no theoretical orthodoxy in critical discourse analysis. With regard to the key concept of ideology, for instance, van Dijk (1993a: 258; 1998), sees 'ideologies' as the 'worldviews' that constitute 'social cognition': «schematically organized complexes of representations and attitudes with regard to certain aspects of the social world, e.g. the schema (...) whites have about blacks, which may feature a category 'appearance'» while Fairclough has a more Marxist view of ideology in which ideologies are «constructions of practices from particular perspectives (...) which iron out the contradictions, dilemmas and antagonisms of practices in ways which accord with the interests and projects of domination» (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1997: 26). But this has not led to divisions within critical discourse analysis. What unites critical discourse analysis is neither methodology nor theoretical orthodoxy, but a common goal: the critique of the hegemonic discourses and genres that effect inequalities, injustices, and oppression in contemporary society. The issues critical discourse analysts have explored over the past 20 years have also varied widely. A great deal of work, particularly by Wodak (e.g. Wodak et al., 1990; Wodak and Matouschek, 1993) and van Dijk (e.g. 1991, 1993b) and their associates has focused on racism and antisemitism, and more recently also on immigration and asylum (e.g. Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999). The discourses of neoliberalism and their role in the neocapitalist policies and practices of governments, the business world, and other institutions have become another important focus (e.g. Fairclough, 1993, Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1997, Fairclough, 2000). But the pages of Discourse and Society and collections such as Toolan (2002) show that critical discourse analysts have addressed many other issues as well, including gender, education, doctor-patient communication, war and terrorism, and welfare and unemployment, to mention just a few. The data used by critical discourse analysts also vary. Although there has been a tendency to focus on speeches by politicians, parliamentary debates, and media reports and editorials, critical discourse analysts have also analyzed school textbooks, advertisements, the books of management gurus, transcripts of doctor-patient and workplace meeting interactions, and much more. And as a glance at the contents of Discourse and Society will demonstrate, this work has increasingly come from all corners of the world.

Critical Linguistics

The immediate forerunner of critical discourse analysis was critical linguistics, a movement that started at the University of East Anglia in the mid–1970s (Fowler et al., 1979; Hodge and Kress, 1993). Halliday's systemic-functional linguistics provided the fundamental insight that made it possible to move linguistic analysis beyond formal description and use it as basis for social critique (1989: 101): Grammar goes beyond formal rules of correctness. It is a means of representing patterns of experience (...) It enable human beings to build a mental picture of reality, to make sense of their experience of what goes on around them and inside them. Critical linguists added two further steps. The first was inspired by Marx. The «patterns of experience» Halliday refers to, they argued, are not necessarily neutral. They are patterned the way they are to suit the needs and interests of those who use them both to understand and to enact their reality, and if such interests include domination, they are ideological. The second was inspired by Whorf. If different languages can encode different «patterns of experience» (and different ideologies), they argued, so can different uses of one and the same language. In a study that has rightly become a classic, Tony Trew (1979: 106–107) described how, when the Harare police, in what was in 1975 still Rhodesia, fired into a crowd of unarmed people and shot thirteen of them The Rhodesia Herald wrote: «A political clash has led to death and injury» while the Tanzanian Daily News wrote, «Rhodesia's white suprematist police (...) opened fire and killed thirteen unarmed Africans». Analyzing texts of this kind, Trew demonstrated that political views are not only encoded through different vocabularies (of the well-known freedom fighter versus terrorist type) but also through different grammatical structures, here for instance through the coding of the same event as either a noun ('death') or a verb ('kill') that, for its grammatical completion, requires an active subject ('police') and an object ('Africans'), so that both the perpetrators and the victims must be referred to explicitly. Another key example of what critical linguists have called «ideological transformations» is passive agent deletion: if the Tanzanian version were to be passivized («Thirteen unarmed Africans were killed ... «) it would no longer be necessary to name the police as the agent of the killing. With work of this kind, critical linguists took the fundamental step of interpreting grammatical categories as potential traces of ideological mystification, and broke with a tradition in which different ways of saying the same thing were seen as mere stylistic variants, or as conventional and meaningless indicators of group membership categories such as class, professional role, and so on. Without their work, critical discourse analysis would not have been possible.

Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical discourse analysis started in the mid–1980s as a new direction in the work of Fairclough, van Dijk, Wodak, and others. As a movement it began in 1992, at a meeting in Amsterdam with presentations by van Dijk, Fairclough, Wodak, Kress, and van Leeuwen, which were later published as a special issue of Discourse and Society (4, 2,1993). The group gradually expanded and continued to meet annually from 1992 onward. Another early collection of influential papers was published a few years later (Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard, 1996). Since then critical discourse analysis, now usually referred to as CDA, has been a fast growing and increasingly interdisciplinary movement. A first large-scale international conference was held in 2004 in Valencia. Two new journals started in the same year, Critical Discourse Studies and the Journal of Language and Politics. Critical discourse analysis moved beyond critical linguistics in a number of ways. The first has already been mentioned: the attempt to ground critical discourse analysis in critical social theory and to articulate the relation between discourses and the social practices in which they are embedded. By the early 1990s, discourse had also become a key term in postmodern philosophy and cultural studies, and critical discourse analysis explicitly distanced itself from the dominant tendency in these fields to reduce the social to discourse, and discourse only. Concepts such as marketization (Fairclough, 1993) could incorporate both changing practices (the market practices that are now introduced in many institutions, including universities) and the changing discourses that played a key role in this process by proposing and legitimating changes, training people in new practices, requiring them to learn new ways of talking and writing, and so on. As universities had to learn to compete with each other for students, treat students as customers, and so on, their discourses were also marketized. Job advertisements, for instance, changed from traditional forms such as «Applications are invited for a lectureship in the Department of English Literature» to forms such as «The Department of Law is a thriving department committed to excellence in teaching and research» to accommodate the new emphasis on and entrepreneurial ethos and self-promotion. Fairclough stressed the interdiscursivity of such genres. The old continues alongside the new, certainly for as long as the new practices still cause tension and have not stabilized. Critical discourse analysis also moved beyond critical linguistics in adopting a much more fully interdisciplinary approach, studying not only texts and transcripts of talk, but also their contexts, whether by historical or ethnographic methods. Wodak's 'discourse-historical approach' set the example here, increasingly involving

collaborations between discourse analysts, on the one hand, and historians, political scientists, anthropologists, and sociologists on the other hand, as well as stimulating reflection on interdisciplinarity itself (e.g.Weiss andWodak, 2003). Critical discourse analysis has also moved beyond language, taking on board that discourses are often multimodally realized, not only through text and talk, but also through other modes of communication such as images. Kress and van Leeuwen (1996) developed methods of visual analysis that were strongly inspired by Halliday's systemic-functional linguistics and demonstrated how these methods could be used for purposes of critical discourse analysis. To mention an example, van Leeuwen (2000) shows how 'visual racism' is realized not just by the most obvious racist stereotypes, but also through subtler methods. The members of some social groups, for instance, are never personalized, never depicted as individuals with unique characteristics. They are represented en groupe, often in highly similar or identical poses. This can then create a 'they are all the same' or 'you can't tell them apart' effect. Again, the members of some social groups are consistently depicted in 'long shot', which, literally and figuratively, 'distances' them from the viewer. Overall, then, critical discourse analysis has moved towards more explicit dialogue between social theory and practice, richer contextualization, greater interdisciplinarity and greater attention to the multimodality of discourse.

Critiques

Critical discourse analysis is no longer of interest only to linguists. The work published in journals such as Critical Discourse Studies and the Journal of Language and Politics shows that social scientists from a range of different fields are actively engaging with critical discourse analysis. By contrast, CDA has received some strong-worded critiques from within linguistics. These have often been included in collections of CDA papers (e.g. Toolan, 2002) and in the prescribed reading lists of university courses in linguistics departments, thus encouraging a certain suspicion of critical discourse analysis, especially in contexts where linguistics is taught and practiced as a neutral scientific enterprise. In one of the most widely quoted critiques, Widdowson (1995, 1996) argues that it is the business of discourse analysis to describe formal patterns 'above the sentence' and that critical discourse analysts confuse discourse analysis with textual interpretation. In a similar vein Stubbs (1997) calls the analysed of critical discourse analysts 'textual commentaries.' Like Widdowson, Stubbs mainly targets Fairclough, conveniently ignoring the wide range of critical discourse work published over the years in Discourse and Society and elsewhere. The text analysed in

Fairclough (1989), which are often pedagogical examples to demonstrate methods of analysis in what is essentially a textbook, are, according to Stubbs, «fragmentary» and «insufficient» because they do not constitute a representative sample and do not involve the kind of large scale quantitative work in which many linguists are now engaged. Most of all, however, these critiques take offense at the explicit social and political goals of critical discourse analysis. Widdowson, for instance, argues that texts are differently interpreted by different readers and that critical discourse analysts unfairly privilege their own interpretations. From the point of view of critical discourse analysis (see e.g. Fairclough, 1996), traditional sociolinguistic and stylistic approaches to the study of language in social life may have succeeded in describing patterns of language use and patterns of language change, but they have not explained them. They have treated them as more or less meaningless conventions and autonomous evolutionary processes. Critical discourse analysts are seeking to explain why texts are the way they are, and why they change the way they do, and following Halliday, they look for the answers to these questions in the social, economical, and political world. Critical discourse analysts are aware that their own work, too, is driven by social, economical, and political motives, but they argue that this applies to all academic work. Social divisions of labor have traditionally ensured that scientists and other academics do not have to confront the conditions that make the continuation of their work possible and the place it has in the wider scheme of things. Critical discourse analysts at least make their position explicit and feel they do not need to apologize for the critical stance of their work; on the contrary, by contributing to debates on issues that are of crucial importance to society, they continue the tradition of reasoned debate that has been fundamental to democratic societies since antiquity, feeling that their work as scholars entails greater social responsibilities than providing facts for others to interpret and use.

Practical class 4

Functional Linguistics
Kirsten Malmkjær, 2002 | CAMBRIDGE (UK)

Functionalism in linguistics arises from the concerns of Vilém Mathesius (1882–1945), a teacher at the Caroline University in Prague, who in 1911 published an article, 'On the potentiality of the phenomena of language' (English translation in Vachek 1964), in which he calls for a non-historical approach to the study of language. Some of the linguists who shared his concerns, including the Russian, Roman Osipovich Jakobson (1896–1982), and who became known as the **Prague School Linguists**, met in Prague for regular discussions between 1926 and 1945, but the Prague School also included linguists not based in Czechoslovakia (Sampson 1980: 103), such as the Russian, Nikolaj Sergeyevich Trubetzkoy (1890–1938). More recently, functionalism has come to be associated with the British linguist Michael Alexander Kirkwood Halliday (b. 1925) and his followers.

It was the belief of the Prague School linguists that 'the phonological, grammatical and semantic structures of a language are determined by the functions they have to perform in the societies in which they operate' (Lyons 1981: 224), and the notions of **theme**, **rheme** and **functional sentence perspective**, which are still much in evidence in Halliday's work (see especially Halliday 1985/1994), originate in Mathesius's work (Sampson 1980: 104).

J.R. Firth (1890–1960), who became the first professor of Linguistics in England, took what was best in structuralism and functionalism and blended it with insights provided by the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942). Because both Firth and Malinowski were based in London, they and their followers, including Halliday and R.A. Hudson (b. 1939), are sometimes referred to as the **London School** (Sampson 1980: chapter 9).

Malinowski carried out extensive fieldwork in the Trobriand Islands and argues that language is not a self-contained system – the extreme structuralist view – but is *entirely* dependent on the society in which it is used (in itself also an extreme view). He maintains that language is thus dependent on its society in two senses:

1. A language evolves in response to the specific demands of the society in which it is used.

2. Its use is entirely context-dependent: 'utterance and situation are bound up inextricably with each other and the context of situation is indispensable for the understanding of the words' (Malinowski 1923).

He maintains (Sampson 1980: 225): that a European, suddenly plunged into a Trobriand community and given a wordby-word translation of the Trobrianders' utterances, would be no nearer understanding them than if the utterances remained untranslated – the utterances become comprehensible only in the context of the whole way of life of which they form part.

He distinguishes the immediate **context of utterance** from a general and generalizable **context of situation**, and argues that we must study meaning with reference to an analysis of the functions of language in any given culture. For example, in one Polynesian society Malinowski studied, he distinguished three major functions:

- The **pragmatic function** – language as a form of action
- The **magical function** – language as a means of control over the environment
- The **narrative function** – language as a storehouse filled with useful and necessary information preserving historical accounts

Malinowski is perhaps best known, however, for his notion of **phatic communion**. By this, he means speech, which serves the function of creating or maintaining 'bonds of sentiment' (Sampson 1980: 224) between speakers (Malinowski 1923: 315); English examples would include idle chat about the weather, and phrases like *How are you?*

In connection with the idea of context of situation and the idea of function as explanatory terms in linguistics, Firth points out that if the meaning of linguistic items is dependent on cultural context, we need to establish a set of categories, which link linguistic material with cultural context. Thus, the following categories are necessary in any description of linguistic events (1950/1957b: 182):

A. The relevant features of participants: persons, personalities.

(i) The verbal action of the participants.

(ii) The non-verbal action of the participants.

B. The relevant objects.

C. The effect of the verbal action.

According to Firth, the notion that 'meaning is function in context' needs formal definition so that it can be used as a principle throughout the theory; both the smallest and the largest items must be describable in these terms.

To achieve this formal definition, Firth uses a Saussurean notion of system, though his use of the term is more rigorous than Saussure's. Firth's **system** is an enumerated set of choices in a specific context. Any item will have two types of context: the context of other possible choices in the system, and the context in which the system itself occurs. The choices made in the systems will be functionally determined.

Halliday works within a highly explicit systemic theory which is clearly Firthian, but more fully elaborated, and the grammars written by scholars in the Hallidayan tradition are, therefore, often called **systemic grammars**. When accounting for how language is used, for the choices speakers make, however, Halliday prefers to talk of **functional grammar**; as he puts it (1970: 141): The nature of language is closely related to . . . the functions it has to serve. In the most concrete terms, these functions are specific to a culture: the use of language to organize fishing expeditions in the Trobriand Islands, described half a century ago by Malinowski, has no parallel in our own society. But underlying such specific instances of language use, are more general functions which are common to all cultures. We do not all go on fishing expeditions; however, we all use language as a means of organizing other people, and directing their behaviour.

This quotation both shows the influence from Malinowski and hints at how Halliday generalizes the notion of function in order that it may become more widely applicable as an explanatory term.

Halliday's theory of language is organized around two very basic and common-sense observations: that language is part of the social semiotic, and that people talk to each other. The theory of language is part of an overall theory of social interaction, and from such a perspective it is obvious that a language must be seen as more than a set of sentences, as it is for Chomsky. Rather, language will be seen as text, or **discourse** – the exchange of meanings in interpersonal contexts. The creativity of language is situated in this exchange. A Hallidayan grammar is therefore a grammar of meaningful choices rather than of formal rules.

By saying that language is part of the **social semiotic**, Halliday means that the whole of the culture is meaningful, is constructed out of a series of systems of signs. Language is one of these systems – a particularly important one, because most of the other systems are learned through, and translatable into, language, and because it *reflects* aspects of the situations in which it occurs.

As a social system, language is subject to two types of variation: variation according to *user*, and variation according to *use*. The first type of variation is in accent and dialect, and it does not, in principle, entail any variation in meaning. Different dialects, are, in principle, different ways of saying the same thing, and dialectal linguistic variation reflects the social order basically in terms of geography. Variation according to *use* (**register variation**), however, produces variation in meaning. A **register** is what you are speaking at a particular time, and is determined by what you and others – and which others – are doing there and then; that is, by the nature of the ongoing social activity. Register variation therefore reflects the social order

in the special sense of the variety of social processes. The notion of register is a notion required to relate the functions of language (see below) to those aspects of the situation in which it is being used that are the relevant aspects for us to include under the notion of **speech situation** or **context**. According to Halliday, the relevant aspects of the situation are what he calls, respectively, **field**, **tenor** and **mode**.

The **field of discourse** is *what is going on* – the social action, which has a meaning as such in the social system. Typically, it is a complex act in some ordered configuration, in which the text is playing some part. It includes 'subject matter' as one aspect of what is going on.

The **tenor of discourse** relates to *who is taking part* in the social action. It includes the role structure into which the participants in the discourse fit; that is, socially meaningful participant relationships, whether these are permanent attributes of the participants – mother–child – or whether they are role relationships that are specific to the situation – doctor–patient. Actual speech roles are also included, and these may be created through the exchange of verbal meanings: through the exchange itself, it will become clear, for instance, who, at any particular time, is **knower** and **nonknower** (Berry 1981) with regard to any particular subject matter of the discourse.

The **mode of discourse** deals with the role that the text or language itself is playing in the situation at hand. It refers to the particular status that is assigned to the text within the situation and to its symbolic organization. A text will have a function in relation to the social action and the role structure (plea, reprimand, informing); it will be transmitted through some channel (writing, speech); and it will have a particular rhetorical mode (formal, casual).

It is now possible to determine the general principles governing the way in which these semiotic aspects of the situation are reflected in texts. Each linguistically relevant situational component will tend to determine choices in one of the three semantic components that language comprises, by virtue of being the system through which we talk to each other.

Since it is the means whereby we talk to each other, language has two major functions. It is a means of *reflecting on things* – that is, it has an **ideational function** – and it is a means of *acting* on things. But, of course, the only 'things' it is possible to act on symbolically (and language is a symbolic system) are *people* (and some animals, perhaps), so the second function of language is called the **interpersonal function**.

Finally, language has the function, which enables the other two functions to operate; namely, that which represents the language user's text-forming potential. This is called the **textual function**, and 'it is through the

options in this component that the speaker is enabled to make what he says operational in context, as distinct from being merely citational, like lists of words in a dictionary, or sentences in a grammar book' (Halliday 1975: 17).

As indicated in the quotation just given, for each of the functions that language has for its users there is a correspondent component of the semantic system of language from which choices are made somewhat as follows:

The **field of discourse** – what is going on – will tend to determine choices in the **ideational component** of the language, among classes of things, qualities, quantities, times, places and in the transitivity system.

The **tenor of discourse** – who is taking part – will tend to determine choices in the **interpersonal systems** of mood, modality, person and key; and in intensity, evaluation and comment.

The **mode of discourse** – the part the text is playing – will tend to determine choices in the **textual component** of language, in the system of voice, among cohesive patterns, information structures and in choice of theme. The concept of genre, too, is an aspect of what Halliday sees as mode. But exactly *what* choices are made is subject to variation according to two further factors. Reference to these factors – register and code – must be made in the explanation of the relationship between language and situation.

Register means that concept of text variety, which allows us to make sensible predictions about the kind of language, which will occur in a given situation – that is, in association with a particular field, tenor and mode. Register is (Halliday 1978: 111) 'the configuration of semantic resources that the member of a culture typically associates with a situation type'. However, members of different (sub)cultures will differ as to which text type they tend to associate with which situation type, and differences of this supralinguistic, sociosemiotic type are explained in terms of Bernstein's (1971) notion of the **code**, which acts as a filter through which the culture is transmitted to a child.

It is important to remember that the interpersonal, ideational and textual functions mentioned here are the **macrofunctions** of the semantic system of language; they are the functions that Halliday thinks of as universal. In addition, of course, language serves a number of **microfunctions** for its users, such as asking for things, making commands, etc., but the proper heading under which to consider these is that of speech-act theory.

Practical class 5

Cognitive Linguistics
Leonard Talmy, 2006 | BUFFALO (USA)

Developing over the past two to three decades, cognitive linguistics has as its central concern the representation of conceptual structure in language. This relatively new field can initially be characterized through a contrast of its conceptual approach with two other familiar approaches, the formal and the psychological. The formal approach focuses on the overt structural patterns exhibited by linguistic forms, largely abstracted away from any associated meaning. The tradition of generative grammar has been centered here, but has had limited involvement with the other two approaches. Its formal semantics has largely included only enough about meaning to correlate with its formal categories and operations. And its reach to psychology has largely considered only the kinds of cognitive structure and processing needed to account for its formal categories and operations. The psychological approach regards language from the perspective of general cognitive systems such as perception, memory, attention, and reasoning. Centered here, the field of psychology has also addressed the other two approaches. Its conceptual concerns have included semantic memory, the associativity of concepts, the structure of categories, inference generation, and contextual knowledge. But it has insufficiently considered systematic conceptual structuring.

By contrast, the conceptual approach of cognitive linguistics is concerned with the patterns in which and processes by which conceptual content is organized in language. It has thus addressed the linguistic structuring of such basic conceptual categories as space and time, scenes and events, entities and processes, motion and location, and force and causation. To these it adds the basic ideational and affective categories attributed to cognitive agents, such as attention and perspective, volition and intention, and expectation and affect. It addresses the semantic structure of morphological and lexical forms, as well as of syntactic patterns. And it addresses the interrelationships of conceptual structures, such as those in metaphoric mapping, those within a semantic frame, those between text and context, and those in the grouping of conceptual categories into large structuring systems. Overall, the aim of cognitive linguistics is to ascertain the global integrated system of conceptual structuring in language. Further, cognitive linguistics addresses the formal properties of language, accounting for grammatical structure in terms of its representation of conceptual structure. And, distinguishing it from earlier semantics, cognitive linguistics

relates its findings to the cognitive structures of the psychological approach. Its long-range trajectory is to integrate the linguistic and the psychological perspectives on cognitive organization in a unified understanding of human conceptual structure.

Many of the major themes of cognitive linguistics can be related in a way that shows the overall structure of the field. A beginning observation is that language consists of two subsystems – the open-class or lexical, and the closed-class or grammatical – that have different semantic and functional properties. Closed-class, but not open-class forms, exhibit great semantic constraint, and do so at two levels. First, their referents can belong to certain semantic categories, such as number, gender, and tense, but not to others such as color or material. For example, inflections on a noun indicate its number in many languages, but never its color. Second, they can refer only to certain concepts even within an acceptable category like number – e.g., 'singular,' 'dual,' 'plural,' and 'paucal,' but never 'even,' 'odd,' or 'dozen.' Certain principles govern this semantic constraint, e.g., the exclusion of reference to Euclidean properties such as specificity of magnitude or shape. What largely remain are topological properties such as the magnitude-neutral distance represented by the deictics in *This speck/planet is smaller than that speck/planet*, or the shape-neutral path represented by the preposition in *I circled/zigzagged through the forest*. The two subsystems differ also in their basic functions, with conceptual content represented by open-class forms and conceptual structure by closed-class forms. For example, in the overall conception evoked by the sentence *A rustler lassoed the steers*, the three semantically rich open-class forms – *rustle*, *lasso*, *steer* – contribute most of the content, while most of the structure is determined by the remaining closed-class forms. Shifts in all the closed-class forms – as in *Will the lassoers rustle a steer*? – restructure the conception but leave the cowboy-landscape content largely intact, whereas a shift in the open-class forms – as in *A machine stamped the envelopes* – changes content while leaving the structure intact. The basic finding in this ''semantics of grammar'' portion of cognitive linguistics is that the closed-class subsystem is the fundamental conceptual structuring system of language (Talmy, 2000).

Such conceptual structure is understood in cognitive linguistics as 'schematic', with particular 'schemas' or 'image-schemas' represented in individual linguistic forms – whether alone in closed-class forms or with additional material in open-class forms. The idea is that the structural specifications of linguistic forms are regularly conceptualized in terms of abstracted, idealized, and sometimes virtually geometric delineations. Such schemas fall into conceptual categories that join in extensive 'schematic

systems.' Many of the substantive findings about conceptual organization made by cognitive linguists can be placed within these schematic systems. One schematic system is 'configurational structure,' covering the structure of objects in space and events in time – often with parallels between the two. For example, inits category of 'plexity' – a term covering both number and aspect – the object referent of *bird* and the event referent of *(to) sigh* are intrinsically 'uniplex', but the addition of the extra forms in *bird*s and *keep sighing* triggers a cognitive operation of 'multiplexing' that yields multiplex referents. And in the category 'state of boundedness,' the intrinsically unbounded object and event referents of *water* and *(to) sleep* can undergo 'bounding' through the additional form in *some water* and *(to) sleep some* to yield bounded referents.

The second schematic system of 'perspective' covers the location or path of the point at which one places one's 'mental eyes' to regard a represented scene. For example, in *There are some houses in the valley*, the closed-class forms together represent a distal stationary perspective point with global scope of attention. But the substituted forms in *There is a house every now and then through the valley* represent a proximal moving perspective point with local scope of attention.

The third schematic system of 'attention' covers the patterns in which different aspects of a linguistic reference are foregrounded or backgrounded. For example, the word *hypotenuse* 'profiles' – foregrounds in attention – its direct reference to a line segment against an attentionally backgrounded 'base' of the conception of a right triangle (Langacker, 1987). The verb *bite* in *The dog bit the cat* foregrounds the 'active zone' of the dog's teeth. And over an expression of a certain kind, the 'Figure' or 'trajector' is the most salient constituent whose path or site is characterized in terms of a secondarily salient constituent, the 'Ground' or 'landmark.' These functional assignments accord with convention in *The bike is near the house*, but their reversal yields the odd *?The house is near the bike*.

A fourth schematic system of 'force dynamics' covers such relations between entities as opposition, resistance, overcoming, and blockage, and places causation alongside permitting and preventing, helping and hindering. To illustrate, the sentence *The ball rolled along the green* is force dynamically neutral, but in *The ball kept rolling along the green*, either the ball's tendency toward rest is overcome by something like the wind, or its tendency toward motion overcomes something such as stiff grass (Talmy, 2000).

Schemas from all the schematic systems, and the cognitive operations they trigger can be nested to form intricate structural patterns. To illustrate with events in time, the uniplex event in *The beacon flashed* can be

multiplexed as in *The beacon kept flashing*; this can be bounded as in *The beacon flashed 5 times in a row*; this can be treated as a new uniplexity and remultiplexed as in *The beacon kept flashing 5 times at a stre*tch; and this can in turn be rebounded, as in *The beacon flashed 5 times at a stretch for 3 hours.*

Further conceptual structuring is seen within the meanings of morphemes. A morpheme's meaning is generally a prototype category whose members differ in privilege, whose properties can vary in number and strength, and whose boundary can vary in scope (Lakoff, 1987). For example, the meaning of *breakfast* prototypically refers to eating certain foods in the morning, but can extend to other foods at that time or the same foods at other times (Fillmore, 1982). For a polysemous morpheme, one sense can function as the prototype to which the other senses are progressively linked by conceptual increments within a 'radial category.' Thus, for the preposition over, the prototype sense may be 'horizontal motion above an object' as in *The bird flew over the hill*, but linked to this by 'endpoint focus' is the sense in *Sam lives over the hill* (Brugmann, 1981).

These findings have led cognitive linguists to certain stances on the properties of conceptualization. The conceptual structuring found in language is largely held to be a product of human cognition and imposed on external phenomena (where it pertains to them), rather than arising from putative structure intrinsic to such external phenomena and veridically taken up by language. For example, in one type of 'fictive motion,' motion can be imputed to a shadow – cross linguistically always from an object to its silhouette – as in *The pole threw its shadow on the wall*, even though a distinct evaluative part of our cognition may judge the situation to lack physical motion. An important consequence is that alternatives of conceptualization or 'construal' can be applied to the same phenomena. Thus, a person standing 5 feet from and pointing to a bicycle can use either deictic in *Take away that/this bicycle*, in effect imputing the presence of a spatial boundary either between herself and the bicycle or on the far side of the bicycle.

The notion of 'embodiment' extends the idea of conceptual imposition and bases the imposed concepts largely on experiences humans have of their bodies interacting with environments or on psychological or neural structure (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). As one tenet of this view, the 'objectivist' notion of the autonomous existence of logic and reason is replaced by experiential or cognitive structure. For example, our sense of the meaning of the word *angle* is not derived from some independent ideal mathematical realm, but is rather built up from our experience, e.g., from perceptions of a

static forking branch, from moving two sticks until their ends touch, or from rotating one stick while its end touches that of another.

The cognitive process of conceptual imposition – more general than going from mental to external phenomena or from experiential to ideal realms – also covers directed mappings from any one conceptual domain to another. An extensive form of such imputation is metaphor, mainly studied in cognitive linguistics not for its familiar salient form in literature but, under the term 'conceptual metaphor,' for its largely unconscious pervasive structuring of everyday expression. In it, certain structural elements of a conceptual 'source domain' are mapped onto the content of a conceptual 'target domain.' The embodiment-based directionality of the imputational mapping is from a more concrete domain, one grounded in bodily experience, to a more abstract domain – much as in the Piagetian theory of cognitive development. Thus, the more palpable domain of physical motion through space can be mapped onto the more abstract domain of progression through time – in fact, in two different ways – as in *We're approaching Christmas* and *Christmas is approaching* – whereas mappings in the reverse direction are minimal (Lakoff, 1992).

Generally, mappings between domains are implicit in metaphor, but are explicitly established by linguistic forms in the area of 'mental spaces.' The mapping here is again directional, going from a 'base' space – a conceptual domain generally factual for the speaker – to a subordinate space that can be counterfactual, representational, at a different time, etc. Elements in the former space connect to corresponding elements in the latter. Thus, in *Max thinks Harry's name is Joe*, the speaker's base space includes 'Max' and 'Harry' as elements; the word *thinks* sets up a subordinate space for a portion of Max's belief system; and this contains an element 'Joe' that corresponds to 'Harry' (Fauconnier, 1985). Further, two separate mental spaces can map elements of their content and structure into a third mental space that constitutes a 'blend' or 'conceptual integration' of the two inputs, with potentially novel structure. Thus, in referring to a modern catamaran reenacting a centuryold voyage by an early clipper, a speaker can say *At this point, the catamaran is barely maintaining a 4 day lead over the clipper*, thereby conceptually superimposing the two treks and generating the apparency of a race (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002).

In terms of the sociology of the field, there is considerable consensus across cognitive linguists on the assumptions of the field and on the body of work basic to it. No competing schools of thought have arisen, and cognitive linguists engage in relatively little critiquing of each other's work, which mainly differs only in the phenomena focused on.

Practical class 6

Theory of Functional Syntax:
from Semantic Structures to Linguistic Expressions
Arto Mustajoki, 2006 | HELSINKI (FINLAND)

1. **The main goal and tasks of FS**

1.1. FS is based on the principle of going «from meaning to form»; to be more specific, «from semantic categories to linguistic means».

1.2. FS differs from traditional grammar mainly in how the description of linguistic phenomena is structured, but not so much in the content of the description. So, the surface structures *John is cold*, *John has a hangover*, *John is in a coma*, *John is freezing* are all dealt with in the same chapter entitled *Physiological state* because they have a similar semantic structure (a Physiogical state with an actant, an Experiencer).

1.3. Our purpose in creating FS is not to replace traditional grammar, but to provide a complementary way of describing linguistic phenomena.

1.4. In the communicative situation, FS reflects the point of view of the speaker who is searching for a suitable way to express his/her thoughts. However, FS does not aim to describe the mental processes taking place in the speaker's head.

1.5. The present-day version of FS does not go very far into pragmatics (features of dialogue and discourse), but such elements can easily be added to the model.

1.6. The creation of a FS consists of three stages:

- defining the foundation of the description – semantic structures and their main elements, semantic categories
- description of the linguistic means which can be used in expressing the defined semantic structures and categories in language *x* or in a set of languages
- establishing the possible restrictions in the use of the linguistic means.

2. The main concepts and terms of FS

2.1. The linguistic description in FS is based on semantic structures, which reflect the state of affairs and the speaker's comments on it.

2.2. The states of affairs are situations or fragments of reality (the real, virtual, or inner world) as they are interpreted by the speaker.

2.3. Besides the schematic semantic structures, one can speak about their realizations through the addition of specific content. For instance, a Physiological state, one of the nuclear semantic structures, can be realized with a great number of different contents, e.g. «John is in a state of hunger / coldness / temperature / hangover / cancer etc.»

2.4. The following notation is used:

- [St_{Phl}; E] – semantic structure, which consists of a predicate (Physiological state) and a actant (Experiencer)
- «John is in a state of temperature» – one of the possible contents of the semantic structure
- N + V_{have} + N – one of the possible surface structures which can be used to express the semantic structure in English
- *John has a temperature* – a possible linguistic realization of the surface structure.

2.5. Semantic categories are not based on the smallest possible elements of meaning (atoms, primitives), but they are supposed to reflect a naïve speaker's impressions of the world. For instance, behind the content «Mary gives John a book» stands a nuclear structure, which is not split further into semantic elements, such as «Mary CAUSES: John has a book».

2.6. A semantic structure consists of the following elements:

- nucleus of the semantic structure = (deep) predicate + actants An example: a predicate denoting a concrete action + actant $_1$ (Agent) + $actant_2$ (Object) («John is building a house»).
- modificator = a metaverb determining the nucleus + actants (in some cases a metalexeme without an actant).

Examples: «ASK», «BEGIN», «CAUSE», «POSSIBLE», «END».

- specificator = a semantic element clarifying an actant, the predicate, or the semantic structure as a whole.

Examples: Time, Aspectuality, Determinacy, Quantity.

2.7. As to complexity, semantic structures can be divided into two main categories:

- simple semantic structure = nucleus + obligatory modificators

An example: ASK + predicate denoting a concrete action + actant $_1$ (Agent) + $actant_2$ (Object); a possible content :: «I ASK: John builds a house»; a possible linguistic expression: *Is John building a house?*

- complex semantic structure = simple semantic structure $_1$ + metaconjunction + simple semantic $structure_2$.

A possible content: «Alex builds a house ALTHOUGH Alex already has two houses»; a possible linguistic expression: *Alex is building a house although he already has two houses.*

2.8. A simple semantic structure can be expanded by two ways: adding an optional modificator or an embedded element:

- expanded (simple) semantic structure = simple semantic structure + optional modificator

An example: «BEGIN + a predicate denoting concrete action + actant $_1$ (Agent) + actant$_2$ (Object); a possible content: «Alex began building a house»; a possible linguistic expression: *Alex started building a house.*

- embedding = actant of a simple semantic structure with an extra semantic element.

An example: predicate + actant$_1$ + (Characterization + actant $_2$); a possible content: «Alex builds (a luxurious house)»; a possible linguistic expression: *Alex is building a luxurious house.*

2.9. If a state of affairs forms part of a semantic structure, it is denoted by the symbol P, e.g. {[P $_1$] IN ORDER TO [P$_2$]} (*Alex will build a new house in order to fulfil his wife's dream*).

Actants

2.10. Actants are not treated in FS as separate units, but as non-predicative elements of semantic structures and their modificators.

2.11. Actants that are able – according to the interpretation of the speaker – to control the action, or to feel emotions or other states, belong to category I (prototype: «a human being») Further categories are: concrete inanimate actants (II, «a chair»), mass actants (III; «water») and abstract actants (IV; «an idea»).

2.12. Actants can be divided into the following classes according to their roles:

- Agent (A) – an actant, which produces and/or controls the action (always belongs to category I): «John writes a letter / opens the window / is running».
- Experiencer (E) – an actant, which feels an emotion or physiological state (only category I): «John is cold / bored «, «John loves Mary».
- Neutral (N) – an actant about which something is said (who / how / where (s)he/it is) (all categories from I to IV): «Fingers / roads / stories are long» «John is tall / an Englishman» «There ~~is~~ a solution».
- Object (O) – an actant towards which a concrete or abstract action is directed or which appears as a result of such action (all categories from I to IV): «John opens a window / writes a letter / loves Mary / music».
- Theme (T) – an actant, which the Agent of speech is talking about (all categories from I to IV): «John is talking about football / Mary».

- Recipient (R) – an actant, which receives something or benefits from the action (only category I): «John gave Mary a book / sent Liza a letter / told an anecdote to Paul».
- Source (S) – an actant from which something is transferred to the Recipient (mainly category I): «Mary got a book from John / read in the newspaper about the catastrophe».
- Instrument (I) – an actant, which is used by the Agent (all categories except I): «Mary wrote the story with a pencil / on the computer».
- Place (L) – an actant referring to a locative element obligatory for the state of affairs (apparently all categories from I to IV): «The house is located on the sea», «There is nobody in here», «The goalkeeper has the ball».

Predicates

2.13. The classification of predicates is based on a combination of different criteria: their semantics, temporal-aspectual features, the set of actants they have, and the question to which they give an answer. There are the following primary predicates and their semantic types:

- Action (Ac): An Agent is doing something and controlling the state of affairs; possible actants: Object, Instrument, Recipient, Theme. Semantic types of temporally localized (related to concrete situations) states of affairs: Motion (Ac_{Lc}): «Mary is walking / is carrying a book to school». Physical activity (besides motion) (Ac_{Phys}): «John kicked / killed the mouse». Intellectual activity (Ac_{Int}): «John was thinking about the kids». Speech activity (Ac_{Sp}): «We talked about Mary's faith». Activity connected with possession (Ac_{Ps}): «Mary gave the dog a lump of meat». Social activity (Ac_{Soc}): «John punished Nick». Physiological activity (Ac_{Phl}): «We were eating soup». A type of a temporally non-localized state of affairs: Characterizing (or identifying) activity (Ac_{Ch}) / (Ac_{Id}): «John sings in a choir».
- Relation (Rl): identifies the relationship between an Experincer and Object or between two Neutrals. Semantic types (all of them refer to temporally non-localized states of affairs): Social relation (Rl_{Soc}): «John is responsible for all the decisions». Emotional relation (Rl_{Em}): «Mary loves John». Intellectual relation (Rl_{Int}): «Mary does remember everything». Identifying relation (Rl_{Id}): «Mary is John's wife». Characterizing relation (Rl_{Ch}): «John is taller than Paul».
- Possession (Ps): relation between an Agent-Owner and an Object («John has a Mercedes»).
- Location (Lc): temporally localized (non-permanent) or temporally non-localized (more or less permanent) relation between an Agent or a

Neutral and a Place («A book lies on the table», «The house is located by the sea»).

- Existence (Ex): information about a temporally non-localized existence of a Neutral («There are angels») or a temporally localized existence of an Agent or a Neutral in a certain place («There is a book on the table», «There is a house by the sea»).
- State (St): typical features: 1) non-processual state of affairs; 2) only one actant, an Experiencer in Emotional and Physiological states, a Neutral in a Physical states and a Place in an Environmental state. Examples: Emotional state (St_{Em}): «John is in a state of boredom» (*John is bored)*. Physiological state (St_{Phl}): «John is in a state of coldness» (*John is cold*). Physical state (St_{Phys}): «The hands / floors are in a state of dirt». Environmental state (St_{Nat}): «This place is in a state of coldness» (*It is cold (in here)*).
- Characterization (Ch): only one actant, Neutral; temporally non-localized state of affairs, qualitative featuring («Mary is beautiful / clever», «The book is interesting / new»).
- Identification and classification (Id): temporally non-localized state of affairs, belonging of a Neutral to a certain group: «John is an Englishman / a teacher».

2.14. Besides the primary predicates, there also exist secondary ones (symbol =>) referring to changes in relations or states. Examples: (Rl_{Int}=>): «Mary remembered her friends» (*Mary forgot her friends*). (Rl_{Ps}=>): «John has a wallet» (*John lost his wallet*). (=>Ex): «There exists (a certain) key» (*A key was found*). (=>St_{Phl}): «John is in a state of healthiness» (*John is getting well*).

Nuclear semantic structures

2.15. Nuclear semantic structures can be divided into groups according to their communicative proximity, i.e. to what extent they can be used in the same speech situation to express what the speaker wants to say. For instance, semantic structures with the predicates «buy (a car)» and «have (a car)» are dealt with in the same chapter, although they represent quite different types of predicates (one refers to an action, the other to a state of possession). The communicative semantic spheres are as follows: Physical activity and action, Motion and location, Social activity and relation, Intellectual activity, Existence, Possession, Emotion, Physiological state, Physical state, Environmental state, Characterization, Identification.

Modificators

2.16. There are obligatory and optional modificators. Obligatory modificators are included in every semantic structure, optional ones occur only if the speaker finds it necessary.

2.17. At the semantic level modificators are indicated using metaverbs. In the schematic presentation of semantic structures, modificators stand before the nucleus [P], e.g. Causation is indicated by {(Caus; A) [P]} or more exactly {(Caus = PERSUADE; A) [P]}, where – stands for the Agent of the modificators (in this particular case Agent-Causator).

2.18. Modificators are often explicitly expressed at the surface level, but there are many types of utterances in which they are omitted.

2.19. There exists one obligatory modificator – Speech function (Func). It has the following main classes:

- Statement: the most important metaverb is «STATE», which is normally not expressed explicitly at the utterance level: *John is cleaning up the room.* There are also some other metaverbs, e.g. «ANSWER», «AGREE», «PROMISE», «SWEAR».
- Question: «ASK» (*Does John clean up the room?*).
- Request: the basic metaverb is «ASK FOR» (*Do clean up the room!*). Further metaverbs: «ADVICE», «INVITE», «DEMAND», «PROPOSE», «WARN», «BEG».

2.20. Besides the main Speech functions, two more can be noted:

- Proclamation: «DECLARE» (*I declare the meeting closed.*)
- Social contact: «COOPERATE» (*Hello*) and «EMPATHIZE» (*I feel sorry for you*).

2.21. The whole range of Speech functions is used in direct speech (dialogue). Indirect speech (story telling) usually consists entirely of Statements.

2.22. There are three optional modificators: Stage, Causation and Authorization.

2.23. The Agent of the modificator Stage is always the same as in the nucleus. The six categories of Stage are:

- The meaning of Irreal stage (Irr) occurs when the speaker builds up in his/her mind a hypothetical situation, a fragment of a virtual world (*If I saw a bear, I would faint*).
- Preparatory stage (PrePhase) is a possible part of the realization process of - referring to a phase where - has not yet begun to exist, but the potential Agent takes preparatory (usually mental) action in order to do or begin to do P. Metaverbs: «PLAN», «PREPARE», «DECIDE», «TRY», «AVOID» (*Mary is going to travel to Mongolia*).

- In Modal phase (ModPhase) attention is paid to the circumstances that have a certain influence on the probability of the realization of P. The Agent (or some kind of Experiencer) does not directly control the Modal phase, but s/he is the Agent of the potential P. Modal phases are indicated not by metaverbs, but by other metalexemes: «POSSIBLY», «IMPOSSIBLE»; «ALLOWED», «PROHIBITED»; «NECESSARY», «UNNECESSARY», «DESIRABLE», «UNDESIRABLE».
- Temporal phase (TempPhase) is expressed by the metaverbs «BEGIN», «CONTINUE», «FINISH» and by the metalexemes (non-agentive variants of the metaverbs) «BEGINNING», «CONTINUATION», «END» (*John started / continued / finished cleaning up the room // It started / continued / ceased to rain*).
- Change of tempo (Tempo) is expressed by metaverbs «SPEED UP» and «SLOW DOWN» (*Mary speeded up / delayed the preparation of the project*).
- Final stage (FinPhase) denotes some changes in the speakers' attitude to the realization of the final stage of P. Examples of the metaverbs: «MANAGE», «DO / ARRIVE IN TIME», «BE LATE».

2.24. In Causation (Caus), the activities of an Agent cause P, but the Agent her/himself is not the Agent (or other «Subject-actant») of P (cf. *Mary made John angry.* - «Mary CAUSED (by her behaviour): John got angry»).

2.25. The modificator Causation differs from an embedded causation in the way that in the latter case we are dealing with a direct impact on the Object. The use of a metaverb does not reflect the nature of such a P in an acceptable way: [Ac; S, (=>Ch; O)] *John shortened the carpet* – «John CAUSED: the carpet got shorter».

2.26. The use of the modificator Causation differs from complex semantic structures with the metaconjunction «BECAUSE» in the sense that in the latter case we are not dealing with real causation, but with a cause-consequence relationship between two P's: {(Caus; P_{Caus}) [P]} *A heavy rain flattened the corn*; {[P] BECAUSE [P_{Caus}]} *The corn was flattened because of the heavy rain.*

2.27. There are several semantic categories of Causation: Pure causation (*John's gift made Mary happy, Pat let the ball roll down the slope*), Factitive causation (*John had his suit made by a tailor*), Deontic causation (*Mary forces John to clean up the room*), Speech causation (*Mary persuaded John to clean up the room*), Preventative causation (*Mary hindered John from cleaning up the room*), Permissive causation («ALLOW» – «NOT PREVENT») (*Mary allowed John to clean up the room*), Prohibitive causation (*Mary forbade John to clean up the room*),

Assistive causation (*Mary helped John to clean up the room*), Introductive Causation (*Mary taught John to clean up*).

2.28. The modification Authorization (Aut) gives additional information about the «owner» of the P or her/his attitudes to it.

- Author of the opinion {(Aut = REGARD; A_{Aut}) [P]} denotes who stands behind the information given (*According to recent investigations / in the opinion of some Finns / to my mind sauna has a very positive influence on people's heath*).
- Probability (epistemic modality, Mod $_{Ep}$): the speaker comments on the scale of probability (p) of P: HIGH p (*I am sure that he will come*), NOT-VERY-HIGH p (*I think he will come*), LOW p (*Maybe, he will come*).
- Judgement: the speaker determines his/her attitude to P (*It is nice / bad /a pity /useful that it will rain*).

Specificators

2.29. Specificators concretize particular features of an actant or a predicate. There are primary and secondary specificators.

2.30. Primary specificators give additional information mainly about the predicate. They therefore play a central role in the semantic structure. There are the following primary specificators: Negation, Temporality and Aspectuality.

2.31. In speech, affirmation is usually not expressed and is considered to be present by default. It is therefore natural to speak about the specificator of Negation. It relates either to the predicate (and at the same time to the whole semantic structure) (*Yesterday John was not reading newspapers*) or to a metaverb (*Yesterday John did not want to read newspapers*), or to one of the actants or specificators (*Yesterday John didn't read newspapers, John didn't read newspapers yesterday*).

2.32. In the field of Temporality the following semantic categories are considered: Time, Temporal Localization of the P, Repeated time.

- Time has three main meanings according to the combinations of the reference point, the time of the event, and the moment of speech: Past, Present, Future.
- All states of affairs are divided into two categories: temporally localized and temporally non-localized (abstract) ($Temp_{Abstr}$). Only the temporally localized states of affairs can refer to a particular situation: *Yesterday John read newspapers / cleaned up the room / played tennis / watched TV. *Yesterday John was tall /an Englishman / liked ice-cream.*

- Repeated time has two types of realization: Frequentativeness ($Temp_{Fr}$) (*John has been to Oslo twice*) and Usuality ($Temp_{Us}$) (*John often travels to Helsinki*).

2.33. The main aspectual meanings are: Stative (Asp = STAT) (*It is cold, John had a temperature, Mary is sitting in the chair*), Processual (Asp = PROC) (*Mary wandered in the forest, John mumbled something to himself, Pat was playing on the guitar),* Dynamic (Asp = DYN) (*Mary writes a book, We were going to the shop, John is pushing the car to the garage*), Terminal (Asp = TERM) (*Mary wrote a book, We went to the shop, John pushed the car to the garage*), Momental (Asp = MOM) (*Mary sneezed, The dog jumped up, Something flashed*), Resultative (Asp = RES) (*We arrived home at two o'clock, Mary has written a book*).

2.34. The secondary specificators are Determinacy, Quantity, Place and Manner.

2.35. The specificator of Determinacy has three main meanings: Defined (Det = DEF) (*I bought that car*), Specified (Det = SPEC) (*I bought a new car*), Unspecified (Det = INDEF) (*I would like to buy a new car*).

2.36. There is also an additional case of Determinacy: Generalization, which occurs in temporally non-localized states of affairs (*A cat is cleverer than a dog /Cats are cleverer than dogs, Love is eternal*).

2.37. The specificators of Quantity can be divided into four main classes on the basis of whether they express exact or inexact quantity on the one hand, and absolute or relative quantity on the other. Examples: exact absolute (*four dogs*), exact relative (*two of us*), inexact absolute (*some people*), inexact relative (*some of us*).

2.38. More specific meanings can be expressed by metalexemes. So, inexact (absolute and relative) quantity is denoted by the metalexemes «A SMALL AMOUNT» (*Few people attended the concert*), «A NEUTRAL AMOUNT» (*Some people attended the concert, A part of the audience was drunk*), «A BIG AMOUNT» (*A lot of people / most of us attended the concert*).

2.39. Quantity with an Authorization is expressed by the metalexemes «ONLY» and «ENOUGH».

2.40. The specificator Place (Loc) differs from the other optional specificators referring to the whole semantic structure. There are several opposite pairs of place meanings: «IN» – «ON», «ABOVE» – «UNDER», «IN FRONT OF» – «BEHIND». Some further meanings can be distinguished, e.g. «BETWEEN», «OPPOSITE», «IN THE MIDDLE», «NEAR», «$ALONG_1$».

2.41. The main meanings of Place are divided into three variants according to which question they answer: movement TO, movement FROM,

or without a movement, e.g. «IN-TO» (*to put into the pocket*), «IN-FROM» (*to take from the pocket*), «IN» (*to have in the pocket*).

2.42. Obviously, some additional metaprepositions with more abstract place meanings have to be introduced, e.g. «AT_1» (*John is at a conference / in a meeting*), «AT_2» (*John is at his grandmother's*), «WITHIN» (*There is a language centre within the university*).

2.43. Some metaprepositions can be used only with a movement predicate, e.g. «THROUGH» (*to go through the forest*), $ALONG_2$ (*to walk along the seaside*), «VORBEI» [1] (*We passed the Parliament building)*.

2.44. The specificator of Manner covers different semantic elements, which concretize the way the action is carried out. In a prototypical case the specificator characterizes the predicate («QUICKLY», «SLOWLY»). Manner is often expressed at the surface level using an incorporation of that meaning to a verb, e.g. *to mumble* («speak quietly and indistinctly»).

Complex semantic structures: metaconjunction

2.45. Complex semantic structures consist of two or more simple (or expanded simple) semantic structures and metaconjunction(s) joining them. They have the following schematic presentation {[P_1] METACONJUCNTION [P_2]}. Three types of relations can be determined: Connective, Taxis, and Logical.

2.46. Connective relations include the following meanings: Coordination («AND», «AS WELL»), Juxtaposition («WHEREAS»), Division («OR»), Identification («EQUALS»), Comparison («AS»).

2.47. Taxis relations include the followings meanings: Simultaneous («AT THE SAME TIME AS», Successive: Preceding («BEFORE»), Successive: Following («AFTER»).

2.48. Logical relations include the followings meanings: Cause («BECAUSE»), Consequence («THEREFORE»), Condition («IF»), Concession («ALTHOUGH»), Goal («IN ORDER TO»).

3. Relationship between semantic and surface structures

3.1. Although the semantic structure as a whole resembles the surface structure, there are a great number of cases of asymmetry between them.

3.2. Any semantic structure or part of it can have (and very often has) a variety of different linguistic expressions. So, Physiological state [$St_{Phl;}$ E] can be expressed by several surface structures: *He is cold*, *He has a temperature*, *He is in a coma* etc.

3.3. Most surface structures are capable of representing more than one semantic structure, e.g. *John has a temperature* (Physiological state), *John has blue eyes* (Characterization), *John has a new car* (Possession).

3.4. There are some regular differences between semantic and surface structures, namely: Incorporation (*John poisoned the mouse,* cf. «John killed the mouse with poison»), Ellipsis (*I will come in time,* cf. «I PROMISE: I will come in time), Analytic expression (*The surgeon performed an operation on Mary*, cf. «The surgeon operated on Mary»), Condensation (a whole P is expressed by a single word) (*Disappointment causes depression*, cf. {[P_1] CAUSES [P_2]} or «The fact that *x* is disappointed CAUSES: *x* falls into depression») .

3.5. The question concerning the synonymy of linguistic expressions representing the same semantic structure is settled by regarding them as having the same denotative (invariative) meaning but different presentative (variative) meanings produced by concrete forms of the surface structure.

3.6. The denotative and presentative meanings can be considered both at the schematic level and at the content level. Thus, the semantic structure [St_{Phl}; E] has different realizations at the surface level (N + Adj, N + V_{have} + N, N + V_{be} + in+N etc.). All these surface structures have the same denotative meaning, but differ from each other in presentative meaning. In a similar way the utterances *I am cold* and *I am freezing* have the same denotative meaning but different presentative meanings.

3.7. The description of linguistic expressions representing a given semantic category does not include structurally unstable hints, the interpretation of which is dependent on a particular speech situation. However, conventional indirect ways to express different meanings are taken into consideration. The structure found in the utterance *It would be nice if we went to the cinema* is therefore mentioned as a possible way of expressing Request because it represents a structural means for the indirect expression of this meaning, whereas *It is stuffy in here* with the covert meaning «I ASK: open the window» is not included because understanding such hints requires a particular speech situation.

3.8. The connection between a semantic structure and its surface equivalents is not established by means of some kind of generative machinery, but by using the linguistic intuition of a native speaker. A linguistic expression *x* is thus an equivalent for a semantic category or structure *y* on the condition that *x* can be used in expressing *y*. In proving this connection the researcher has to rely on the intuition of a native speaker.

3.9. Semantic structures do not reflect a particular language and the categories grammaticalized in it. They are to a certain extent universal. However, it is not reasonable to speak about «complete» universality; in

order to justify this, it would be necessary to have more evidence from languages of different kinds.

3.10. The model of FS can be used in a description of a single language, as well as in a comparison of two or more languages. In the latter case FS serves as a *tertium comparationis* for the comparative study.

4. Methodological approaches and solution taken in compiling the FS

4.1. The whole model is consistently based on the principle «from meaning to form».

4.2. This principle concerns the presentation of the linguistic data. In establishing and defining the semantic categories that serve as the starting point for the model, a variety of methods and techniques can be used. This includes deriving evidence from the facts of different languages (i.e. the principle «from form to meaning» can be applied for this purpose).

4.3. FS seeks to provide a full description of a language, and not only some fragments of it, in the same sense as traditional grammars of different languages. However, phonetic, derivational, and morphological phenomena are not described, but are regarded as given. Therefore, for a FS of German it is enough to say that the structure «N_{dat} + V_{sein} + Adj» is one of the ways to express Physiological state; describing the formation of the dative case does not belong to the tasks of the FS.

4.4. The concept of FS is characterized by the aspiration of combining a solid scientific foundation with a practical and applied orientation. As a consequence of this approach, the following features of FS can be mentioned: both solid theoretical works and materials intended for language learning have been used as background literature in the creation of the model and in the description of particular semantic categories;

- some classifications of semantic categories are based not only on a single criterion, but on a selection of different approaches; this makes the classifications less consistent, but at the same time they better reflect the intuitive impression of a native speaker (and of a linguist) about the proximity of semantic units;
- in the use of terminology, ultimate strictness and consistency is a natural goal; however, the full attainment of such exactitude would entail a much more detailed definition of each particular semantic category – which, as a contradictory result, would not necessary increase the number of readers understanding the terms in the way that the author intended;
- use of a «moderate» schematic notation.

4.5. The model of FS is presented at the same time in its (more or less) full form, covering «all» aspects of a linguistic description. Such an

approach enables the reader to get an all- round picture of the abilities and possibilities of the concept. This is also essential for understanding the whole idea of FS because different details of the model acquire their real meaning only in the context of other ones. However, the aspiration to cover linguistic phenomena on a large scale makes it impossible, on the other hand, to pay sufficient attention to all the semantic categories described.

Practical class 7

Metaphor and Conceptual Blending
Seana Coulson, 2006 | SAN DIEGO, CA (USA)

Conceptual Metaphor Theory

In 'conceptual metaphor theory,' metaphorical expressions are the linguistic manifestation of underlying conceptual knowledge. Whereas traditional approaches have tended to consider metaphorical uses of words and phrases on a case-by-case basis, cognitive linguists have pointed to patterns in the metaphorical uses of word meanings. For example, in (1) through (4) we see a number of examples that employ words whose literal meaning concerns the domain of vision, used metaphorically to characterize the domain of understanding. In such cases, the real topic of discussion (e.g., understanding) is known as the 'topic' or 'target' domain, while the domain characteristically associated with the vocabulary (e.g., seeing) is known as the 'vehicle' or 'source' domain.

(1) *The truth is clear*.
(2) *He was blinded by love*.
(3) *His writing is opaque*.
(4) *I see what you mean*.

In these and many such examples of this metaphoric mapping, the relationship between the domains is systematic: if seeing corresponds to understanding, then not seeing corresponds to not understanding, faulty vision corresponds to faulty understanding, and so forth. In conceptual metaphor theory, the systematic nature of the relationships between domains in the metaphor results from mapping cognitive models from one domain onto counterparts in the other. This results in a transfer of images and vocabulary from the source domain onto the target. Moreover, it also involves the projection of inferential structure so that inferences from the source domain can be translated into parallel inferences and counterparts in the target. For instance, in the SEEING domain, if someone is 'blinded' he will be unable to see. Analogously, in the KNOWING domain, if someone is 'blinded' he will be unable to apprehend certain sorts of information. For this reason, metaphor is considered a conceptual phenomenon, rather than merely a lexical one. Viewing metaphorical language as a manifestation of the conceptual system explains why the correspondences between elements and relations in the two domains of a metaphor are systematic rather than

random. Cognitive linguists argue that the systematicity in the usage of source and target domain terminology derives from the fact that some of the logic of the source domain has been imported into the target in a way that maintains the mappings from one to the other. Consequently, there are parallels between the source and target domains, both in word meanings and in the inferences that one might draw from sentences that use those word meanings. Although the objective features of the two domains in a metaphor are often quite different, the two domains can be seen as sharing abstract similarities. Analyses of conceptual metaphors are typically stated in terms of the domains that are associated by the metaphor. The domain of vision, for instance, is metaphorically linked with the domain of knowledge and understanding. Consequently, these utterances are said to be instances of the KNOWING IS SEEING metaphor. Alternatively, metaphors can be described in terms of the high-level mapping between the two domains, as in Seeing → Knowing. The latter notation is especially useful when the analyst wants to outline the correspondences between the two domains. Conceptual metaphors such as KNOWING IS SEEING make up a pervasive repertoire of patterns in language and thought. The many expressions we can remember or create that conform to the pattern have been taken as evidence that, just as the metaphoric meanings of many of these words are conventional, so too are the metaphoric mappings. Consequently, a lexical analysis of metaphor is not complete unless it refers to the underlying mapping patterns. The idea that knowledge of metaphoric mappings constitutes part of the linguistic competence of the speaker is supported by the use of conceptual metaphors in novel, poetic language (Lakoff and Turner, 1989). For example, in To the lighthouse, one of Virginia Woolf's characters describes moments of insight as «illuminations, matches struck unexpectedly in the dark». Although many of the linguistic expressions in this excerpt are creative, the conceptual mappings conform to the pattern in the KNOWING IS SEEING metaphor. Just as a match affords the possibility of seeing one's surroundings for a brief period of time, a moment of insight allows one to understand something for a brief moment of time. The seer in the match scenario corresponds to the knower, and the quality of vision corresponds to the quality of understanding.

Higher-Level Mappings

In addition to KNOWING IS SEEING, cognitive linguists have identified a large number of conventionalized metaphors, such as DESIRE IS HUNGER (sex-starved, sexual appetite), HOPE IS LIGHT (dim hopes, ray of hope), or LOVE IS A JOURNEY (we've come a long way together,

their marriage is going off-track, we're just spinning our wheels) (see Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1999). That is, there are many expressions about desire, hope, and love that systematically exploit vocabulary from the domains of hunger, light, and journeys, respectively. As noted earlier, the systematicity derives from the fact that the mappings between elements in the source and the target domains are typically constant from expression to expression, and that many source domain inferences map onto analogous target domain inferences. Moreover, many conventionalized metaphors such as LOVE IS A JOURNEY can themselves be seen as instantiations of more general crossdomain mappings. LOVE IS A JOURNEY, along with A CAREER IS A JOURNEY and even LIFE IS A JOURNEY, are all instantiations of a more general mapping between long-term purposeful activities and progress along a path. Indeed, the latter is part of a very abstract mapping scheme known as the 'event structure metaphor' (Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). As outlined by Lakoff (1993), the event structure metaphor includes the mappings outlined as follows:

States → Locations Changes → Movements
Causes → Forces
Actions → Intentional movements
Purposes → Destinations
Means → Paths
Problems → Impediments to motion

Particular metaphoric expressions such as deadend relationship can thus be seen as motivated by metaphoric mappings at multiple levels of abstraction (LOVE IS A JOURNEY, LONG-TERM PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS, and the event structure metaphor).

Primary Metaphor and Experiential Grounding

One important claim in conceptual metaphor theory is that 'primary metaphors' are grounded in correlations in experience. For example, the metaphorical mapping between quantity and height (MORE IS UP) is thought to be motivated by correlations between the number of objects in a pile and its height, or the amount of liquid in a glass and the height of the fluid level. In traditional accounts dating back to Aristotle, metaphors were based on similarities between the two domains invoked in the metaphor. By contrast, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) highlighted the existence of a large number of metaphorical expressions, such as big idea, whose two domains have no inherent similarities, arguing instead that such metaphors are

experientially motivated. The experiential motivation of metaphors is consistent with the fact that the mapping between the domains and entities in a primary metaphor is directional. For instance, although the conceptual metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING allows us to utter an expression such as I don't see what you're saying to indicate the existence of a comprehension problem, it does not license I don't understand your face to indicate a problem with visual acuity. Directionality is thought to reflect the underlying cognitive operations in metaphor, in which an experientially basic source domain is exploited to reason about a more abstract target domain. Indeed, many entrenched metaphors involve the use of a concrete source domain to discuss an abstract target. For example, importance is expressed in terms of size (as in big idea or small problem), similarity is construed as physical proximity (as in close versus disparate philosophical positions), and difficulties are discussed in terms of burdens (as in heavy responsibilities). Primary metaphors originate in primary scenes in which critical aspects of the source and target domains co-occur with one another. For example, the KNOWING IS SEEING metaphor is thought to be motivated by contexts in which visual experience brings about understanding. In fact, corpus research shows that child-directed speech contains many utterances in which both the perceptual and the cognitive meaning of see are simultaneously present as in (5) (Johnson, 1999).

(5) *Oh, I see what you wanted*.

In fact, children produce many such utterances themselves, prompting the suggestion that the meaning of words such as see evidences 'conflation,' as the word refers simultaneously to the visual and the cognitive experience. Learning the metaphorical meaning is not a matter of generalizing from a concrete meaning to an abstract one, but rather requires 'deconflation,' in which the child gradually dissociates and distinguishes between the two domains in the metaphor (Johnson, 1999). Primary metaphors such as KNOWING IS SEEING are directly grounded in experience, while other metaphors are only indirectly grounded. For example, the THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS metaphor is supported by examples like (6) to (8) from Grady (1997), in which theories are discussed with verbiage that might appropriately be applied to buildings.

(6) *You have failed to buttress your arguments with sufficient facts*.
(7) *Recent discoveries have shaken the theory to its foundations*.
(8) *Their theory collapsed under the weight of scrutiny*.

However, it is unlikely that many people have correlated experiences of theories and buildings. Moreover, many experientially basic aspects of our concepts of buildings are not exploited in this metaphor, as in (9) and (10) (Grady and Johnson, 2002).

(9) *This theory has no windows*.
(10) *I examined the walls of his theory*.

Instances in which source domain language (in this case pertaining to buildings) has no target domain interpretation reveal 'metaphorical gaps.' Primary metaphors, however, do not evidence these gaps, as virtually any word that is meaningful in the source domain can be metaphorically interpreted in the target domain (Grady, 1999). Consequently, Grady (1997) suggested that the THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS mappings that underlie (6) through (8) arose from a combination of two primary metaphors: ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE and PERSISTING IS REMAINING ERECT. Unlike the proposed mapping between theories and buildings, experiential grounding of a mapping between persistence and remaining upright is quite plausible (Grady, 1999).

Conceptual Blending Theory

Much of the linguistic data accounted for by conceptual metaphor theory can also be analyzed in terms of 'conceptual blending theory' (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002). An elaboration of 'mental space theory' (described later), the conceptual blending framework (also known as 'conceptual integration' and 'blending theory') assumes many of the same claims as conceptual metaphor theory, such as the idea that metaphor is a conceptual as well as a linguistic phenomenon and that it involves the systematic projection of language, imagery, and inferential structure between domains. However, in contrast to the emphasis on conventional metaphors in conceptual metaphor theory, conceptual blending theory is intended to capture spontaneous, online processes that can yield short-lived and novel conceptualizations. Furthermore, blending theory reveals connections between the cognitive underpinnings of metaphor and a variety of other linguistic phenomena handled by mental space theory.

Mental Space Theory

Mental space theory (Fauconnier, 1994) is a theory of referential structure, a level of conceptual organization between the situation being

described and the linguistic structures that describe it (Langacker, 1993). Although motivated by linguistic data, mental spaces are not specifically linguistic in nature and reflect the operation of more general cognitive processes. In this framework, words do not refer directly to entities in the world. Rather, linguistic cues prompt speakers to set up elements in a referential structure that may or may not refer to objects in the world. Created to solve semantic problems created by referential opacity (see also Factivity) and indirect reference, mental spaces can be thought of as temporary containers for relevant information about a particular domain. A mental space contains a partial representation of the entities and relations of a particular scenario as perceived, imagined, remembered, or otherwise understood by a speaker. This representation typically includes elements to represent each of the discourse entities, and simple frames to represent the relationships that exist between them. Mental space theory deals with many philosophical problems of meaning by employing multiple spaces to represent a single sentence. Although different spaces can contain disparate information about the same elements, each individual space is internally coherent, and together they function to represent all of the relevant information. In contrast to traditional approaches to meaning construction, the bulk of the cognitive work involves tracking the mappings between spaces rather than the derivation of a logical representation of sentence meaning.

(11) *Orlando Bloom is the new James Bond*.
(12) *Iraq is the new Vietnam, as protests return to the airwaves*.
(13) *The new James Bond wears jewelry everywhere he goes*.

In the context of a newspaper article about the signing of British actor Orlando Bloom to play the character James Bond in an upcoming spy movie, example (11) prompts the construction of two mental spaces, one for reality and one for the movie. Element a represents Orlando Bloom in the reality space, while element a' represents James Bond in the movie space. An 'identity' mapping between a and a' represents the fact that in this context a and a' are the same person, even though Orlando Bloom the actor may not share all of his character James Bond's qualities.

Reality		*Movie*
a	→	a'
Bloom (a)		Bond (a')

In the context of an article about the increasing involvement of musicians in antiwar protests, (12) prompts the construction of two mental spaces: one for 2004 and one for 1970. Element w represents the American war with Iraq in the 2004 space, whereas element w' represents the American war with North Vietnam in the 1970 space. The link between these two elements is not identity, but rather analogy. Similarly, there is an analogy link between the contextually evoked protests in the 1970 space (p') and the explicitly evoked protests in the 2004 space (p).

2004		*1970*
w	→	w'
p	→	p'

Location (w, Iraq) Location (w', Vietnam). Once elements in different mental spaces are linked by a mapping, it is possible to refer to an element in one space by using language more appropriate for the other space. For example, one might utter (13) to convey Orlando Bloom's penchant for wearing necklaces. As in (11), (13) would involve the construction of two mental spaces: one for reality and one for the movie. Element b stands for Bloom in reality space, whereas b' stands for Bond in movie space, and (given that wearing jewelry is unlikely for the very macho James Bond character) the predicate wears-jewelry pertains to b and not b'. Thus, in (13), the speaker refers to b (Bloom), only indirectly by naming its counterpart b' (Bond). In mental space theory, the possibility of using a term from one space to refer to a linked element in another domain is known as the 'access principle.'

Reality		*Movie*
b	→	b'
Bloom (b)		Bond (b')
Wears-Jewelry (b)		

The access principle is in fact central to the account of metaphor in mental space theory.

(14) *Paris is the heart of France*.
(15) *The heart of France is under attack*.

On Fauconnier's (1994) account, a metaphor such as (14) is handled by setting up two mental spaces: one for the source domain (anatomy) and one for the target (geography).

Anatomy		*Geography*
Heart	→	Paris
Body	→	France

The heart is linked to Paris, and the body is linked to France by analogy mappings. Once these spaces are linked, one can refer to Paris as the heart of France, as in (15). Moreover, as in conceptual metaphor theory, cognitive models that detail the importance of the heart to sustaining the body are cognitively accessible to the target domain and can be mapped onto target space counterparts.

Conceptual Blending and Metaphor

Fauconnier and Turner (1998) suggested that metaphoric mappings were one manifestation of a more general integration process that crucially involved the construction of blended mental spaces. 'Blended spaces' are mental spaces that are built up online to incorporate information from different frames, as well as local contextual information. Central to conceptual blending theory is the notion of the 'conceptual integration network,' an array of mental spaces in which the processes of conceptual blending unfold (Fauconnier and Turner, 1998). These networks consist of two or more input spaces structured by information from discrete cognitive domains, a generic space that contains structure common to the inputs, and a blended space that contains selected aspects of structure from each input space along with any emergent structure that arises in the course of comprehension. Blending involves the establishment of partial mappings between cognitive models in different spaces in the network and the projection of conceptual structure from space to space. One motivation for blending theory is the observation that metaphoric expressions often have implications that do not appear to originate in either the source or the target domain. For example, although neither butchers nor surgeons are customarily considered incompetent, a surgeon metaphorically described by his or her colleagues as a butcher does not have a good reputation. In blending theory, appreciating this metaphor involves establishing mappings between elements and relations in the source input of butchery and the target input of surgery. As in conceptual metaphor theory, there is a mapping between surgeon and butcher, patient and dead animal, as well as scalpel

and cleaver. However, blending theory also posits the construction of a blended space in which structures from each of these inputs can be integrated. In this example, the blended space inherits the goals of the surgeon and the means and manner of the butcher (Grady et al., 1999). The inference that the surgeon is incompetent arises when these structures are integrated to create a hypothetical agent with both characteristics. Behavior that is perfectly appropriate for a butcher whose goal is to slaughter an animal is appalling for the surgeon operating on a live human being (conceptual integration network for *That surgeon is a butcher*). The fact that the inference of incompetence does not originate in the source domain of butchery is further suggested by the existence of other metaphoric uses of butcher – such as describing a military official as the butcher of Srebenica – that recruit structure and imagery from the butchery domain but do not connote incompetence. Differences in the implications of the butcher metaphor in the domains of medicine and the military highlight the need for an account of their underlying conceptual origin. Blending can also be used to explain how the target domain influences the meaning of metaphoric expressions. For example, the metaphoric idiom digging your own grave is used to imply that someone is unwittingly contributing to their own failure. While this metaphor depends on conventional metaphoric mappings between death and failure, the meaning of the metaphor in the target domain does not seem to result from a straightforward projection from the source domain of grave digging. If the target domain concerns a case where one's ill-advised stock purchases lead to financial ruin, the digger maps onto the purchaser, the digging maps onto the purchasing, and the digger's death maps onto the purchaser's financial ruin. However, note that in the realistic domain of grave-digging, there is no causal relationship between digging and the gravedigger's death. The blended space thus invokes its imagery from the source input space but obtains its causal structure from the target input (Coulson, 2001; Fauconnier and Turner, 2002). Furthermore, unlike metaphor theory, which attempts to explain generalizations in metaphoric expressions via the conceptual mappings that motivate them, conceptual blending theory attempts to explain meaning construction operations that underlie particular metaphoric expressions. Consequently, blending theory can address the meaning construction in metaphoric expressions that do not employ conventionalized mapping schemes. For example, the italicized portion of this excerpt from an interview with philosopher Daniel Dennet involves a metaphorical blend: ''There's not a thing that's magical about a computer. One of the most brilliant things about a computer is that there's nothing up its sleeve'' (Edge 94, November 19, 2001). The input domains here are computers and magicians, and the blend involves a hybrid model in which the computer is a magician. However, the connection between these

two domains arises purely from the cotext of this example, as there is no conventional COMPUTERS ARE MAGICIANS mapping in English. Blending also can be used to explain how a number of different kinds of mappings can be combined to explain the meaning of a particular example such as (16) (from Grady et al., 1999). (16) With Trent Lott as the Senate Majority Leader, and Gingrich at the helm in the House, the list to the Right could destabilize the entire Ship of State. This example involves an elaboration of the conventional Nation-as-Ship metaphor, in which the Nation's policies correspond to the ship's course, leadership corresponds to steering the ship, and policy failures correspond to deviations from the ship's course. The Nation-as-Ship metaphor is itself structured by the more abstract event structure metaphor. The source input is the domain of Ships, which projects an image of a ship on the water, as well as the concept of the helm, to the blended space. The target input is the domain of American politics, which projects particular elements, including Trent Lott and Gingrich, to the blend, where they are integrated with the sailing scenario. Example (16) describes the ship listing to the right. However, in the realistic domain of ships, neither the presence of one individual (Trent Lott) nor the beliefs of the helmsman are likely to cause the ship to list. The logic of this metaphoric utterance comes not from the source input but rather the target input in which the Senate Majority Leader and the Speaker of the House can affect national policies and the overall political orientation of government. Furthermore, the standard association between conservatism and the right as against liberalism and the left is clearly not based on the ship model, as it is frequently encountered in other contexts. However, because the scenario in the blend involves spatial motion, the literal notion of rightward movement is integrated with the other structure in the blend to yield a cognitive model of a ship piloted by Newt Gingrich that lists to the right. Consequently, Fauconnier and Turner (2002) proposed that metaphoric utterances are mentally represented in networks of mental spaces known as 'integration networks.' As noted earlier, conceptual integration networks are comprised of four mental spaces. The source and target domain each structure one input space; the generic space represents abstract commonalities in the inputs; and the blended space inherits structure from its inputs as well as containing emergent structure of its own. Rather than emphasizing the extent to which metaphorical utterances instantiate entrenched mappings between source and target domains, conceptual integration networks only represent those cognitive models that are particularly relevant to the mapping supported by the utterance. While mappings in the integration network require knowledge of conceptual metaphors, such as KNOWING IS SEEING, blending theory is best suited for representing the joint

influence of input domains and the origin of emergent inferences in particular metaphoric utterances.

Metaphor, Conceptual Blending, and Linguistic Theory

In part because of its origin in mental space theory, conceptual blending theory suggests that the meaning construction operations that underlie metaphoric meanings are but a subset of those involved in other sorts of indirect reference. By treating all sorts of mappings as formally identical, it is possible to understand the transfer of structure in metaphor as being fundamentally similar to the transfer of structure in non-metaphorical instances. Thus, regardless of whether or not the information being combined originates in different domains, the integrative operations can be understood as requiring the construction of mappings between partial structures that originate in different mental spaces. This formal identity allows for the unification of the treatment of metaphor – which principally recruits analogy mappings – with the treatment of 'counterfactuals' and 'conditionals,' conceptual blends that often recruit identity mappings. A number of researchers working within the framework of conceptual blending have addressed its implications for counterfactuals (e.g., Coulson, 2000; Fauconnier, 1997; Oakley, 1998). Similarly, the formal treatment of all sorts of mappings is useful in explaining the variety of complex combinations coded for by modified noun phrases. For example, blending theory has been used to explore issues of noun modification in seemingly simple cases like red pencil (Sweetser, 2000), more exotic cases like land yacht and dolphin-safe tuna (Turner and Fauconnier, 1995), and privative constructions such as alleged affair and fake gun (Coulson and Fauconnier, 1996). The most obvious application of conceptual metaphor and blending theory, however, is in lexical semantics, or the study of word meaning. The pervasiveness of metaphoric meanings suggests that metaphoric extension is a major factor in the emergence of new senses, and thus plays an important role in 'polysemy'. Polysemy is the phenomenon in which a single word form has many related senses, as in cut paper, cut the budget, and cut corners. Because most words have an array of interrelated senses, metaphor and blending can be used to explain how these different senses can be seen as extensions and elaborations that arise as a function of different contextual circumstances. Another productive process for creating word senses is 'metonymy,' in which words are used to refer to concepts closely related to their more customary referents. For example, in (17), Shakespeare refers not to the man, but to the plays authored by the man. Similarly, in (18), the White House refers not to the building but to the people who work in the building.

(17) *Kenneth loves Shakespeare*.
(18) *The White House never admits an error*.

The interaction of metaphor and metonymy has recently emerged as a major focus of research in cognitive linguistics (see, e.g., Dirven and Poerings, 2003). Accounts of both metaphor and metonymy are important for the study of how meanings change over time (Sweetser, 1990; Traugott and Dasher, 2001). Conceptual metaphor theory can identify conventional mapping schemes, such as the event structure metaphor, to describe patterns of semantic change, and the experiential grounding of primary metaphors might help explain why some patterns are more pervasive than others. Moreover, conceptual blending theory, with its capacity to describe the integration of general knowledge and contextual circumstances, might be used to address historical, social, and psychological causes of semantic change.

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