МІНІСТЕРСТВО ОСВІТИ І НАУКИ УКРАЇНИ
РІВНЕНСЬКИЙ ДЕРЖАВНИЙ ГУМАНІТАРНИЙ УНІВЕРСИТЕТ
ФІЛОЛОГІЧНИЙ ФАКУЛЬТЕТ
КАФЕДРА РОМАНО-ГЕРМАНСЬКОЇ ФІЛОЛОГІЇ

КОГНІТИВНА ЛІНГВІСТИКА: ІСТОРІЯ ВИНИКНЕННЯ, РОЗВИТОК НАУКОВИХ ШКІЛ, СТАНОВЛЕННЯ

(назва навчальної дисципліни)

МЕТОДИЧНІ РЕКОМЕНДАЦІЇ ДО ПРАКТИЧНИХ ЗАНЯТЬ
навчальної дисципліни
підготовки Доктор філософії (PhD)
(назва освітньо-наукового рівня)
спеціальність 035 Філологія
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ЗМІСТ

ВСТУП

Програма вивчення навчальної дисципліни «Когнітивна лінгвістика: історія виникнення, розвиток наукових шкіл, становлення» складена відповідно до освітньої програми підготовки Доктора філософії (PhD) за спеціальністю 035 Філологія.

Предметом вивчення навчальної дисципліни є людська когніція – взаємодія систем сприйняття, уявлення та особливості засвоєння й обробки інформації за допомогою мовних знаків; роль мови в концептуалізації та категоризації світу, в пізнавальних процесах і узагальненні людського досвіду; зв'язок когнітивних здібностей людини з мовою та форми їх взаємодії.

Міждисциплінарні зв'язки. Акцентуючи увагу на взаємозв'язках та взаємодії мови та мислення, курс розглядає питання, пов'язані з логікою (логічний аналіз мови), (когнітивною) психологією (психолінгвістика), нейрофізіологією (нейролінгвістика), теорією штучного інтелекту.

1. ОПИС НАВЧАЛЬНОЇ ДИСЦИПЛІНИ

Курс покликаний розширити та поглибити в аспірантів знання з теорії та історії когнітивної лінгвістики, спонукати критично оцінювати становлення, проблематику та перспективи сучасної когнітивної лінгвістики. У результаті освоєння програми здобувач повинен критично оцінювати основні поняття та терміни когнітивної лінгвістики, освоїти методику когнітивного аналізу, а також сформувати уявлення про структури репрезентації знань та про принципи концептуалізації й категоризації зовнішнього та внутрішнього світу людини, їх віддзеркалення в структурі та семантиці мовних одиниць. Поставлена мета визначає оволодіння аспірантами комплексу знань та навичок: скласти загальну уяву про стан сучасної лінгвістичної науки; чітко усвідомити етапи становлення та розвитку когнітивної лінгвістики; опанувати теоретичні засади когнітивної лінгвістики та вміти застосовувати їх практично при проведенні концептуального аналізу мовного матеріалу, прогнозувати перспективи подальших досліджень у межах когнітивної лінгвістики.

Згідно з вимогами освітньої програми аспіранти повинні:

знати: становлення та розвиток основних напрямів у сучасній когнітивній лінгвістиці, історію виникнення, розвиток наукових шкіл, становлення методологічної бази когнітивної лінгвістики, основні риси когнітивного підходу до мови, основні категорії і постулати когнітивної лінгвістики, методи і прийоми опису концептів, їх моделювання;

вміти: критично оцінювати передвісників та основоположників когнітивної лінгвістики, їх лінгвістичні погляди та методи дослідження, чітко характеризувати головні періоди становлення когнітивної лінгвістики, розрізняти специфіку та проблеми різних напрямів когнітивної лінгвістики, їх представників та коло їхніх наукових інтересів, логічно та аргументовано викладати проблематику сучасних напрямів розвитку когнітивної лінгвістики, давати визначення основних понять, характеризувати дослідження провідних вчених певного напряму.

Програмні результати: а) знання основ філософії науки, загальних проблем пізнання, актуальних проблем розвитку філологічної науки; б) сучасних методів проведення досліджень у галузі філології та в суміжних галузях науки; сучасних уявлень про принципи структурної і функціональної організації досліджуваних мовних систем; в) уміння самостійно планувати та виконувати

дослідження, оцінювати отримані результати, застосовувати їх у подальших наукових розвідках у галузі філології; г) логічно та аргументовано викладати проблематику сучасних напрямів розвитку лінгвістики, уміло й доречно використовувати основні лінгвістичні поняття; ґ) застосовувати системний підхід, інтегруючи знання з інших дисциплін, під час проведення досліджень із філології; аналізувати й критично оцінювати інформацію з різних джерел; д) аргументувати вибір методів розв'язування спеціалізованих завдань, критично оцінювати отримані результати й захищати прийняті рішення; оцінювати доцільність і можливість застосування нових методів, технологій у галузі філології.

Програма розрахована на 24 години практичних занять.

2. ПРОГРАМА НАВЧАЛЬНОЇ ДИСЦИПЛІНИ «КОГНІТИВНА ЛІНГВІСТИКА: ІСТОРІЯ ВИНИКНЕННЯ, РОЗВИТОК НАУКОВИХ ШКІЛ, СТАНОВЛЕННЯ»

Змістовий модуль 1. Когнітивна лінгвістика і її місце в сучасній науковій парадигмі.
Тема 1. Етапи становлення когнітивної лінгвістики.
Тема 2. Основні категорії і постулати когнітивної лінгвістики.

Змістовий модуль 2. Семантика в когнітивній лінгвістиці.
Тема 3. Основні ідеї когнітивної семантики: теоретичні передумови.
Тема 4. Основні ідеї когнітивної семантики: застосування та результати.

Змістовий модуль 3. Когнітивна лінгвістика на сучасному етапі.
Тема 5. Когнітивна ономасіологія.
Тема 6. Когнітивні теорії граматики.

3. ТЕМИ ПРАКТИЧНИХ ЗАНЯТЬ

1.	Когнітивна лінгвістика в системі наук. Становлення когнітивної лінгвістики: джерела та етапи формування науки. Проблеми, задачі і постулати науки. Мова як об'єкт когнітивних досліджень, зв'язок мови з мисленнєвими та психічними процесами і структурами.	4
2.	Термінологічна база когнітивної лінгвістики. Поняття концептуалізації та категоризації. Поняття концепту і концептосфери. Номінативне поле концепту. Концепт і значення. Структура концепту. Концептуальний аналіз. Типологія концептів: конкретно-чуттєвий образ, уявлення, схема, поняття, фрейм, сценарій, гештальт тощо. Структура прототипної категорії. Поняття прототипу, види прототипів: зразок, еталон, стереотип, ідеал тощо. Поняття «фамільна подібність». Основні моделі категоризації: пропозиціональні моделі, схематичні моделі образів, метафоричні та метонімічні моделі. Типи категорій: категорії базового рівня, класичні, породжувані, радіальні, градуйовані, кластерні та інші категорії.	4
3.	Когнітивна семантика як один із центральних розділів когнітивної лінгвістики. Експерієнціальна теорія Дж. Лакоффа. Когнітивна граматика Р. Ленекера. Теорія ментальних просторів Ж. Фокон'є. Концепція «онтологічних категорій» Р. Джакендоффа. Комплексні примітиви К. Ванделуаза. Фреймова концепція Ч. Філлмора. Концепція фреймів С.А. Жаботинської. Фреймова семантика як метод аналізу та спосіб представлення значення мовних одиниць.	4
4.	Вивчення метафори і метонімії в когнітивній лінгвістиці. «Метафори, в яких ми живемо» Дж. Лакоффа, М. Джонсона. Семантика прийменників у працях А. Герсковітц. Топологічна семантика.	4
5.	Дослідницькі напрямки когнітивної ономасіології. Структура ментально-психонетичного комплексу. Концепція О.О. Селіванової. Модель диктуму пропозиції ментально-психонетичного комплексу. Термінально-асоціативна модель ментально-психонетичного комплексу. Пропозитивно-диктумна	2

	мотивація. Асоціативно-термінальна мотивація. Змішаний тип мотивації. Концептуально-інтеграційна мотивація. Псевдомотивація.	
6.	Когнітивні теорії граматики. Граматика конструкцій Ч. Філлмора. Концепція конструкційної граматики А. Голдберг. Радикальна граматика конструкцій У. Крофта. Когнітивна теорія морфології Дж. Байбі.	4
7.	Індивідуальне науково-дослідне завдання.	2
	Разом	24

4. ПРАКТИЧНІ ЗАНЯТТЯ

Практичне заняття 1

Завдання І.

1. Когнітивна лінгвістика в системі наук.
2. Становлення когнітивної лінгвістики: джерела та етапи формування науки.
3. Проблеми, задачі і постулати когнітивної науки.
4. Мова як об'єкт когнітивних досліджень, зв'язок мови з мисленнєвими та психічними процесами і структурами.

Завдання ІІ.

1. Перегляньте «Hilpert M. A Course in Cognitive Linguistics: Introduction. Режим доступу: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WeH 3C39Dawg&list=PLK gdsSsfw-faeun9_0LVETPT-ZGpKptlj» і будьте готові до обговорення.
2. Прочитайте статтю *Talmy L. Cognitive Linguistics* і складіть розгорнутий план її змісту.

Література:

1. Величковский Б. М. Когнитивная наука: основы психологии познания. М.: Смысл; Издательский центр «Академия», 2006. Т. 1. 448 с.
2. Демьянков В. З. Когнитивизм, когниция, язык и лингвистическая теория. *Язык и структуры представления знаний*. Сб. научно-аналитических обзоров. М.: Российская Академия наук, 1992. С. 39–77.
3. Демьянков В. З. Когнитивная лингвистика как разновидность интерпретирующего подхода. *Вопросы языкознания*. 1994. № 4. С.17–33.
4. Кравченко А. В. Когнитивная лингвистика и новая эпистемология (к вопросу об идеальном проекте языкознания). *Известия АН. Серия литературы и языка*. 2001. Т. 60. № 5. С. 3–13.
5. Кубрякова Е.С. Проблемы представления знаний в современной науке и роль лингвистики в решении этих проблем. *Язык и структуры представления знаний*. Сб. научно-аналитических обзоров. М.: Российская Академия наук, 1992. С. 4–38.
6. Кубрякова Е.С. Начальные этапы становления когнитивизма: лингвистика – психология – когнитивная наука. *Вопросы языкознания*. 1994. № 4. С. 68–78.

7. Кубрякова Е. С. Язык и знание: на пути получения знаний о языке: части речи с когнитивной точки зрения. Роль языка в познании мира. М.: Языки славянских культур, 2004. 555 с.
8. Evans V., Green M. Cognitive Linguistics. New York: Routledge, 2018. 830 p.
9. Hilferty J. Cognitive linguistics: an introductory sketch. Режим доступу до ресурсу: http://lingua.fil.es/~hilferty/coglx.pdf
10. Langacker R. Foundations of cognitive grammar: theoretical prerequisites. V. 1. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1987. 516 p.

Практичне заняття 2

Завдання І.

1. Термінологічна база когнітивної лінгвістики.

2. Поняття концептуалізації та категоризації. Поняття концепту і концептосфери. Номінативне поле концепту. Концепт і значення. Структура концепту.

3. Концептуальний аналіз. Типологія концептів: конкретно-чуттєвий образ, уявлення, схема, поняття, фрейм, сценарій, гештальт тощо.

4. Структура прототипної категорії. Поняття прототипу, види прототипів: зразок, еталон, стереотип, ідеал тощо. Поняття «фамільна подібність».

5. Основні моделі категоризації: пропозиціональні моделі, схематичні моделі образів, метафоричні та метонімічні моделі.

6. Типи категорій: категорії базового рівня, класичні, породжувані, радіальні, градуйовані, кластерні та інші категорії.

Завдання ІІ.

1. Перегляньте «Болдырев Н.Н. Теория категоризации. Режим доступу: http://tube.sfu-kras.ru/video/1647» і будьте готові до обговорення.

2. Прочитайте статтю *Margolis E., Laurence S. Concepts* і складіть розгорнутий план її змісту.

Література:

1. Болдырев Н.Н. Когнитивная семантика. Тамбов: Изд-во ТГУ, 2000. 123 с.

2. Кибрик А. Е. Лингвистическая реконструкция когнитивной структуры. *Первая российская конференция по когнитивной науке*. Тезисы докладов. Казань: Изд-во Казанского гос. ун-та, 2004. С. 110–111.

3. Кравченко А. В. Язык и восприятие: когнитивные аспекты языковой категоризации. Иркутск: Изд-во Иркутского ун-та, 1996. 160 с.

4. Кубрякова Е.С. Категоризация мира: пространство и время (вступительное слово). *Категоризация мира: пространство и время*. Материалы научной конференции. М.: МГУ им. М.В. Ломоносова. 1997. С. 5–14.

5. Никитин М.В. Основания когнитивной семантики. СПб.: РГПУ, 2003. 277 с.

6. Панкрац Ю.Г. Пропозициональная форма представления знаний. *Язык и структуры представления знаний*. Сб. научно-аналитических обзоров. М.: Российская Академия наук. 1992. С. 78–97.

7. Стернин И.А., Попова З.Д. Когнитивная лингвистика. М.: Восток-Запад, 2007. 320 с.

8. Семантика и категоризация / АН СССР Ин-т языкознания: Р.М. Фрумкина и др. М.: Наука, 1991. 168 с.

9. Evans V., Green M. Cognitive Linguistics. New York: Routledge, 2018. 830 p.

10. Langacker R. Foundations of cognitive grammar: theoretical prerequisites. V. 1. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1987. 516 p.

Практичне заняття 3

Завдання І.

1. Когнітивна семантика як один із центральних розділів когнітивної лінгвістики.

2. Експерієнціальна теорія Дж. Лакоффа.

3. Когнітивна граматика Р. Ленекера.

4. Теорія ментальних просторів Ж. Фокон’є.

5. Концепція «онтологічних категорій» Р. Джакендоффа.

6. Комплексні примітиви К. Ванделуаза.

7. Фреймова концепція Ч. Філлмора. Концепція фреймів С.А. Жаботинської.

8. Фреймова семантика як метод аналізу та спосіб представлення значення мовних одиниць.

Завдання ІІ.

1. Перегляньте «A course in Cognitive Linguistics: Cognitive Grammar. Режим доступу: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dDfX 3971Z_A» і будьте готові до обговорення.

2. Перегляньте «George Lakoff on Embodied Cognition and Language. Режим доступу: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XWYao AoijdQ» і будьте готові до обговорення.

3. Прочитайте статтю *Taylor J.R. Cognitive Semantics* і складіть розгорнутий план її змісту.

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2. Жаботинская С.А. Концептуальный анализ: типы фреймов. *Вісник Черкаського ун-ту*. 1999. Вип. 11. С. 12–25.
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4. Рахилина Е. В. Когнитивная семантика: история, персоналии, идеи, результаты. *Семиотика и информатика*. 1998. Вып. 36. С. 274–323.
5. Рахилина Е. В. Основные идеи когнитивной семантики. *Современная американская лингвистика: Фундаментальные направления*. М: Едиториал УРСС, 2002. С. 370–389.
6. Рахилина Е. В., Резникова Т. И. Фреймовый подход к лексической типологии. *Вопросы языкознания*. 2013. № 2. С. 3–31.
7. Филлмор Ч. Основные проблемы лексической семантики. *Новое в зарубежной лингвистике*. 1988. Вып. 12. С. 74–122.
8. Филлмор Ч. Фреймы и семантика понимания. *Новое в зарубежной лингвистике: Когнитивные аспекты языка*. 1988. Вып. 23. С. 52–92.
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10. Evans V., Green M. Cognitive Linguistics. New York: Routledge, 2018. 830 p.
11. Fauconnier G. Mappings in thought and language. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997. 201 p.
12. Jackendoff R. S. Semantics and cognition. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1986. 297 p.

13. Lakoff G. Women, fire, and dangerous things: what categories reveal about the mind. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990. 345 p.
14. Langacker R. Foundations of cognitive grammar: theoretical prerequisites. V. 1. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1987. 516 p.
15. Langacker R. Foundations of cognitive grammar: descriptive application. V. 2. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1987. 590 p.
16. Talmy L. Toward a cognitive semantics: In 2 vol. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000a. Vol. 1: Concept structuring systems. 565 p.
17. Talmy L. Toward a cognitive semantics: In 2 vol. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000b. Vol. 2: Typology and process in concept structuring. 495 p.

Практичне заняття 4

Завдання І.

1. Вивчення метафори і метонімії в когнітивній лінгвістиці.
2. «Метафори, в яких ми живемо» Дж. Лакоффа, М. Джонсона.
3. Семантика прийменників у працях А. Герсковітц.
4. Топологічна семантика.

Завдання ІІ.

1. Перегляньте «George Lakoff on how he started his work on conceptual metaphor. Режим доступу: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =Eu-9rpJITY8» і будьте готові до обговорення.
2. Перегляньте «Metaphors we live by. Режим доступу: https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=kaWS4wRrcbg» і будьте готові до обговорення.
3. Прочитайте статтю *Chilton P. Metaphors in Political Discourse* і складіть розгорнутий план її змісту.

Література:

1. Лакофф Дж., Джонсон М. Метафоры, которыми мы живем. *Теория метафоры*. М.: Прогресс, 1990. С. 387–416.
2. Лакофф Дж. Мышление в зеркале классификаторов. *Новое в зарубежной лингвистике: Когнитивные аспекты языка*. 1988. Вып. 23. С. 12-51.
3. Рахилина Е. В. Основные идеи когнитивной семантики. *Современная американская лингвистика: Фундаментальные направления*. М.: Едиториал УРСС, 2002. С. 370–389.

4. Ченки А. Современные когнитивные подходы к семантике: сходства и различия в теориях и целях. *Вопросы языкознания*. 1996. № 2. С.68–78.

5. Evans V., Green M. Cognitive Linguistics. New York: Routledge, 2018. 830 p.

6. Haser V. Metaphor, metonymy, and experientialist philosophy: Challenging cognitive semantics. Berlin; New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2005. 296 p.

7. Lakoff G. Women, fire, and dangerous things: what categories reveal about the mind. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990. 345 p.

8. Langacker R. Foundations of cognitive grammar: theoretical prerequisites. V. 1. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1987. 516 p.

9. Radden G., Kövecses Z. Towards a theory of metonymy. *Metonymy in language and thought*. Amsterdam / Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publ., Co., 1999. P. 17–60.

Практичне заняття 5

Завдання І.

1. Дослідницькі напрямки когнітивної ономасіології.
2. Структура ментально-психонетичного комплексу.
3. Концепція О.О. Селіванової.
4. Модель диктуму пропозиції ментально-психонетичного комплексу.
5. Термінально-асоціативна модель ментально-психонетичного комплексу.
6. Пропозитивно-диктумна мотивація. Асоціативно-термінальна мотивація. Змішаний тип мотивації. Концептуально-інтеграційна мотивація. Псевдомотивація.

Завдання ІІ.

1. Перегляньте «Onomasiology. Режим доступу: https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=iwUVhJx4YrU» і будьте готові до обговорення.
2. Прочитайте статтю *Geeraerts D. Onomasiology and Lexical Variation* і складіть розгорнутий план її змісту.

Література:

1. Кубрякова Е.С. Части речи с когнитивной точки зрения. М.: Ин-т языкознания РАН ИЯ, 1997. 328 с.

2. Стернин И.А., Попова З.Д. Когнитивная лингвистика. М.: Восток-Запад, 2007. 320 с.

3. Рахилина Е. В. Когнитивный анализ предметных имен: от сочетаемости к семантике. М.: Русские словари, 2008. 416 с.

4. Селиванова Е.А. Теоретические основы когнитивной ономасиологии. *Вісник Черкаського ун-ту*. 1999. Вип. 11. С. 3–12.

5. Селиванова Е.А. Когнитивная ономасиология. К.: Фитосоциоцентр, 2000. 248 с.

6. Селіванова О.О. Актуальні напрями сучасної лінгвістики (аналітичний огляд). К.: Фитосоциоцентр, 1999. 148 с.

7. Evans V., Green M. Cognitive Linguistics. New York: Routledge, 2018. 830 p.

8. Langacker R. Foundations of cognitive grammar: theoretical prerequisites. V. 1. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1987. 516 p.

Практичне заняття 6

Завдання І.

1. Когнітивні теорії граматики.
2. Граматика конструкцій Ч. Філлмора.
3. Концепція конструкційної граматики А. Голдберг.
4. Радикальна граматика конструкцій В. Крофта.
5. Когнітивна теорія морфології Дж. Байбі.

Завдання ІІ.

1. Перегляньте «Adele Goldberg on Linguistics and Grammar. Режим доступу: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FVuyhx2msTI» і будьте готові до обговорення.

2. Перегляньте «What is Construction Grammar? Режим доступу: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9DllnszLuM0» і будьте готові до обговорення.

3. Прочитайте статтю *Michaelis L.A. Construction Grammar* і складіть розгорнутий план її змісту.

Література:

1. Кубрякова Е.С. Начальные этапы становления когнитивизма: лингвистика – психология – когнитивная наука. *Вопросы языкознания*. 1994. № 4. С. 68–78.

2. Рахилина Е. В., Плунгян В. А. Ю. Д. Апресян как теоретик Грамматики конструкций. *Слово и язык*. Сборник статей к восьмидесятилетию академика Ю. Д. Апресяна. М.: Языки славянских культур, 2011. С. 548–557.

3. Филлмор Ч. Основные проблемы лексической семантики. *Новое в зарубежной лингвистике*. 1988. Вып. 12. С. 74–122.

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9. Goldberg A. E. The inherent semantics of argument structure: The case of the English detransitive construction. *Cognitive linguistics: Basic readings*. Berlin; New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2006. P. 401–438.

5. ІНДИВІДУАЛЬНІ ЗАВДАННЯ

Індивідуальне науково-дослідне завдання виконується у формі доповіді. Доповідь – робота, в якій висвітлюється тема завдання, даються висновки, пропозиції. Представлення доповіді передбачає усне (публічне) виголошення та обговорення. Мова виголошення – англійська. Обсяг доповіді – 10-12 сторінок.

Структура тексту доповіді

Зміст – структурування тексту.

Вступ – зазначаються підстави, причини, проблемна ситуація, що зумовили необхідність написання доповіді.

Основна частина – аналізується сучасний стан проблеми, наводяться аргументи, обґрунтовується основна ідея.

Підсумкова частина – містить висновки, рекомендації, пропозиції.

Список використаної літератури – публікації переважно останніх 5-10 років.

Вимоги до оформлення доповіді

Титульний лист містить таку інформацію: назва закладу вищої освіти, назва кафедри, назва теми доповіді; прізвище, ім'я, по батькові аспіранта, курс, група; назва спеціальності, спеціалізації; місто, рік.

Аркуш формату А4, надрукованих через 1,5 інтервалу, шрифт Times New Roman 14, абзац – 1,25 см.

Поля сторінок: верхнє – 20 мм, нижнє – 20 мм, праве – 20 мм, ліве – 20 мм.

Рівняння тексту – по ширині сторінки, без переносів.

Заголовки структурних частин: ЗМІСТ, ВСТУП, ОСНОВНА ЧАСТИНА, ПІДСУМКОВА ЧАСТИНА, СПИСОК ВИКОРИСТАНОЇ ЛІТЕРАТУРИ друкують великими літерами симетрично до тексту.

Рукопис повен бути послідовно пронумерований (номер сторінки – внизу, по центру).

Оцінка індивідуальних завдань

Індивідуальне науково-дослідне завдання оцінюється в 25 балів: 15 балів – оформлення доповіді, 10 балів – презентація та захист доповіді.

Теми індивідуальних завдань

1. Когнітивна лінгвістика в системі наук.
2. Становлення когнітивної лінгвістики: джерела та етапи формування науки.
3. Проблеми, задачі і постулати науки.
4. Антропоцентризм як основна наукова парадигма когнітивно-лінгвістичного підходу.
5. Когніція: погляд з позицій когнітивної лінгвістики.
6. Мова як об’єкт когнітивних досліджень, зв’язок мови з мисленнєвими та психічними процесами і структурами.
7. Термінологічна база когнітивної лінгвістики.
8. Поняття концептуалізації та категоризації.
9. Поняття концепту і концептосфери.
10. Номінативне поле концепту.
11. Концепт і значення. Структура концепту.
12. Концептуальний аналіз.
13. Типологія концептів: конкретно-чуттєвий образ, уявлення, схема, поняття, фрейм, сценарій, гештальт тощо.
14. Передумови виникнення й психологічні основи прототипного підходу, його основні принципи.
15. Структура прототипної категорії.
16. Поняття прототипу, види прототипів: зразок, еталон, стереотип, ідеал тощо.
17. Поняття «фамільна подібність».
18. Основні моделі категоризації: пропозиціональні моделі, схематичні моделі образів, метафоричні та метонімічні моделі.
19. Типи категорій: категорії базового рівня, класичні, породжувані, радіальні, градуйовані, кластерні та інші категорії.
20. Когнітивна семантика як один із центральних розділів когнітивної лінгвістики.
21. Експерієнціальна теорія Дж. Лакоффа.
22. Когнітивна граматика Р. Ленекера.
23. Теорія ментальних просторів Ж. Фокон’є.
24. Концепція «онтологічних категорій» Р. Джакендоффа.
25. Комплексні примітиви К. Ванделуаза.
26. Фреймова концепція Ч. Філлмора.
27. Концепція фреймів С.А. Жаботинської.
28. Фреймова семантика як метод аналізу та спосіб представлення значення мовних одиниць.

29. Вивчення метафори і метонімії в когнітивній лінгвістиці.
30. «Метафори, в яких ми живемо» Дж. Лакоффа, М. Джонсона.
31. Семантика прийменників у працях А. Герсковітц.
32. Топологічна семантика.
33. Дослідницькі напрямки когнітивної ономасіології.
34. Ономасіологічні структура та категорія. Концепція О.О. Селіванової.
35. Граматика конструкцій Ч. Філлмора.
36. Концепція конструкційної граматики А. Голдберг.
37. Радикальна граматика конструкцій В. Крофта.
38. Когнітивна теорія морфології Дж. Байбі.

6. СХЕМА НАРАХУВАННЯ БАЛІВ

Поточне тестування та самостійна робота						Сума
Змістовий модуль 1		Змістовий модуль 2		Змістовий модуль 3		ІНДЗ	
Т1	Т2	Т3	Т4	Т5	Т6		
5	5	5	5	5	5	25	100
Модульний контроль – 15		Модульний контроль – 15		Модульний контроль – 15			

№	Вид навчальної діяльності	Оціночні бали	Кількість балів
Т1	Робота на лекційних заняттях	5	5
Т2	Виконання завдань під час практичних занять	5	5
Модульний контроль: Тест		15	15
Т3	Виконання завдань самостійної роботи	5	5
Т4	Робота на лекційних заняттях	5	5
Модульний контроль: Тест		15	15
Т5	Виконання завдань під час практичних занять	5	5
Т6	Виконання завдань самостійної роботи	5	5
Модульний контроль: Тест		15	15
ІНДЗ: Доповідь на тему		25	25
Разом		100	

7. ДОДАТКИ

СТАТТІ ДО ПРАКТИЧНИХ ЗАНЯТЬ

Практичне заняття 1

Cognitive Linguistics
Leonard Talmy, 2006 | BUFFALO (USA)

Developing over the past two to three decades, cognitive linguistics has as its central concern the representation of conceptual structure in language. This relatively new field can initially be characterized through a contrast of its conceptual approach with two other familiar approaches, the formal and the psychological. The formal approach focuses on the overt structural patterns exhibited by linguistic forms, largely abstracted away from any associated meaning. The tradition of generative grammar has been centered here, but has had limited involvement with the other two approaches. Its formal semantics has largely included only enough about meaning to correlate with its formal categories and operations. And its reach to psychology has largely considered only the kinds of cognitive structure and processing needed to account for its formal categories and operations. The psychological approach regards language from the perspective of general cognitive systems such as perception, memory, attention, and reasoning. Centered here, the field of psychology has also addressed the other two approaches. Its conceptual concerns have included semantic memory, the associativity of concepts, the structure of categories, inference generation, and contextual knowledge. But it has insufficiently considered systematic conceptual structuring.

By contrast, the conceptual approach of cognitive linguistics is concerned with the patterns in which and processes by which conceptual content is organized in language. It has thus addressed the linguistic structuring of such basic conceptual categories as space and time, scenes and events, entities and processes, motion and location, and force and causation. To these it adds the basic ideational and affective categories attributed to cognitive agents, such as attention and perspective, volition and intention, and expectation and affect. It addresses the semantic structure of morphological and lexical forms, as well as of syntactic patterns. And it addresses the interrelationships of conceptual structures, such as those in metaphoric mapping, those within a semantic frame, those between text and

context, and those in the grouping of conceptual categories into large structuring systems. Overall, the aim of cognitive linguistics is to ascertain the global integrated system of conceptual structuring in language. Further, cognitive linguistics addresses the formal properties of language, accounting for grammatical structure in terms of its representation of conceptual structure. And, distinguishing it from earlier semantics, cognitive linguistics relates its findings to the cognitive structures of the psychological approach. Its long-range trajectory is to integrate the linguistic and the psychological perspectives on cognitive organization in a unified understanding of human conceptual structure.

Many of the major themes of cognitive linguistics can be related in a way that shows the overall structure of the field. A beginning observation is that language consists of two subsystems – the open-class or lexical, and the closed-class or grammatical – that have different semantic and functional properties. Closed-class, but not open-class forms, exhibit great semantic constraint, and do so at two levels. First, their referents can belong to certain semantic categories, such as number, gender, and tense, but not to others such as color or material. For example, inflections on a noun indicate its number in many languages, but never its color. Second, they can refer only to certain concepts even within an acceptable category like number – e.g., 'singular,' 'dual,' 'plural,' and 'paucal,' but never 'even,' 'odd,' or 'dozen.' Certain principles govern this semantic constraint, e.g., the exclusion of reference to Euclidean properties such as specificity of magnitude or shape. What largely remain are topological properties such as the magnitude-neutral distance represented by the deictics in *This speck/planet is smaller than that speck/planet*, or the shape-neutral path represented by the preposition in *I circled/zigzagged through the forest*. The two subsystems differ also in their basic functions, with conceptual content represented by open-class forms and conceptual structure by closed-class forms. For example, in the overall conception evoked by the sentence *A rustler lassoed the steers*, the three semantically rich open-class forms – *rustle, lasso, steer* – contribute most of the content, while most of the structure is determined by the remaining closed-class forms. Shifts in all the closed-class forms – as in *Will the lassoers rustle a steer*? – restructure the conception but leave the cowboy-landscape content largely intact, whereas a shift in the open-class forms – as in *A machine stamped the envelopes* – changes content while leaving the structure intact. The basic finding in this ''semantics of grammar'' portion of cognitive linguistics is that the closed-class subsystem is the fundamental conceptual structuring system of language (Talmy, 2000).

Such conceptual structure is understood in cognitive linguistics as 'schematic', with particular 'schemas' or 'image-schemas' represented in individual linguistic forms – whether alone in closed-class forms or with additional material in open-class forms. The idea is that the structural specifications of linguistic forms are regularly conceptualized in terms of abstracted, idealized, and sometimes virtually geometric delineations. Such schemas fall into conceptual categories that join in extensive 'schematic systems.' Many of the substantive findings about conceptual organization made by cognitive linguists can be placed within these schematic systems. One schematic system is 'configurational structure,' covering the structure of objects in space and events in time – often with parallels between the two. For example, in its category of 'plexity' – a term covering both number and aspect – the object referent of *bird* and the event referent of *(to) sigh* are intrinsically 'uniplex', but the addition of the extra forms in *bird*s and *keep sighing* triggers a cognitive operation of 'multiplexing' that yields multiplex referents. And in the category 'state of boundedness,' the intrinsically unbounded object and event referents of *water* and *(to) sleep* can undergo 'bounding' through the additional form in *some water* and *(to) sleep some* to yield bounded referents.

The second schematic system of 'perspective' covers the location or path of the point at which one places one's 'mental eyes' to regard a represented scene. For example, in *There are some houses in the valley*, the closed-class forms together represent a distal stationary perspective point with global scope of attention. But the substituted forms in *There is a house every now and then through the valley* represent a proximal moving perspective point with local scope of attention.

The third schematic system of 'attention' covers the patterns in which different aspects of a linguistic reference are foregrounded or backgrounded. For example, the word *hypotenuse* 'profiles' – foregrounds in attention – its direct reference to a line segment against an attentionally backgrounded 'base' of the conception of a right triangle (Langacker, 1987). The verb *bite* in *The dog bit the cat* foregrounds the 'active zone' of the dog's teeth. And over an expression of a certain kind, the 'Figure' or 'trajector' is the most salient constituent whose path or site is characterized in terms of a secondarily salient constituent, the 'Ground' or 'landmark.' These functional assignments accord with convention in *The bike is near the house*, but their reversal yields the odd *?The house is near the bike*.

A fourth schematic system of 'force dynamics' covers such relations between entities as opposition, resistance, overcoming, and blockage, and places causation alongside permitting and preventing, helping and

hindering. To illustrate, the sentence *The ball rolled along the green* is force dynamically neutral, but in *The ball kept rolling along the green*, either the ball's tendency toward rest is overcome by something like the wind, or its tendency toward motion overcomes something such as stiff grass (Talmy, 2000).

Schemas from all the schematic systems, and the cognitive operations they trigger can be nested to form intricate structural patterns. To illustrate with events in time, the uniplex event in *The beacon flashed* can be multiplexed as in *The beacon kept flashing*; this can be bounded as in *The beacon flashed 5 times in a row*; this can be treated as a new uniplexity and remultiplexed as in *The beacon kept flashing 5 times at a stre*tch; and this can in turn be rebounded, as in *The beacon flashed 5 times at a stretch for 3 hours.*

Further conceptual structuring is seen within the meanings of morphemes. A morpheme's meaning is generally a prototype category whose members differ in privilege, whose properties can vary in number and strength, and whose boundary can vary in scope (Lakoff, 1987). For example, the meaning of *breakfast* prototypically refers to eating certain foods in the morning, but can extend to other foods at that time or the same foods at other times (Fillmore, 1982). For a polysemous morpheme, one sense can function as the prototype to which the other senses are progressively linked by conceptual increments within a 'radial category.' Thus, for the preposition over, the prototype sense may be 'horizontal motion above an object' as in *The bird flew over the hill*, but linked to this by 'endpoint focus' is the sense in *Sam lives over the hill* (Brugmann, 1981).

These findings have led cognitive linguists to certain stances on the properties of conceptualization. The conceptual structuring found in language is largely held to be a product of human cognition and imposed on external phenomena (where it pertains to them), rather than arising from putative structure intrinsic to such external phenomena and veridically taken up by language. For example, in one type of 'fictive motion,' motion can be imputed to a shadow – cross linguistically always from an object to its silhouette – as in *The pole threw its shadow on the wall*, even though a distinct evaluative part of our cognition may judge the situation to lack physical motion. An important consequence is that alternatives of conceptualization or 'construal' can be applied to the same phenomena. Thus, a person standing 5 feet from and pointing to a bicycle can use either deictic in *Take away that/this bicycle*, in effect imputing the presence of a spatial boundary either between herself and the bicycle or on the far side of the bicycle.

The notion of 'embodiment' extends the idea of conceptual imposition and bases the imposed concepts largely on experiences humans have of their bodies interacting with environments or on psychological or neural structure (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). As one tenet of this view, the 'objectivist' notion of the autonomous existence of logic and reason is replaced by experiential or cognitive structure. For example, our sense of the meaning of the word *angle* is not derived from some independent ideal mathematical realm, but is rather built up from our experience, e.g., from perceptions of a static forking branch, from moving two sticks until their ends touch, or from rotating one stick while its end touches that of another.

The cognitive process of conceptual imposition – more general than going from mental to external phenomena or from experiential to ideal realms – also covers directed mappings from any one conceptual domain to another. An extensive form of such imputation is metaphor, mainly studied in cognitive linguistics not for its familiar salient form in literature but, under the term 'conceptual metaphor,' for its largely unconscious pervasive structuring of everyday expression. In it, certain structural elements of a conceptual 'source domain' are mapped onto the content of a conceptual 'target domain.' The embodiment-based directionality of the imputational mapping is from a more concrete domain, one grounded in bodily experience, to a more abstract domain – much as in the Piagetian theory of cognitive development. Thus, the more palpable domain of physical motion through space can be mapped onto the more abstract domain of progression through time – in fact, in two different ways – as in *We're approaching Christmas* and *Christmas is approaching* – whereas mappings in the reverse direction are minimal (Lakoff, 1992).

Generally, mappings between domains are implicit in metaphor, but are explicitly established by linguistic forms in the area of 'mental spaces.' The mapping here is again directional, going from a 'base' space – a conceptual domain generally factual for the speaker – to a subordinate space that can be counterfactual, representational, at a different time, etc. Elements in the former space connect to corresponding elements in the latter. Thus, in *Max thinks Harry's name is Joe*, the speaker's base space includes 'Max' and 'Harry' as elements; the word *thinks* sets up a subordinate space for a portion of Max's belief system; and this contains an element 'Joe' that corresponds to 'Harry' (Fauconnier, 1985). Further, two separate mental spaces can map elements of their content and structure into a third mental space that constitutes a 'blend' or 'conceptual integration' of the two inputs, with potentially novel structure. Thus, in referring to a modern catamaran reenacting a century-old voyage by an early clipper, a speaker can say *At*

this point, the catamaran is barely maintaining a 4 day lead over the clipper, thereby conceptually superimposing the two treks and generating the apparency of a race (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002).

In terms of the sociology of the field, there is considerable consensus across cognitive linguists on the assumptions of the field and on the body of work basic to it. No competing schools of thought have arisen, and cognitive linguists engage in relatively little critiquing of each other's work, which mainly differs only in the phenomena focused on.

Практичне заняття 2

Concepts
Eric Margolis, 2006 | HOUSTON (USA)
Stephen Laurence, 2006 | SHEFFIELD (UK)

In cognitive science, concepts are generally understood to be structured mental representations with subpropositional content. The concept CHAIR, for example, is a mental representation with the content *chair*. It is implicated in thoughts about chairs and is accessed in categorization processes that function to determine whether something is a chair. Theories of concepts are directed to explaining, among other things, the character of these processes and the structure of the representations involved. Related to this is the project of explaining what conceptual content is and how concepts come to have their content. In the study of conceptual structure, four broad approaches should be distinguished: (1) the classical theory, (2) probabilistic theories, (3) the theory-theory, and (4) conceptual atomism. For recent overviews of theories of concepts, see Margolis and Laurence (1999) and Murphy (2002).

The Classical Theory

According to the classical theory, concepts have definitional structure. A concept's constituents encode conditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for its application. A standard illustration of the theory is the concept BACHELOR, which is claimed to be composed of the representations UNMARRIED, ADULT, and MALE. Each of these is supposed to specify a condition that something must meet in order to be a bachelor and, if anything meets them all, it is a bachelor. The classical theory has always been an enormously attractive theory. Many theorists find it to be intuitively plausible that our concepts are definable. In addition, the theory brings with it a natural and compelling model of how concepts are learned. They are learned by assembling them from their constituents.

The classical theory also offers a straightforward account of categorization. Something is deemed to fall under a concept just in case it satisfies each and every condition that the concept's constituents encode. Finally, the theory appeals to the very same resources to explain the referential properties of a concept. A concept refers to those things that have each and every feature specified by its constituents. Of course, all of these explanations depend upon there being a separate treatment of the primitive

(i.e., unstructured) representations that ultimately make up the concepts we possess. But the classical theory supposes that a separate treatment can be given, perhaps one that grounds all of our concepts in perceptual primitives in accordance with traditional empiricist models of the mind.

The classical theory has come under considerable pressure in the last thirty years or so. In philosophy, the classical theory has been subjected to a number of criticisms but perhaps the most fundamental is that attempts to provide definitions for concepts have had a poor track record. There are few – if any – examples of uncontroversial definitional analyses. The problem isn't just confined to philosophically interesting concepts (e.g., JUSTICE) but extends to concepts of the most ordinary kind, such as GAME, PAINT, and even BACHELOR (Wittgenstein, 1953; Fodor *et al.*, 1980). What's more, Quine's (1951) influential critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction has led many philosophers to suppose that the problem with giving definitions is insurmountable.

For psychologists, the main objection to the classical theory has been that it appears to be at odds with what are known as 'typicality effects.' Typicality effects include a broad range of phenomena centered around the fact that certain exemplars are taken to be more representative or typical (Rosch and Mervis, 1975; Rosch, 1978). For instance, apples are judged to be more typical than plums with respect to the category of fruit, and subjects are quicker to judge that apples are a kind of fruit than to judge that plums are and make fewer errors in forming such judgments. Though not strictly inconsistent with these findings, the classical theory does nothing to explain them.

Probabilistic Theories

In response to the failings of the classical theory, Eleanor Rosch and others began exploring the possibility that concepts have a structure that is described as graded, probabilistic, or similarity-based (Smith and Medin, 1981). The difference between these approaches and the classical theory is that the constituents of a concept are no longer assumed to express features that its members have by definition. Instead, they are supposed to express features that its members tend to have. For example, a standard treatment for the concept BIRD incorporates constituents picking out the features *has wings, flies, eats worms*, etc., but probabilistic theories don't require all of these features to be possessed by something to count as a bird. Instead, something falls under the concept when it satisfies a sufficient (weighted) number of them (or on some accounts, something falls under the concept to

a degree corresponding to how many are satisfied; then nothing is a bird absolutely but only a bird to degree *n*).

Like the classical theory, probabilistic theories explain concept learning as a process where a concept is assembled from its constituents. And like the classical theory, probabilistic theories offer a unified treatment of reference and categorization. A concept refers to those things that satisfy enough of the features it encodes, and something is judged to fall under a concept when it satisfies enough of them as well. Categorization, on this account, is often described as a similarity comparison process. An item is categorized as belonging to a given category when the representations for each are deemed sufficiently similar, where this may be measured in terms of the number of constituents that they share.

One advantage of probabilistic theories is that a commitment to probabilistic structure may explain why definitions are so hard to come by. More important, however, is the way that probabilistic structure readily accommodates and explains typicality effects. This is achieved by maintaining that typicality, like categorization, is a similarity comparison process. On this model, the reason apples are judged to be more typical than plums is that the concept APPLE shares more of its constituents with FRUIT. Likewise, this is why apples are judged to be a kind of fruit faster than plums are.

Probabilistic theories continue to enjoy widespread support in cognitive science, but they aren't without their own problems. One concern is that many concepts appear to lack probabilistic structure, especially concepts that correspond to phrases as opposed to words. For example, Fodor (1981), (1998) notes that while GRANDMOTHER may have probabilistic structure (encoding the features *gray-haired, old, kind*, etc.), there is no such structure for GRANDMOTHERS MOST OF WHOSE GRANDCHILDREN ARE MARRIED TO DENTISTS. Fodor also challenges probabilistic theories on the grounds that even when phrasal concepts do have probabilistic structure, their structure doesn't appear to be compositionally determined. This is a problem, since it's the compositionality of the conceptual system that explains the productivity of thought, *viz.*, the fact that there is no upper bound on the number of distinct thoughts that humans can entertain. Fodor points out that the probabilistic structure associated with PET FISH encodes features (*colorful, tiny, lives in a bowl*, etc.) that aren't drawn from the probabilistic structures associated with PET (*furry, cuddly*, etc.) and FISH (*gray, lives in the ocean*, etc.).

Another common criticism of probabilistic theories is that they leave out too much. They don't sufficiently incorporate the causal information that

people appeal to in categorization and don't do justice to the fact that reflective categorization isn't always based on similarity (Murphy and Medin, 1985; Keil, 1989; Rips, 1989). For example, when time is short and when given little information about two animals apart from the fact that they look alike, people may judge that they are both members of the same category. But when asked for a more thoughtful answer about whether, for example, a dog that is surgically altered to look like a raccoon is a dog or a raccoon, the answer for most of us – and even for children – is that it is remains a dog (see Gelman, 2003, for an overview of related literature).

The Theory-Theory

The theory-theory is largely a reaction to the last problem associated with probabilistic theories. It explains categorization, particularly reflective categorization, as a process of causal-explanatory reasoning. On this approach, conceptual structure is a matter of how a concept is related to other concepts in relatively stable causal-explanatory frameworks. The designation 'theory-theory' sometimes implies little more than this. For some psychologists, it is meant to indicate that the explanatory frameworks are comparable to explicit scientific theories and that the mechanisms for acquiring them are identical with the cognitive mechanisms that underlie scientific reasoning. On this more extreme version of the theory-theory, conceptual development is likened to radical theory change in science (Carey, 1985; Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1997).

Many objections to the theory-theory are directed to its more extreme forms, particularly the commitment about conceptual development. The claim that infants are like little scientists has generated a great deal of criticism (e.g., Segal, 1996; Stich and Nichols, 1998). One objection focuses on particular examples, especially of concepts that are fundamental to human cognition (e.g., OBJECT, AGENT, and BELIEF). Although theory-theorists often cite these as examples where substantial conceptual change occurs – change that is supposed to illustrate the theory-theory's model of cognitive development – others would argue that these are innate concepts that remain invariant in important respects throughout development (e.g., Leslie, 1994). A more basic objection to the theory-theory is that the appeal to causal-explanatory reasoning is minimally informative. It may be true that categorization is somewhat like scientific reasoning, but scientific reasoning is itself in need of a great deal of clarification. The result is that the model of categorization is extremely sketchy and somewhat mysterious.

A third objection to the theory-theory, one that has been especially influential in philosophy, is that it makes it difficult to maintain that different people have the same concepts. This objection is directed to versions of the theory-theory that are especially lenient in what counts as a theory. On these versions, just about any belief or inferential disposition associated with a concept is part of a 'theory.' The problem with this approach, however, is that people are bound to have different beliefs than one another and hence different theories. But since a concept's identity and content are supposed to be a matter of its role in one's mental theories, people will be unable to share concepts (Fodor and Lepore, 1992).

Conceptual Atomism

The last of the four theories of conceptual structure is that lexical concepts – word-sized concepts – have no structure at all (Fodor, 1998; Millikan, 2000). Concepts such as BIRD, CHAIR, NUMBER, and RUN are all primitives. Of course, conceptual atomism needs an account of how these primitive concepts are to be distinguished from one another and how their contents are fixed. A standard approach is to appeal to the mind-world causal relations between a concept and the object or property it refers to.

Conceptual atomism is motivated in light of the problems with other theories, especially the problem of providing definitions (the classical theory), the problem of compositionality (probabilisitic theories), and the problem of shared concepts (the theory-theory). If concepts lack structure, then it is no surprise that we have difficulty providing definitions for them. Also, it doesn't matter that probabilistic structure doesn't compose, since **complex** concepts can still be composed on the basis of atomic constituents. And sharing a concept is no longer a challenge. It isn't a matter of having the same beliefs so much as having representations that stand in the same mind-world causal relations.

Conceptual atomism is sometimes rejected outright on the grounds that unstructured concepts can't be learned and hence that atomism implies an untenably strong form of concept nativism. The main concern with conceptual atomism, however, is that without structure, there is nothing to explain how concepts are implicated in categorization and other psychological processes. Nonetheless, atomists see this as an advantage rather than a problem, maintaining that people can have the same concept despite widely varying psychological dispositions. For this reason, the structures that are accessed in categorization and other psychological processes are said to be associated with a concept but not constitutive of it.

Практичне заняття 3

Cognitive Semantics
J.R. Taylor, 2006 | DUNEDIN (NEW ZEALAND)

Cognitive semantics is part of a wider movement known as 'cognitive linguistics.' Prior to surveying the main characteristics of cognitive semantics, it will be advisable to clarify what is meant by cognitive linguistics. As a matter of fact, the term is open to different interpretations. On a broad understanding, any approach that views language as residing in the minds of its speakers and a linguistic description as a hypothesis about a speaker's mental state would merit the designation 'cognitive.' Chomsky's career has been devoted to pursuing cognitive linguistics on this broad understanding. On the narrower, and more specialized interpretation intended here, cognitive linguistics refers to a movement that emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s, mainly as a reaction to certain tendencies of Chomskyan, and, more generally, formalist linguistics. Linguists who were prominently associated with the emergence of cognitive linguistics, in this narrow sense, were George Lakoff, Ronald Langacker, and Leonard Talmy. Rather than a specific theory, cognitive linguistics can best be described as an approach, or cluster of approaches to language study, whose practitioners nevertheless share a basic outlook on the nature of language. Several common aspects can be identified:

- Cognitive linguists are skeptical of the idea, promoted within Chomskyan linguistics, that human language might be associated with a language-specific module of the mind. Their starting point, rather, is that language is embedded in more general cognitive abilities and processes. According to the editorial statement of the monograph series *Cognitive linguistics research* (published by Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin), the guiding assumption is that 'language is an integral facet of cognition which reflects the interaction of social, cultural, psychological, communicative and functional considerations, and which can only be understood in the context of a realistic view of acquisition, cognitive development and mental processing.' Special attention, therefore, has been directed towards studying language, its structure, acquisition, and use, from the perspective of such topics as perception, categorization, concept formation, spatial cognition, and imagery.

Although these capacities might well be subject to highly specialized elaboration in human language, they are not per se linguistic capacities.

- Cognitive linguistics signaled a return to the basic Saussurean insight that language is a symbolic system, which relates signifiers (that is, language in its perceptible form, whether as sound, marks on paper, or gesture) and signifieds (that is, meanings). Indeed, Langacker (1987: 11) characterized a language as 'an open-ended set of linguistic signs [. . .], each of which associates a semantic representation of some kind with a phonological representation.' Importantly, semantic representations, i.e., 'meanings,' are taken to be mental entities, or, perhaps more appropriately, mental processes. Thus, Langacker prefers to refer not to 'concepts' (a term that suggests that meanings are static, clearly individuated entities) but to 'conceptualizations,' where the deverbal nominal emphasizes the dynamic, processual character of the phenomenon.
- A third feature of cognitive linguistics follows from the view of language as a symbolic system, namely that syntax and morphology – patterns for the combination of words and morphemes into larger configurations – are themselves symbolic, and hence inherently meaningful. The same goes for the elements over which syntax and morphology operate – lexical and phrasal categories, for example – as well as the kinds of relations that can hold between these elements, i.e., relations such as subject (of a clause), modification, complementation, apposition, subordination. The view, current in many linguistic theories, that syntax and morphology constitute autonomous levels of linguistic organization is therefore rejected. Indeed, a major thrust of cognitive linguistic research over the past couple of decades has been, precisely, the attempt to offer a conceptual characterization of formal aspects of language organization.

It will be apparent that the orientation of cognitive linguistics, as characterized above, was bound to have considerable influence on the ways in which meanings (whether of words, sentences, syntactic patterns, etc.) have been studied. One aspect has already been mentioned, namely, that meanings are taken to be mental entities. In this, cognitive linguistics contrasts strikingly with other approaches, such as logical approaches, which have focused on logical aspects of sentences and the propositions

they express; with truth-conditional approaches, which focus on the relation between propositions and states of affairs in the world; with structuralist approaches, which view meaning in terms of semantic relations within the language; with behaviorist approaches, which view meaning in terms of stimulus-response associations; and, more generally, with theories of meaning as use. What these alternative approaches to meaning have in common is their avoidance of mentalism, i.e., the characterization of meanings as 'things in the head.'

The remainder of this article surveys some important themes and research topics in cognitive semantics. It should be mentioned that the survey is by no means comprehensive; for broader coverage, the reader is referred to the introductions to cognitive linguistics listed at the end of this article. Some topics, such as metaphor and metonymy, are dealt with elsewhere in this encyclopedia and for this reason are discussed only briefly. It should also be borne in mind that cognitive semantics, like cognitive linguistics itself, does not constitute a unified theory, but is better regarded as a cluster of approaches and research themes that nevertheless share a common outlook and set of assumptions.

Many semanticists, especially those who see the language faculty as an encapsulated module of the mind, insist on the need to make a distinction between the dictionary and the encyclopedia, that is, between what one knows in virtue of one's knowledge of a language and what one knows in virtue of one's knowledge of the world. Cognitive semantics denies the validity of such a distinction. On the contrary, meaning is taken to be essentially encyclopedic in scope. A person's linguistic knowledge would therefore, in principle, be coextensive with the person's total world knowledge. An individual word, to be sure, provides access to only a small segment of encyclopedic knowledge. No clear bounds, however, can be set on how far the relevant knowledge network extends.

The encyclopedic nature of linguistic semantics is captured in the notions of profile, base, domain, and Idealized Cognitive Model (or ICM).

The terms 'profile' and 'base' are due to Langacker (1987). A linguistic expression intrinsically evokes a knowledge structure, some facet of which is profiled. Take the word *hypotenuse*. The word designates a straight line. Whatever we predicate of *hypotenuse* is predicated of a hypotenuse *qua* straight line, as when we assert *The hypotenuse is 3 cm. long*. Obviously, the notion of a straight line does not exhaust the meaning of the word. The straight line in question is part of a larger structure,

namely, a right-angled triangle. Although *hypotenuse* does not designate the triangle, the notion of a triangle is essential for the understanding of the word (Figure 1).



Figure 1 Notion of hypotenuse

Notice that the concept designated by the word cannot be identified with the profile – as mentioned, the profile is simply a straight line. The concept resides in the profiling of a facet of the base. For other examples that illustrate the profile-base relation, consider words such as *thumb* (profiled against the conception of a human hand), *top* (profiled against a schematic notion of a three-dimensional entity), *island* (a mass of land profiled against the surrounding water). In fact, it is axiomatic, in cognitive semantics, that all expressions achieve their meaning through profiling against the relevant background knowledge.

Returning to the hypotenuse example, it will be apparent that the base – the notion of a triangle – itself presupposes broader knowledge configurations, namely, those pertaining to planar geometry, which themselves are based in notions of space and shape. These broader knowledge configurations are referred to as 'domains.' Some domains may be basic, in the sense that they are not reducible to other domains. Examples include time, space, color, temperature, weight, etc. Otherwise, a knowledge structure of any degree of complexity can function as a domain, for example, the rules of a game, a scientific theory, kinship networks, gender stereotypes, educational, political, and legal systems. Domains may also be constituted by deeply held beliefs about life, nature, causation, the supernatural, and so on.

Most concepts are characterized against a 'matrix' of more than one domain. *Uncle*, for example, profiles a male human being against the base of a (portion of a) kinship network, specifically, that part of the network that relates the uncle to his nephews/nieces. The notion of kinship itself rests on

notions of gender, procreation, marriage, inheritance, etc. At the same time, *uncle* profiles a human being, which is understood against multiple domains pertaining to Figure 1 life forms, to three-dimensional bodies and their various parts, with their features of weight, extension, shape, and so on. If we add to this the fact that, in many societies, uncles may have special rights and obligations *vis-a`-vis* their nephews/nieces, we may appreciate that even a single word, if its meaning is fully explored, can take us into the farthest reaches of our knowledge and cultural beliefs.

It will be apparent that the distinction between base and domain is not a clear-cut one. The base may be defined as a knowledge structure that is inherently involved in profiling, whereas domains constitute background, more generalized knowledge. Terminology in this area is also confusing because different authors have favored a range of terms for domain-based knowledge. Some scholars have used the not always clearly distinguishable terms 'scene,' 'scenario,' 'script,' and 'frame' to refer in particular to knowledge about expected sequences of events. Thus, *anger* refers not just to an emotional state, but is understood against an expected scenario that includes such stages as provocation, response, attempts at control, likely outcomes, and so on. Likewise, paying the restaurant bill evokes the 'restaurant script' – knowledge of the kinds of things one does, and the things that happen, when one visits culturally instituted establishments known as 'restaurants.' The notion of paying also invokes the frame of a commercial transaction, with its various participants, conventions, and activities. Mention might also be made of Searle's (1992) notions of 'the Network' and 'the Background,' whereby a particular belief takes its place within a network of other beliefs, and against the background of capacities, abilities, and general know-how.

Of special importance is Lakoff's (1987) notion of 'Idealized Cognitive Model,' or ICM – a notion that bears some affinity with the concept of 'folk theory' (again, different scholars prefer different terms). ICMs capture the fact that knowledge about a particular domain may be to some extent idealized and may not fit the actual states of affairs that we encounter on specific occasions. Consider the words *bachelor* and *spinster*. We might define these as 'adult unmarried male' and 'adult unmarried female,' respectively. The concepts, thus defined, presuppose an ICM of marriage practices in our society. According to the ICM, a person reaches a more-or-less clearly definable marriageable age. People who pass the marriageable age without marrying are referred to as bachelors and spinsters, as the case may be. The ICM attributes different motives to men and women who do not marry. Men do so out of choice, women out of

necessity. As will be appreciated, the ICM is idealized, in that it presupposes that all citizens are heterosexual and that all are equally available for marriage. It thus ignores the existence of celibate priests and of couples who live together without marrying. The discrepancy between model and reality can give rise to prototype effects. The fact that the Pope is not a representative example of the bachelor category derives from the fact that Catholic clergy are not covered by the ICM. Appeal to the ICM can also explain the different connotations of *bachelor* and *spinster*. Although one might not want to subscribe to the sexist framing of the ICM, it does offer an explanation for why *eligible bachelor* is an accepted collocation, whereas *eligible spinster* is not.

As mentioned, the meaning of a word may need to be characterized against a matrix of several domains. However, not all uses of a word need invoke each of the domains in equal measure. Certain uses may activate only some domains whereas others are backgrounded or eclipsed. The notion of a kinship network is likely to be prominent in most uses of *uncle*, yet when parents use the word to introduce one of their adult male friends to their child, the kinship domain is eclipsed. For another example of selective domain activation, consider the concept of a book. When you *drop a book*, the status of the book as a (heavy) material object is activated, when you *read a book*, the status of a book as a printed text is activated, when you *translate a book*, the status of the book as a text in a given language is foregrounded. Note that *begin a book* can be interpreted in various ways, according to which of the domains is activated. The activity that one begins with respect to the book could be reading, writing, editing, translating, or even (if you are bookworm, literally!), eating.

The above examples not only illustrate the importance of domains and related notions in the study of word meanings, they also show why it has been deemed necessary to favor an encyclopedic approach to semantics. The reason is, namely, that we need to appeal to domain-based knowledge in order to account for how words are used and for the ways in which complex expressions are judged. Often, the very possibility of interpreting an expression, and of accepting it as semantically well-formed, can only be explained by reference to appropriate background knowledge.

A common objection to an encyclopedic semantics is that one cannot reasonably claim that everything a person knows about the concept designated by a word is relevant to the use of the word. It is certainly true that some facets of background knowledge may be central, and more intrinsic to a concept, others might be more peripheral or even idiosyncratic to an individual speaker. Nevertheless, even extrinsic knowledge might

become relevant to a word's use, for example, in discourse between intimates or family members. Moreover, the study of semantic change teaches us that even highly peripheral and circumstantial knowledge pertaining to a concept can sometimes leave its mark on the semantic development of a word. Langacker (1987: 160) has remarked that Jimmy Carter's presidency had a notable, if transient, effect on the semantics of *peanut*. Equally, Margaret Thatcher's premiership probably influenced the semantic development of *handbag*, at least for British speakers.

The notion of domain is relevant to two important themes in cognitive semantic research, namely metaphor and metonymy. 'Metaphor' has been analyzed in terms of the structuring of one domain of experience (usually, a more abstract, intangible domain) in terms of a more concrete, and more directly experienced domain. For example, time is commonly conceptualized in terms of space and motion, as when we speak of *a long time*, or say that Christmas *is approaching*, or even that it *is just around the corner*. More recently, metaphor has been studied under the more general rubric of 'conceptual blending,' whereby components of two or more input domains are incorporated into a new conceptualization, the blend. Whereas metaphor involves elements from more than one domain, 'metonymy,' in contrast, concerns elements within a single domain. Thus, we can use the name of an author to refer to books written by the author, as when we enquire whether someone *has read any Dickens*. The transfer of reference from person to product is possible because both are linked within domain-based knowledge pertaining to books and their authorship.

Every situation and every entity that we encounter is uniquely different from every other. In order to be able to function in our physical and social worlds, we need to reduce this information overload. We do this by regarding some situations and some entities as being essentially 'the same.' Having categorized an entity in a certain way, we know how we should behave towards it and what properties it is likely to have. It is significant that whenever we encounter something whose categorization is unclear we typically feel uneasy. 'What is it?', we want to know. Categorization is not a peculiarly human ability. Any creature, if it is to survive, needs at the very least to categorize its environment in terms of edible or inedible, harmful or benign. Humans have developed phenomenal categorization abilities. We operate with literally thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of categories. Moreover, our categories are flexible enough to accommodate new experiences, and we are able to create new categories as the need arises. To know a word is to know, among other things, the range of entities and situations to which the word can be appropriately applied. To this extent, the

study of word meanings is the study of the categories that these words denote. And it is not only words that can be said to designate categories. It can be argued that syntactic configurations, for example, those associated with intransitive, transitive, and ditransitive constructions, designate distinct categorizations of events and their participants. What is the basis for categorization? Intuitively, we might want to say that things get placed in the same category because of their similarity. Similarity, however, is a slippery notion. One approach would be to define similarity in terms of the sharing of some common feature(s) or attribute(s). Similarity, then, would reduce to a matter of partial identity. Feature-based theories of categorization often require that all members of a category share all the relevant features. A corollary of this approach is that categories are well-defined, that is, it is a clear-cut matter whether a given entity does, or does not, belong in the category. It also follows that all members have equal status within the category. There are a number of problems associated with this approach. One is that the categories designated by linguistic expressions may exhibit a prototype structure. Some members of the category might be more representative than others, while the boundary of the category may not be clearly defined. In a well-known passage, though without introducing the prototype concept, Wittgenstein (1953: x66) drew attention to categorization by family resemblance. Imagine a family photograph. Some members of the family might have the family nose, others might have the family chin, others might have the family buck teeth. No member of the family need exhibit all the family traits, yet each exhibits at least one; moreover, some members might exhibit different traits from others. Wittgenstein illustrated the notion on the example of the kinds of things we call 'games,' or *Spiele* (Wittgenstein was writing in German). Some (but not all) games are 'amusing,' some require skill, some involve luck, some involve competition and have winners and losers. The family resemblance notion has been usefully applied to the study of word meaning. Thus, some uses of *climb* (as in *The plane climbed to 30 000 feet*) exhibit the feature 'ascend,' some (such as *The mountaineers climbed along the cliff*) exhibit the feature 'move laboriously using one's limbs.' Considered by themselves, these two uses have very little in common. We see the relation, however, when we consider some further uses of *climb* (as in *The boy climbed the tree*), which exhibit both of the features. A fundamental problem with feature-based theories of categorization concerns the nature of the features themselves. As Wittgenstein pointed out, skill in chess is not the same as skill in tennis. The concept of skill therefore raises the very same issues of how categories are to be defined as were raised by the notion of game, which the notion of skill

is supposed to explicate. Understanding similarity in terms of partial identity is problematic for another reason. Practically any two objects can be regarded as similar in some respect (for example, both may weigh less than 100 kg., or both may cost between $5 and $5000), but this similarity does not mean that they constitute a viable or useful category. An alternative approach would be that categorization is driven by the role of the entities within broader knowledge configurations, that is, by domain-based knowledge and ICMs. Sometimes, apparently similar activities might be categorized differently, as when making marks on paper might be called, in some cases, 'writing', in other cases, 'drawing.' The distinction is based on knowledge pertaining to the nature and purpose of 'writing' and 'drawing.' On the other hand, seemingly very different activities might be brought under the same category. In terms of the actions performed, making marks with a pen on a piece of paper has little in common with depressing small, square-shaped pads on a keyboard. But given the appropriate domain-based knowledge, both can be regarded as instances of 'writing.' Categories, as Murphy and Medin (1985) have aptly remarked, are ultimately based in 'theories' (that is, in ICMs).

The matter may be illustrated by the distinction (admittedly, not always a clear-cut one) between 'natural kinds' and 'nominal kinds.' Natural kinds are believed to be given by nature and are presumed to have a defining 'essence'; moreover, we are inclined to defer to the scientists for an elucidation of their defining essence. Nominal kinds, in contrast, are often defined *vis-a`-vis* human concerns, and their perceptual properties and/or their function is often paramount in their categorization. Remarkably, even very young children are sensitive to the difference (Keil, 1989). Suppose a zebra had its stripes painted out; would it thereby become a horse? Or suppose a giraffe had its neck surgically shortened; would it cease to be a giraffe? Even very young children respond: 'No.' Changes to the appearance of the entities would not alter their defining essence. But suppose you saw off the back of a chair. Does the chair become a stool? Arguably, it does. In this case, a 'superficial' aspect is crucial to categorization.

The dynamics of categorization may be illustrated by considering the relationship between a linguistic expression (e.g., the word *fruit*) and its possible referents (e.g., an apple).We can address the relation from two perspectives. We can ask, for this word, what are the things in the world to which the word can be applied? Alternatively, we can ask, for this thing, what are the linguistic expressions that can refer to it? The first perspective (the 'referential' perspective: 'To what does this word apply?') operationalizes the notion of prototype. *Fruit* designates, primarily, such

things as apples, pears, and bananas – these are the fruit prototypes. Less commonly, the word might be used to refer to olives and tomatoes. The second perspective (the 'onomasiological,' or naming perspective: 'What is this thing to be called?') operationalizes the notion of basic level. It is evident that one and the same thing can be named by terms that differ in their specificity vs. generality. For example, the thing you are now sitting on might be called a *chair*, an *office chair*, a *piece of furniture*, an *artifact*, or even a *thing*. All of these designations could be equally 'correct.' Yet, in the absence of special reasons to the contrary, you would probably call the thing a *chair*. (This, for example, is probably the answer you would give if a foreign learner wanted to know what the thing is called in English.) *Chair* is a basic level term, the basic level being the level in a taxonomy at which things are normally named. The basic level has this special status because categorization at this level provides maximum information about an entity. Thus, at the basic level, chairs contrast with tables, beds, and cupboards – very different kinds of things, in terms of their appearance, use, and function. Terms at a lower level in a taxonomy, e.g., *kitchen chair* vs. *office chair*, do not exhibit such a sharp contrast while terms at a higher level are too general to give much information at all about an entity. Not surprisingly, basic level terms turn out to be of frequent use, they are generally quite short and morphologically simple, and they are learned early in language acquisition.

Langacker has described cognitive linguistics as a 'usage-based' approach. The claim can be understood in two ways. On the one hand, it could be a statement about the methodology of cognitive linguistic research. Usage-based research would be research based on authentic data, as documented in a corpus, recorded in the field, or elicited in controlled situations, rather than on invented, constructed data. Although different researchers might prefer different methodologies, a glance at practically any publication by leading figures in the field, such as Lakoff, Langacker, and Talmy, will show that cognitive linguistics, as a movement, cannot reasonably be said to be 'usage-based' in this sense.

On a second interpretation, usage-based refers to the presumed nature of linguistic knowledge and the manner in which it is acquired, mentally represented, and accessed. The claim, namely, is that a language is learned 'bottom-up' through exposure to usage events. A usage event presents the language user/learner with an actual vocalization in association with a fine-grained, context-dependent conceptualization. Acquisition proceeds through generalization over usage events. Necessarily, many of the context-dependent particularities of the usage events will be filtered out, leaving

only a schematic representation of both the phonology and the semantics. In this respect, cognitive linguistics contrasts strikingly with 'top-down' theories of acquisition, whereby the basic 'architecture' of a language is presumed to be genetically given, exposure to usage data being needed merely to trigger the appropriate settings of innately given parameters.

The usage-based approach raises two questions, which have loomed large in cognitive semantics research. These concern (a) the units over which schematization occurs, and (b) the extent of schematization. Let us first consider the second of these issues.

One of the most vibrant areas of cognitive semantic research has been the study of lexical polysemy. It is a common observation that words exhibit a range of different meanings according to the contexts in which they are used. Indeed, the extent of polysemy appears to be roughly proportional to the frequency with which a word is used. Not surprisingly, among the most highly polysemous words in English are the prepositions.

Consider the preposition *on*. Given such uses as *the book on the table* and *the cat on the mat*, it is easy to see how a schematic, de-contextualized image of the *on*-relation could emerge. It involves locating one object with respect to another in terms of such aspects as contact, verticality, and support. But the preposition has many other uses, as exemplified by *the fly on the ceiling, the picture on the wall, the leaves on the tree, the writing on the blackboard, the washing on the clothes-line, the shoes on my feet, the ring on my finger*. Do we proceed with further abstraction and schematization, coming up with a characterization of the on-relation that is compatible with all of these uses? Or do we identify a set of discrete meanings, which we may then attempt to relate in a prototype or a family resemblance category? If we adopt this latter approach, another question arises, namely, just how many distinct meanings are to be postulated. Three? Ten? Several dozen? Do we want to say that *the water on the floor* and *the cat on the mat* exemplify different senses of on, on the grounds that the relation between *cat* and *mat* is not quite the same as that between *the water* and *the floor*? Needless to say, the issue becomes even more critical when we take into consideration the vast range of non-spatial uses of the preposition: *on television, be on a diet, be on drugs, on Monday*, and countless more.

In general, as is consistent with a usage-based orientation, cognitive semanticists have tended to focus on the particularities of low-level generalizations, an approach that has frequently been censured for the 'polysemy explosion' that it engenders. Nevertheless, the role of more schematic representations is not denied. Langacker, in this connection,

draws attention to the 'rule-list fallacy.' The fallacy resides in the notion that rules (high-level generalizations), once acquired, necessarily expunge knowledge of the lower-level generalizations on whose basis the rules have been abstracted. It is entirely plausible that high and low-level generalizations might co-exist in the mental grammar.

Indeed, knowledge of low-level generalizations – not too far removed, in terms of their schematicity, from actually encountered usage-events – may be needed in order to account for speakers' fluency in their language. The topic interacts with a more general issue, namely, the relative roles of 'computation' vs. 'storage' in language knowledge and language use. Humans are not generally very good at computation, but we are quite adept at storing and retrieving specific information. Consider arithmetical operations. We can, to be sure, compute the product of 12 by 12 by applying general rules, but the process is slow and laborious and subject to error, and some people may need the help of pencil and paper. It is far easier, quicker, and more reliable to access the ready-made solution, if we have learned it, namely, that 12 x 12 = 144. The point of the analogy is that in order for speech production and understanding to proceed smoothly and rapidly, it may well be the case that we access ready-made patterns and preformed chunks, which have been learned in their specific detail, even though these larger units could be assembled in accordance with general principles. The role of formulaic language in fluency and idiomaticity has been investigated especially by linguists engaged in corpus-based lexicography and second language acquisition research. Their findings lend support to the view that linguistic knowledge may indeed be represented at a relatively low level. We might suppose, therefore, that *the ring on my finger* is judged to be acceptable, not because some highly schematic, underspecified sense of *on* has been contextually elaborated, nor because some rather specific sense of *on* has been selected, but simply because speakers have encountered, and learned, such an expression.

These considerations lead into the second aspect of a usage-based model: what are the units over which schematization takes place? The study of lexical semantics has typically been based on the assumption that schematization takes place over word-sized units. Indeed, the above discussion was framed in terms of how many meanings the preposition *on* might have. The study of idioms and related phenomena, such as collocations, constructions, and formulaic expressions, casts doubt on the validity of this assumption. Corpus-based studies, in particular, have drawn attention to the fact that words may need to be characterized in terms of the constructions in which they occur, conversely, that constructions need to be

characterized in terms of the words that are eligible to occur in them. It might be inappropriate, therefore, to speak of the 'mental lexicon,' understood as a list of words with their phonological and semantic properties. A more appropriate concept might be the 'mental phrasicon', or the 'mental contruction.' It would certainly be consistent with a usage-based model to assume that language is represented as schematizations over the units in terms of which language is encountered – not individual words as such, but phrases, constructions, and even utterance-length units.

Linguistic meaning has often been approached in terms of the correspondence between an expression and the situation that it designates. Given the expression *The cat is on the mat*, and a situation in which there is a mat with a cat on it, we might be inclined to say that the linguistic expression fully and accurately describes the observed situation. The matter, however, is not so straightforward. For any conceived situation, certain facets will have been ignored for the purpose of its linguistic expression. Where was the mat? How big was it? What color was it? Was it laid out flat or was it rolled up? Was the cat in the center of the mat? Was the cat sitting or lying? And so on. Secondly, the speaker is able to categorize the situation at different levels of schematicity. Instead of saying that *the cat is on the mat*, the speaker could have stated that *the animal is sprawled out on my new purchase*. The speaker's decision to include or exclude certain facets of the scene, and to categorize the scene and its participants in a certain way, are symptomatic of the broader phenomenon of 'construal,' namely, the way in which a conceived situation is mentally structured for the purpose of its linguistic expression.

There is a sense in which the whole cognitive semantics enterprise is concerned with how speakers construe a conceived situation and how this construal receives linguistic expression, as a function of the conventional resources of a particular language. Some important facets are construal are discussed below.

A feature of our perceptual mechanism is that a perceived scene is structured in terms of 'figure' and 'ground.' Certain aspects of a scene are likely to be especially prominent and specifically attended to, whereas others are relegated to the background context. Given the situation of the cat and the mat, we are likely to say that the cat is on the mat, rather than that the mat is under the cat. Both wordings might be equally true in terms their correspondence with the situation. Yet one would normally be preferred over the other. This preference is because we would most likely select the cat as the figure, whose location is described with respect to the mat, rather than the other way round.

Figure-ground organization is ubiquitous in perception, most obviously in visual perception, but also in other modalities. When we listen to a lecture, the speaker's voice is (hopefully) the auditory figure, which stands out against the sound of the air conditioning and of people coughing and shuffling. A number of aspects influence the figure-ground alignment. The figure, as the primary object of attention, is likely to be moveable and variable, it can act, or be acted on, independently of the ground, and it is likely to be more information-rich (for the perceiver) than the ground. Moreover, animate entities – especially if human – are likely to attract our attention as figure *vis-a`-vis* inanimate entities. The ground, in contrast, is likely to be static relative to the figure, it is presupposed, and provides the context for the characterization of the figure. It must be emphasized, however, that while certain inherent features of a scene may strongly suggest a certain figure-ground alignment, we can often choose to reverse the relation. While at a lecture, we could consciously direct our attention to a background noise, relegating the speaker's voice to the ground.

Figure-ground organization is built into language at many levels. The contrast between an active clause and its passive counterpart can be understood in such terms. *The farmer shot the rabbit* presents the farmer as the figure – we are interested in what the farmer did. *The rabbit was shot (by the farmer)* presents the rabbit as figure – we are interested in what happened to the rabbit. Note that what is at issue in these examples is not so much how the scene as such might be visually perceived, but how it is mentally organized by the speaker for its linguistic encoding. Figure-ground asymmetry is also relevant to the encoding of reciprocal relations. If A resembles B, then B obviously resembles A. Yet we would be far more likely to observe that a boy resembles his grandfather than to say that an old man resembles his grandson. We take the old man as the ground, against which the growing boy is assessed, rather than vice versa.

Another aspect of construal is illustrated by the contrast between *The ball rolled along the floor* and *The ball kept rolling along the floor*. There would be no way to differentiate these sentences in terms of objective features of the situations that they designate. Whenever the one sentence can truthfully be applied to a situation, so can the other. Yet the two sentences construe the situation differently. The difference was investigated by Talmy in terms of his notion of 'force dynamics.' We view entities as having an inherent tendency either for motion (or change) or for rest (or inaction). When entities interact, their inherent force dynamic tendencies also interact. The force of one entity may overcome, or fail to overcome the force of another, or the two forces may be in equilibrium. Typically, in a force-

dynamic interaction, our attention goes on a figure entity (the agonist), whose behavior is tracked relative to an antagonist.

The ball rolled along the floor presents the motion of the ball as resulting from its inherent tendency towards motion. But if we say that *the ball kept rolling along the floor*, we assume a force opposing the ball's activity, which, however, was not strong enough to overcome the ball's tendency towards motion. It is the verb keep that introduces a force-dynamic interaction into the situation, as we construe it. It conveys that the tendency towards motion of the agonist (i.e., the ball) was able to overcome an (unnamed) opposing force. The opposing force may, of course, be explicitly stated: *The ball kept rolling, despite our attempt to halt it*. Force-dynamic interaction holds even with respect to a 'static' situation. *I kept silent* designates the continuation of a static situation. The stasis, however, results from the fact that an (unnamed) antagonist was not powerful enough to cause the situation to change.

Quite a few lexical items have an implicit force-dynamic content, such as *keep, prevent, despite*, and even *finally* and *(to) manage*. Thus, I finally managed to start my car not only conveys that I did start my car, but also that I had to overcome an opposing force. Force dynamics offers an interesting perspective on causation. Prototypically, causation (as expressed by verbs such as *cause* or *make*) involves the agonist (the causer) exerting force that overcomes the inactivity of antagonist. Variants of this scenario including letting and preventing. *Let* conveys that the agonist fails to engage with the antagonist, while *prevent* conveys that the agonist overcomes the disposition towards action of the antagonist. Another fruitful field of application has been in the study of modality (Sweetser, 1990). Thus, *I couldn't leave* conveys that an unnamed antagonist (whether this be another person, a law or proscription, an ethical consideration, a broken leg, or even the fact of a locked door) overcame my disposition to leave. Similarly, *I had to leave* presents my leaving as resulting from a force that overcame my disposition to remain where I was.

Any conceptualization involves a relation between the subject of conceptualization (the person entertaining the conceptualization) and the object of conceptualization (the situation that is conceptualized). In *The cat is on the mat*, the object of conceptualization is, obviously, the location of the cat *vis-a`-vis* the mat. Although not explicitly mentioned in the sentence, the subject of conceptualization is relevant to the conceptualization in a number of ways. Firstly, the use of the definite noun phrases *the cat* and *the mat* conveys that the referents of these expressions are uniquely identifiable to the speaker, also, that the speaker expects the hearer to be able to

uniquely identify the referents. (It's not just *a cat*, but *the cat*.) Also, the use of the tensed verb is conveys that the situation is claimed to hold at the time the speaker utters the expression. Since the speaker's role is not itself the object of conceptualization, we may say that the speaker is being construed subjectively.

Langacker has illustrated the notion of objective vs. subjective construal by means of an analogy. For persons who need to wear them, their spectacles are not usually the object of their visual experience. Spectacles function simply as an aid to the seeing process but are not themselves seen. Their role is therefore a subjective one. A person can, to be sure, take off their spectacles and visually examine them, in which case, the spectacles are viewed objectively. 'Objectification,' then, is the process whereby some facet of the subject of conceptualization becomes the object of conceptualization. 'Don't talk to your mother like that,' a woman says to her child. Here, the speaker makes herself the object of conceptualization by referring to herself in the third person. 'Subjectification,' in contrast, is the process whereby some facet of the object of conceptualization gets to be located in the subject of conceptualization. Take, as an example, the contrast between *Jim walked over the hill* and *Jim lives over the hill*. The first sentence profiles the motion of the figure entity *vis-a`-vis* the ground. The second merely designates the location of the figure. The location, however, is presented as one that lies at the end of a path that goes *over the hill*. Importantly, the path is not traced by the object of conceptualization, that is, by Jim. Rather, it is the subject of conceptualization who mentally traces the path.

Subjectification has been identified as an important component of grammaticalization. Consider the use of *(be) going to* as a marker of the future. *Ellen is going to the store* can be construed objectively – Ellen is currently engaged in the process of moving towards the store. If we continue to observe Ellen's motion, we will probably find that she ends up at the store. We can easily see how (be) going to is likely to take on connotations of prediction. Indeed, Ellen is going to the store might be interpreted in just such a way, not as a statement about Ellen's current activity, but as a prediction about the future. Similarly*, It's going to rain* and *You're going to fall* have the force of a prediction, extrapolated from the observation of current circumstances. Notice, in these examples, that in spite of the use of the verb *go*, there is no objective movement, whether literal or metaphorical, towards the future situation. Rather, it is the conceptualizer who mentally traces the future evolution of the present situation. The idea of motion,

contained in the verb *go*, has been subjectified, that is, it has been located in the subject of conceptualization.

A special manifestation of subjectification is the phenomenon of 'fictive motion.' This typically involves the use of a basically dynamic expression to designate an objectively static situation. *Go*, we might say, is basically a motion verb, or, more generally, a change of state verb (*I went to the airport*, *The milk went sour*, *The lights went red*). But consider a statement that *the road goes through the mountains*. No motion is involved here – the road is merely configured in a certain way, it does not (objectively) go anywhere. The idea of motion implied by go can, however, be attributed to the subject of conceptualization. One mentally traces the path followed by the road through the mountains. Mental motion on the part of the conceptualizer is also invoked in reference to *the road from London to Oxford*, which, of course, could be the very same entity, objectively speaking, as *the road from Oxford to London*. Similarly, one and the same entity could be referred to, either as *the gate into the garden* or *the gate out of the garden*.

Although speakers may construe a situation in many alternate ways, their options are to some extent constrained by the linguistic resources available to them. The matter can be illustrated with respect to language-specific lexicalization patterns. Talmy has drawn attention to alternative ways in which a motion event can be linguistically encoded. Consider the English expression *I flew across the Atlantic*. In English (and in other Germanic languages), we prefer to encode the manner of motion by means of the verb (*fly*), the path of the motion being expressed in a prepositional phrase (*across the Atlantic*). In Romance languages, an alternative construal is preferred. Path is encoded by the verb, manner by means of an adverbial phrase: *J'ai traverse´ l'Atlantique en avion* 'I crossed the Atlantic by plane.' Notice that, in the French sentence, the statement of the manner of motion is optional; the French speaker does not have to state how the Atlantic was crossed, merely that it was crossed. Comparison of the ways in which speakers of different languages give linguistic expression to visually presented situations, and of the ways in which texts in one language are translated into another, supports the notion that situations tend to be construed in a manner that is compatible with the construals made available by the conventional resources of different languages (Slobin, 1996). For example, speakers of English (and Germanic languages) will tend to specify the manner of motion in much finer detail than speakers of Romance languages.

An important theme in cognitive semantic research has been the insight that the relation between words and the world is mediated by the language user him/herself. The language user is a physical being, with its various parts, existing in time and space, who is subject to a gravitational field, and who engages in bodily interaction with entities in the environment. Quite a number of our concepts are directly related to aspects of our bodily experience. To put the matter somewhat fancifully: if we humans were creatures with a different mode of existence, if, for example, we were gelatinous, air-born creatures, floating around in the stratosphere, it is doubtful whether we could ever have access to many of the concepts that are lexicalized in presently existing human languages. Thus, to understand the concept of what it means for an object to be heavy, we have to have experienced the sensation of holding, lifting, or trying to move, a heavy object. The notion of heavy cannot be fully explicated in purely propositional terms, nor in terms of verbal paraphrase. A characteristic of basic level terms, in particular, is that, very often, they are understood in terms of how we would typically interact with the entities in question. Consider the concept of chair. We understand the concept, not simply in terms of what chairs look like, nor even in terms of their various parts and how they are interrelated, but in terms of what we do with our bodies with respect to them, namely, we sit on them, and they support our body weight. We have no such 'embodied' conceptualization of more schematic concepts such as 'thing' or 'artifact.' We do not understand these categories in terms of how we characteristically interact with them.

The role of bodily experiences has been elaborated in the theory of image schemas (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987). 'Image schemas' are common recurring patterns of bodily experience. Examples include notions of containment, support, balance, orientation (up/down), whole/part, motion along a path from a source to a goal, and many more. (Force dynamic interactions, discussed above, may also be understood in image schematic terms.) Take the notion of balance. We experience balance when trying to stand on one leg, when learning to ride a bicycle, or when trying to remain upright in a strong wind. The notion involves the distribution of weights around a central axis. (Balance, therefore, is understood in force-dynamic terms.) The notion can be applied to many domains of experience. We can speak of *a balanced diet, a balanced argument, a political balance of power*, and of *the balance of a picture or photograph*. One could, no doubt, analyze these expressions as examples of metaphor. This approach, however, might be to miss the embodied, non-propositional nature of the

concept. Our experience of balancing provides a primitive, experiential schema that can be instantiated in many different domains.

A particularly contentious issue in semantics concerns the question of compositionality. According to the compositionality principle, the properties (here: the semantic properties) of the whole can be computed from the properties of the parts and the manner of their combination. From one point of view, compositionality is a self-evident fact about human language. *The cat is on the mat* means what it does in virtue of the meanings of the component words, and the fact that the words stand in certain syntactic configurations. Speakers of English can work out what the sentence means, they do not have to have specifically learned this sentence. Unless compositionality were a feature of language, speakers would not be able to construct, and to understand, novel sentences. The very fact of linguistic creativity suggests that compositionality has got to be the case.

Not surprisingly, therefore, in many linguistic theories, the compositionality of natural languages is axiomatic, and the study of semantics is to a large extent the study of the processes of semantic composition. Cognitive linguists, however, have drawn attention to some serious problems with the notion. It is, of course, generally accepted that idioms are problematic for the compositionality principle. Indeed, idioms are commonly defined as expressions that are not compositional. The expression *spill the beans* 'inadvertently reveal confidential information' is idiomatic precisely because the expression is not compositional, that is, its meaning cannot be worked out on the basis of the meanings that *spill* and *beans* have elsewhere in the language.

Leaving aside obviously idiomatic expressions – which, by definition, are noncompositional in their semantics – it is remarkable that the interpretation of an expression typically goes beyond, and may even be at variance with, the information that is linguistically encoded. Langacker (1987: 279–282) discussed the example *the football under the table*. The expression is clearly not idiomatic, neither would it seem to be problematic for the compositionality principle. Take a moment, however, to visualize the described configuration. Probably, you will imagine a table standing in its canonical position, with its legs on the floor, and the football resting on the floor, approximately in the center of the polygon defined by the bottom of the table's legs. Note, however, that these specific details of the visualization were not encoded in the expression – they have been supplied on the basis of encyclopedic knowledge about tables. The purely compositional meaning of the expression has been enriched by encyclopedic knowledge. There is more to this example, however. If you think about it

carefully, you will see that the enriched interpretation is in an important sense at variance with the compositional meaning. If by 'X is under Y,' we mean that X is at a place lower than the place of Y, the football, strictly speaking, is not actually under the table at all. The football, namely, is not at a place that is lower than the lowest part of the table. In interpreting even this seemingly unproblematic expression, we have had to go beyond, and to distort, its strictly compositional meaning.

This state of affairs is not unexpected on a usage-based model. The resources of a language – lexical, syntactic, phraseological – are abstractions over encountered uses. The meanings abstracted from previous usage events are necessarily schematic, and may not fit precisely the requirements of the situation at hand. In giving linguistic expression to a conceptualization, we search for the linguistic resources that most closely match our intentions, accepting that some discrepancies and imprecisions are likely to occur. We trust to the inferencing powers of our interlocutors to achieve the fit between the expression and the intended conceptualization.

Meaning is central to linguistic enquiry. Meaning, after all, is what language is all about. Yet meaning is a notoriously difficult topic to analyze. What is meaning, and how are we to study it?

Some semanticists have studied meaning in terms of relations between language and situations in the world. Others have focused on relations within a language, explicating meanings in terms of paradigmatic relations of contrast, synonymy, hyponymy, entailment, and so on, and syntagmatic relations of collocation and co-occurrence. Yet others have tried to reduce meaning to matters of observable linguistic behavior. Cognitive semanticists have grasped the nettle and taken seriously the notion that meanings are 'in the head,' and are to be equated with the conceptualizations entertained by language users. Cognitive semantics offers the researcher a theoretical framework and a set of analytical tools for exploring this difficult issue.

Практичне заняття 4

Metaphors in Political Discourse
Paul Chilton, 2006 | NORWICH (UK)

Everyone knows that politicians use language in ways designed to persuade, and perhaps deceive, and some people would include 'metaphors' as examples of political rhetoric. It is important to be clear what is understood by the term 'metaphor.' In the first part of this article we outline the traditional understanding and then the contemporary cognitive theory of metaphor. In the second part we apply the latter to examples of political discourse, specifically discourse about political institutions, showing how a scientific understanding of metaphor can yield insights into what humans are doing when they reason about politics.

The Classical Tradition

Greek and Roman thinkers were well aware that language was integral with politics and public life in general and studied it under the rubric of 'rhetoric.' Their writings on the subject to some extent seek to explain metaphor (among many other rhetorical devices) as a phenomenon of human communicative behavior, but they were far more concerned with evaluating the persuasive or esthetic effects of metaphors with a view to advising public speakers.

Aristotle, however, has a theoretical framework. He defines metaphor as 'the application of a word that belongs to another thing' (Aristotle, 1995: 21) and discerns different types of such application. For Aristotle, then, metaphor is about the use of words, not about the nature of thought. Moreover, Aristotle thought of metaphor as something exceptional. In *Rhetoric* he is above all concerned with the emotive effects caused by metaphor and by the 'correct' choice of metaphors. He regards metaphor as special to certain forms of writing and speaking and to certain talented individuals. These ideas, repeated by classical writers such as Cicero and Quintilian, are implausible in the light of modern research on metaphor. Aristotle does note the role of metaphor in the expressing of new ideas, but others concentrated on functions such as being brief, and avoiding obscenity and eulogistic embellishment. In fact, the tendency is to reduce the prominence of metaphor and to handle it with a fair degree of suspicion.

This stance is inherited and magnified by the early modern philosopher and pivotal political theorist Thomas Hobbes (cf. Chilton, 1996). Here is

Hobbes on metaphor: ‘‘Metaphors, and senseless and ambiguous words, are like *ignes fatui*; and reasoning upon them, is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention, and sedition, or contempt’’ (*Leviathan*, chapter 5, pp. 116–7, original emphasis). In this passage it becomes clear that for Hobbes metaphor may actually be a kind of threat to the political status quo. This should at least alert us to the possibility that metaphors play a very important role in political life.

The Cognitive Theory of Metaphor

In the 1980s linguists realized that metaphor was not simply a matter of transferring a word from its ‘proper’ referent to some other referent, nor a special use of language confined to the literary or oratorical domains (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1999). The following points are essential for any serious investigation of ‘metaphor in political discourse.’

First, metaphor is a cognitive, not a linguistic phenomenon. The human mind has various forms of organized knowledge. These may be innate or partly innate and elaborated by culture-relative experience. Let us call these ‘domains.’ Metaphor is then defined as a mapping from a source domain of this type to a target domain. The evidence suggests that many source domains tend to be based in physical, especially spatial, experience and be stored in the mind as what are often referred to as ‘image schemas.’ What the metaphorical mapping does is transfer structure from the source domain to a less well-specified domain.

Second, it is apparent that such metaphorical mappings account for the meanings of many ordinary words in a language as well as idiomatic expressions. Metaphors are therefore not confined to special genres. However, in political discourse, as in other types of discourse, particular words and idioms will obviously be relevant, so particular metaphors will be also. We will see that certain image schemas are an important source of political concepts, e.g., the source-path-goal schema and the container schema. An important point to be made here is that metaphors are actually an instrument for reasoning, contrary to what was asserted by Hobbes. They provide a means by which the human mind can make inferences, for if metaphors map structure from a source domain to a target domain, inferences that can be done in the source domain can (potentially) be done in the target domain.

Another methodological consideration concerns the etymology of political vocabulary. In English and some other languages many words for political phenomena derive from Latin or Greek words with different

meanings. Meaning change in general is often metaphorical in the sense defined here. In the case of political words the metaphors involved can be of interest because they give some indication of how the human conceptual system operates over historical time in this domain of human life.

Finally, two caveats are in order. First, this article refers primarily to metaphor in political discourse in English. Second, it refers to the Western political tradition. Whether the points made can be generalized is a question for further research.

Metaphor and Politics

Political behavior involves using language as a form of political action and as a form of reflection on (metarepresentation of) political behavior. The two are not of course entirely separate but in what follows we shall focus on the second. What, then, are the political concepts that have a metaphorical basis?

If we make the assumption that political behavior involves both cooperation and competition, we can ask how metaphor is involved in the conceptualizing of this duo. It is clear that the relevant concepts will concern differentiation of various sorts and the relations among the parts. Relations of power will be especially significant.

The basic vocabulary of hierarchy and precedence is derived metaphorically from spatial concepts. Two of the fundamental image schemas are the front-back schema and the up-down schema, based on human anatomy, perception and cognition.

The front-back schema gives us metaphorical mappings for precedence (the word itself being etymologically metaphorical [*prae-cedere*] and related to physical ordering of individuals in procession). This is why we speak of an individual or group coming **before**, in **front** of, **ahead** of, in the **vanguard**, etc., while others **come behind**, **fall behind**, **follow**, etc. It will be noticed that these expressions contain mappings from additional image schemas. One of these is the path schema, which reflects experience of human movement. Front-back combined with path gives us the powerful concept of **leadership** and **followers**. In certain political discourses, such concepts are applied to whole groups (ethnic groups, states, regions) in expressions such as '**backward** nations'; indeed the concept of **progress** itself is etymologically derived (*pro-gressus*) from the spatial front-back and path schemas. In persuasive political discourse, orators frequently claim that their country is, or urge that it should be, **moving forward**. In fact, this schema appears to be indispensable for the meanings associated with one

important strand of political discourse, namely reference to policy and future planning. Politicians and their bureaucrats thus frequently speak and write of **looking toward the future**, **taking rapid steps**, **moving on**, coming to **a crossroads**, **going in the right direction**, and so on.

In the up-down schema, up maps onto good, strong and powerful. Thus superior individuals or groups are not only better in some normative sense, but also possess power over others. These expressions are embedded in the language and enter into systematic semantic relations. Thus if someone is **over** or **above** you, you are **beneath** or **below** them; you will be **subordinate**, **inferior**, and they may **stoop**, **condescend**, and so on. This network is the basis for further concepts: a group may **rise up**, or cause an **uprising**, and an established authority may **decline**, **fall**, or **collapse**. The basic image schema of standing upright is important to the rather complex development of the concepts evoked by words such as 'estate' and 'state.'

Concepts of control and power are lexically encoded by way of the spatial up-down image schema. This can be seen from the constructions into which the relevant lexical items enter in English and other languages. For example, it is systematically the case that we say power over, control over, authority over, charge over, responsibility over, and so forth, rather than some other preposition. One of the key concepts of Western political philosophy from the early modern period onward is **sovereignty**. The history of this word, like that of the term 'state,' is complex, but what should be noted here is that it is also metaphorically derived according to the up–down schema: *sovereign* > popular Latin *superanus* > Latin *super* ('on top of,' 'over').

The conceptualization of discrete groups of individuals, in many cases in discrete geographical regions, is probably a crucial component of political thinking and action. The form of such concepts is provided by the basic container image schema, which has many politically significant ramifications. The container schema captures human experience of 'inside,' 'outside' and the intermediate boundary. On the linguistic evidence, it is apparently recruited by the conceptual system to understand, reason about, and communicate about social groups. In reality collections of objects and individuals need not have determinate bounds. The container image schema, however, imposes them. Presumably it coincides with what may or may not be a basic schema, that of self and other. It is this schema that makes it possible to draw inferences such as: if A is not **in** the group, then he is **outside** it; in order to **enter** the group A must cross a boundary. As Chilton (1996) and Chilton and Lakoff (1995) argued, the container schema is fundamental to the concept and discourse of security, as well as to the

modern concept of the state and the international system, where countries and regions are conceptualized as container-like entities. Two combinations with other image schemas are worth noting here. In combination with the center-periphery schema, we have political concepts of **central authority** and **remote** or **peripheral regions**. In combination with the path schema, we have what appear to be emotionally charged concepts of invasion, incursion, and the infringement of national boundaries.

In the Western political tradition certain metaphors with cultural (rather than image-schematic) sources for the state have recurred, as Peil (1983) has shown: the body politic, the ship of state, buildings, machines. The first three can be regarded as linked to the container schema, and the body schema involves basic as well as cultural knowledge. All provide rich possibilities for political inferences in the sense outlined earlier.

The body-politic metaphor is particularly entrenched. It permits the mapping of structured knowledge about the body (and its ills) onto the political domain. If the polity has a **head**, it also has its lesser parts that serve it. If the polity is a body, then it may have **disease**, which may be due to an invasive element, e.g., a **parasite**. It follows that it needs a **physician** to **cure** it, who may prescribe a cure such as a **purge**. As is well known, this train of thought was developed and manipulated in Nazi thinking and propaganda. Peil's other metaphors provide inferential potential that will be more or less familiar to readers. If the state is a **ship**, it may need a strong **captain** to **steer** it though **rough seas**; if it is a building it will need strong **foundations**, a **roof** to protect it, and **pillars** to hold it up; if it is a **machine**, then there are **levers** of power, the machinery has **checks** and **balances**, and it may be more or less **efficient**, or may go **out of control**.

Such examples suggest that the cognitive theory of metaphor provides a means of investigating the intricate conceptual networks that underlie discourse about political institutions. They also suggest that core features of political theory, at least in its traditional Western forms, make use of metaphors derived from a small set of image schemas. But these are hypotheses for future research.

Практичне заняття 5

Onomasiology and Lexical Variation
Dirk Geeraerts, 2006 | LEUVEN (BELGIUM)

The Scope of Onomasiological Research

Although it has hardly found its way to the canonical English terminology of linguistics, the distinction between onomasiology and semasiology is a traditional one in Continental structural semantics and the Eastern European tradition of lexicological research. As Baldinger puts it, ‘‘Semasiology … considers the isolated word and the way its meanings are manifested, while onomasiology looks at the designations of a particular concept, that is, at a multiplicity of expressions which form a whole’’ (1980: 278). The distinction between semasiology and onomasiology, in other words, equals the distinction between meaning and naming: semasiology takes its starting point in the word as a form, and charts the meanings that the word can occur with; onomasiology takes its starting-point in a concept, and investigates by which different expressions the concept can be designated, or named.

To grasp the range of onomasiology, one should realize that the two descriptions of onomasiology that Baldinger mentions are not exactly equivalent. On the one hand, studying ‘a multiplicity of expressions which form a whole’ lies at the basis of the traditional, structuralist conception of onomasiology, i.e., to the study of semantically related expressions (as in lexical field theory, or the study of the lexicon as a relational network of words interconnected by links of a hyponymical, antonymical, synonymous nature, etc.). On the other hand, studying ‘the designations of a particular concept’ opens the way for a contextualized, pragmatic conception of onomasiology, involving the actual choices made for a particular name as a designation of a particular concept or a particular referent.

This distinction can be further equated with the distinction between an investigation of structure, and an investigation of use, or between an investigation of langue and an investigation of parole. The structural conception deals with sets of related expressions, and basically asks the question: what are the relations among the alternative expressions? The pragmatic conception deals with the actual choices made from among a set of related expressions, and basically asks the question: what factors determine the choice for one or the other alternative?

This second, usage-oriented (or if one wishes, pragmatic) form of onomasiology is related to two specific points of interest: differences of structural weight that may appear within onomasiological structures, and onomasiological change.

1. The importance of structural weight may be appreciated by considering semasiological structures first. Qualitative aspects of semasiological structure involve the following questions: which meanings does a word have, and how are they semantically related? The outcome is an investigation into polysemy, and the relationships of metonymy, metaphor, etc. That hold between the various readings of an item. Quantitative aspects of lexical structure, on the other hand, involve the question whether all the readings of an item carry the same structural weight. The semasiological into prototypicality effects of various kinds: prototypicality research is basically concerned with differences of structural weight among the members or the subsenses of a lexical item. The qualitative perspective is a much more traditional one in semasiological lexicology than the quantitative one, which was taken up systematically only recently, with the birth and development of prototype theory.

The distinction between the qualitative and the quantitative aspects of semantic structure (as we may loosely call them) can be extrapolated to onomasiology. The qualitative question then takes the following form: what kinds of (semantic) relations hold between the lexical items in a lexicon (or a subset of the lexicon)? The outcome, clearly, is an investigation into various kind of lexical structuring: field relationships, taxonomies, lexical relations like antonymy and so on. The quantitative question takes the following form: are some categories cognitively more salient than others; that is, are there any differences in the probability that one category rather than another will be chosen for designating things out in the world? Are certain lexical categories more obvious names than others? Again, this type of quantitative research is fairly new. The best-known example is probably Berlin and Kay's basic level model (Berlin and Kay, 1969; Berlin, 1978), which involves the claim that a particular taxonomical level constitutes a preferred, default level of categorization. The basic level in a taxonomy is the level that is (in a given culture) most naturally chosen as the level where categorization takes place; it has, in a sense, more structural weight than the other levels.

2. The distinction between a structure-oriented and a usage-oriented form of onomasiology extends naturally towards the study of onomasiological change. On the one hand, when we think of onomasiological change in a structural way, we will be basically interested

in what may be called ‘‘lexicogenesis’’ – the mechanisms for introducing new pairs of word forms and word meanings. These involve all the traditional mechanisms that introduce new items into the onomasiological inventory of a language, like word formation, word creation (the creation of entirely new roots), borrowing, blending, truncation, ellipsis, folk etymology, and others. Crucially, the semasiological extension of the range of meanings of an existing word is itself one of the major mechanisms of onomasiological change – one of the mechanisms, that is, through which a concept to be expressed gets linked to a lexical expression. In this sense, the study of onomasiological changes is more comprehensive than the study of semasiological changes, since it encompasses the latter (while the reverse is obviously not the case).

On the other hand, if we think of onomasiological change in a usage-oriented way, the lexicogenetic perspective inevitably has to be supplemented with a sociolexicological perspective – with the study, that is, of how onomasiological changes spread through a speech community. Beyond merely identifying onomasiological mechanisms in the traditional etymological vein, we need to study how these mechanisms are put at work and how they may lead to overall changes in the habits of the language community. Classifications of lexicogenetic mechanisms merely identify the space of possible or virtual onomasiological changes; sociolexicology studies the actual realization of the changes.

The Contribution of Various Traditions of Research

The various traditions of lexical semantics have contributed in different ways to the study of onomasiology. The major traditions are the following:

- prestructuralist semantics, as dominant between 1870 and 1930, and as represented by the work of Paul, Breal, Darmesteter,Wundt, and many others;
- structuralist semantics, as dominant between 1930 and 1960, and as represented by the work of Trier, Weisgerber, Coseriu, Lyons, and lexical field theorists at large;
- generativist and neogenerativist semantics, as originated in the 1960s, with the work of Katz and Fodor;
- cognitive semantics, as originated in the 1980s, and as represented by the work of Lakoff, Langacker, Talmy, and others.

Of these four traditions, all except the generativist/neogenerativist have made noteworthy contributions to the field of onomasiology.

1. Prestructuralist semantics – apart from coining the term *onomasiology* itself (Zauner, 1902) – has introduced some of the basic terminology for describing lexicogenetic mechanisms. Although basically concerned with semasiological changes, the major semasiological treatises from Breal and Paul to Stern and Carnoy do not restrict themselves to strictly semasiological mechanisms like metaphor and metonymy, but also devote attention to mechanisms of onomasiological change like borrowing or folk etymology. (Compare Quadri [1952] for an overview of the tradition.) While the distinction between the two perspectives is treated more systematically in the structuralist era, attempts to classify lexicogenetic mechanisms continue to the present day. Different proposals may be found in the work of, among others, Dornseiff (1966), Algeo (1980), Tournier (1985), and Zgusta (1990).

2. The crucial contribution of structuralist semantics to onomasiology is its insistence, in the wake of De Saussure himself, on the distinction between semasiology and onomasiology. In the realm of diachronic linguistics, this division shows up, for instance, in Ullmann's classification of semantic changes (1962). More importantly, the bulk of (synchronic) structuralist semantics is devoted to the identification and description of different onomasiological structures in the lexicon, such as lexical fields, taxonomical hierarchies, lexical relations like antonymy and synonymy, and syntagmatic relationships.

3. There are three important contributions that cognitive semantics has so far made to onomasiology. First, cognitive semantics has drawn the attention to a number of qualitative onomasiological structures that did not come to the fore in the structuralist tradition. This shift holds true, on the one hand, for the development of the Fillmorean frame model of semantic analysis (Fillmore, 1977, Fillmore and Atkins, 1992). Frames constitute a specific type of syntagmatic structure in the lexicon that received little or no attention in the structuralist tradition. On the other hand, the seminal introduction of generalized metaphor research in the line of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) can be seen as the identification of figurative lexical fields: the ensembles of nearsynonymous metaphors studied as conceptual metaphors constitute fields of related metaphorical expressions (just like ordinary semantic fields consist of ensembles of near-synonymous lexical items).

Second, cognitive semantics introduces a quantitative perspective into the study of onomasiological structures. As mentioned above, basic level research in the line of Berlin and Kay introduces the notion of salience into

the description of taxonomical structures: basic levels are preferred, default levels of categorization.

Third, cognitive semantics introduces a quantitative perspective into the study of lexicogenetic mechanisms. Within the set of lexicogenetic mechanisms, some could be more salient (i.e., might be used more often) than others. Superficially, this increased use could involve, for instance, an overall preference for borrowing rather than morphological productivity as mechanisms for introducing new words, but from a cognitive semantic perspective, there are other, more subtle questions to ask: do the way in which novel words and expressions are being coined, reveal specific (and possibly preferred) ways of conceptualizing the onomasiological targets? For instance, do specific cultures have dominant metaphors for a given domain of experience (and could such dominant metaphors perhaps be universal – see Kovecses, 1990)?

In addition, cognitive semantics is gradually developing a pragmatic, usage-oriented form of onomasiological research in which the various factors that influence the onomasiological choice of a category for talking about a given referent, are being investigated. It has been shown, for instance (Geeraerts *et al.*, 1994, 1999), that the selection of a name for a referent appears to be determined by the semasiological salience of the referent, i.e., the degree of prototypicality of the referent with regard to the semasiological structure of the category, by the onomasiological salience of the category represented by the expression, and by contextual features of a classical sociolinguistic and geographical nature, involving the competition between different language varieties.

A Conceptual Map of Onomasiology

To conclude, we can summarize the relationship between the various aspects of onomasiology into a single comprehensive schema in Table 1.

Filling in the chart with the names of the research traditions that have made a dominant contribution to each of the various subfields schematizes the progressive development of onomasiology.

Table 1 A conceptual map of onomasiological research

	Qualitative approaches: what are the relevant phenomena?	*Quantitative approaches: which phenomena carry more weight?*
Synchronic structures	Research into lexical structures: *structuralist semantics* (plus cognitive semantics)	Research into onomasiological salience: *cognitive semantics*
Mechanisms and processes of change	Research into lexicogenetic mechanisms: *prestructuralist semantics*	Research into lexicogenetic mechanisms: *cognitive semantics*

The historical development from prestructuralist semantics over structuralist semantics to cognitive semantics implies a gradual enlargement of the field of onomasiological research, from an interest in lexicogenetic mechanisms over research into lexical structures (fields and others) to various quantitative approaches taking into account the difference in salience of the onomasiological phenomena.

Практичне заняття 6

Construction Grammar
Laura A. Michaelis, 2006 | BOULDER (USA)

Introduction

Theories of sentence meaning describe the relationship between the meaning of a sentence and the meanings of the words of that sentence. In compositional theories of sentence meaning, the semantic and syntactic requirements of the word (its argument structure) can be used to predict the semantic and syntactic type of a phrase in which that word is the syntactic head. According to this view, known as the principle of lexical projection, words constrain potential sisterhood relations by specifying the types of complements, adjuncts, and determiners that they either require or welcome (Zwicky, 1995; Jackendoff, 1997: Chap. 3; Sag *et al*., 2003: Chap. 4). In projection-based models of sentence meaning, concepts – like entities, events, and properties – are expressed exclusively by words (Jackendoff, 1997: 48). Rules of syntactic combination assemble words and their dependent elements into phrases, and the phrases denote complex concepts like predicates and propositions. The rules of combination do not add conceptual content to that contributed by the words and therefore do not alter the combinatory potential of words. Thus, on the projection-based view, sentences have meaning but sentence patterns do not.

The projection-based view of sentence meaning articulates closely with models of syntax based on principles and parameters. In such models:

> [a] language [is not] a system of rules, but a set of specifications for parameters in an invariant system of principles of [universal grammar], and traditional grammatical constructions are perhaps best regarded as taxonomic epiphenomena – collections of structures with properties resulting from the interaction of fixed principles with parameters set one way or another (Chomsky, 1989: 43).

On this view, the syntactic patterns of a language are not licensed by the grammar of that language; they are simply artifacts of the interaction between universal and language-particular constraints. Construction Grammar (CxG) was devised in part to counteract the reductionist views of syntax and semantics described above, but at the same time it represented a

return to a traditional, 'taxonomic' mode of grammatical analysis. Proponents of CxG have sought to show that there are constraints on form and interpretation that cannot be explained except as the products of grammatical constructions, form-meaning pairings of varying degrees of productivity and internal complexity. In CxG, grammar is viewed as a structured inventory of such pairings. Extensive discussion of the implications of this view for syntactic theory can be found in Fillmore et al., 1988; Kay and Fillmore, 1999; Kay, 2002; Zwicky and Pullum, 1991; Zwicky, 1994, 1995; Goldberg, 1995, 2002; Michaelis and Lambrecht, 1996; Michaelis and Ruppenhofer, 2001; Goldberg and Jackendoff, 2004; Fillmore *et al*. (in press).

Grammatical constructions have been a fundamental tool of linguistic description since ancient times (Harris and Taylor, 1997), and for most of that history they have been treated no differently from words – forms with specific meanings and functions. It was only with the advent of generative grammar that constructions fell into disrepute. It is easy to understand why: the idea that patterns of word combination could be intrinsically meaningful simply cannot be accommodated within the logical structure of the projection-based view. If, for example, we change the associations within an arithmetic sequence like *2 x (3 + 4)* so as to create the sequence *(2 x 3) + 4*, we change what the sequence denotes (from 14 to 10), but not what the numbers denote. If we apply the same logic to syntax, we conclude that changing the syntactic associations in a string of words changes only what the word string means, not what the words in that string mean. While this conclusion is well founded, proponents of CxG have argued that it is based on an inappropriate analogy: content words (like nouns and verbs) do not designate in the way that numbers do, because syntactic context determines what kind of event, property, or entity the word denotes and, in turn, what the combinatory behavior of that word is (Goldberg, 1995; Michaelis and Ruppenhofer, 2001; Goldberg and Jackendoff, 2004).We will refer to this effect of syntactic context as *type shifting*.

In the second section, we will look at the treatment of type shifting in a construction-based model of syntax, with particular attention to verbal argument structure and nominal syntax. As we will see, the CxG model of semantic composition is integrative rather than projection-based: like words, constructions denote semantic types (e.g., events and entities) and, like words, constructions license syntactic and semantic dependents; therefore, the interpretation of a phrase involves combining the interpretive and combinatoric constraints of the phrasal pattern with those of the word that is the head of the phrase. In the course of this discussion, we will explore the

formal representation of these constraints and the procedure used to combine them.

In the third section, we will discuss additional arguments in favor of construction-based grammar; these arguments involve idiomatic patterns, functional oppositions in grammar, exceptions to 'transconstructional filters' and deficiencies of rule-based grammatical generalizations. A concluding section will suggest connections between construction-based grammar and usage-based theories of language acquisition and processing.

Type Shifting as Evidence for Construction-Based Meaning

Argument Structure

Projection-based theories of the syntax-semantics interface, including Lexical Functional Grammar (Bresnan, 2001), Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar (Pollard and Sag, 1994), and Role and Reference Grammar (Van Valin and LaPolla, 1997), tend to focus on verbal argument structure, and for good reason: the relationship between a verb's semantic requirements and the meaning of the clause built around that verb appears highly transparent. For example, (1) denotes an event of transfer – involving an agent, a 'gift,' and a recipient – because the verb *give* denotes a scene of transfer, and likewise requires the presence of these three participants:

(1) We gave the account to her.

Models of sentence meaning based on lexical projection provide a straightforward picture of the syntax-semantics interface: while the verb determines what the sentence means, syntactic rules determine how it means. For example, in (1) the verb and the two arguments that follow it are grouped together into a verb phrase (the predicate), which then combines with a noun phrase (the subject) to form a sentence. In addition to constituent-building rules, syntacticians have proposed realization rules, called linking rules, that assign each of the verb's thematic roles (e.g., agent or patient) to a unique grammatical role (e.g., subject or object). Linking rules, which are typically assumed to have crosslinguistic validity (Bresnan, 1994; Van Valin and LaPolla, 1997), are used to represent the fact that there is usually more than one way to express the semantic arguments of a given verb. For example, the verb *give*, in addition to allowing realization of its recipient argument as a prepositional phrase (e.g., *to her*), as in (1), it allows that recipient argument to be realized as a direct object, as in (2):

(2) We gave her the account.

Thus, a given verb may be subject to several (mutually incompatible) linking rules. These inking rules are assumed to add syntactic–realization constraints to verb entries in which ‘‘[a]rgument roles are lexically underspecified for the possible surface syntactic functions they can assume’’ (Bresnan, 1994: 91). These rules do not add to, subtract from, or alter the array of thematic roles associated with the verb. For example, Bresnan (1994) represents locative inversion, a presentational construction found in both English and the Bantu language Chichewa, as one linking possibility for verbs like *stand*, which license both a location argument and a theme argument. Such verbs are subject both to the linking rule that produces the pattern in (3) and to the linking rule that produces the ‘inverted’ pattern in (4):

(3) Two women stood in the plaza.
(4) In the plaza stood two women.

However, attested examples of locative inversion like that in (5) are difficult to square with the model of argument linking outlined above:

(5) Down at the harbor there is a teal-green clubhouse for socializing and parties.
Beside it sparkles the community pool (*Vanity Fair*, August 2001).

Examples like (5) are problematic in Bresnan’s framework because the verb *sparkle* does not assign either a locative role or a theme role – it is an intransitive verb of light emission – and yet it is welcomed by the locative-inversion argument-structure pattern. In examples like (5), Bresnan argues (1994: 91), a locative-theme argument structure imposed by the pragmatic requirement of presentational focus is ‘overlaid’ on the argument structure of the verb. However, if argument structures are merely alternate possibilities for the realization of the semantic roles licensed by the verb, and not independent form-meaning pairings, the source of the ‘overlay’ is mysterious.

Adherence to the projection principle results not only in *ad hoc* devices such as an ‘overlay theme’ in cases like (5), but also, as Goldberg points out (1995, 2002), appeal to implausible verb senses. Goldberg’s construction-based model of argument structure accords a central place to innovative verb uses like that in (5) and those in (6–8):

(6) Most likely they were fellow visitors, just panting up to the sky-high altar out of curiosity (Lindsey Davis, *Last Act in Palmyra*, p. 28).

(7) When a visitor passes through the village, young lamas stop picking up trash to mug for the camera. A gruff 'police monk' barks them back to work (*Newsweek* 10/13/97).

(8) Although he professed to like the sweater she knit him for his birthday, he wouldn't wear it in public […] (www.knitty.com/ISSUEwinter02/FEATsweatercurse.html).

Goldberg argues that if argument structure were determined exclusively by the lexical verb of the clause, we would have to posit a special verb sense for each of the usages exemplified in (6–8). Sentence (6) would require a special sense of *pant* in which it means 'move while panting,' (7) would require a special sense of the verb *bark* in which it means 'cause to move by barking,' and (8) would require a sense of the verb *knit* that would be captured by the paraphrase 'knit something in order to give it to someone.' Such word senses, as Goldberg argues, are not only *ad hoc* and unintuitive, but also entail radical and unconstrained verb polysemy.

In the construction-based model of argument structure proposed by Goldberg, verb meaning is constant across syntactic contexts. No additional lexical entries are created to represent the meanings and projection properties of verbs found in nonce patterns like those in (5–8). Instead, verbs combine with verb-level linking constructions, which denote event types. These linking constructions assign grammatical functions to participant roles contributed by the verb. Because these constructions denote event types, each licenses the array of thematic roles entailed by its particular event type. Take, for example, the ditransitive construction, exemplified in (8). According to Goldberg (1995: Chap. 2), this pattern, which she represents as a sentence type of the form NP V NP NP, denotes an array of closely related event types, including actual transfer, intended transfer, metaphorical transfer, and denial of transfer. Because of the event type it designates, the ditransitive construction licenses three thematic roles: an agent, a theme, and a recipient. The set of thematic roles licensed by the construction may properly include the set of roles licensed by the verb, that is, its valence. In such cases, the construction augments the verb's valence. For example, the verb *knit*, as a verb of creation, licenses two thematic roles, an agent and a theme. In (8), however, *knit* is accompanied by three

thematic roles: its valence has been augmented up to that of a verb of transfer because the construction in which it is embedded (the ditransitive) designates an event of transfer. While verbal argument structure cannot vary as a function of syntactic context in projection-based models of argument structure, valence augmentation is a predictable side effect of semantic composition in construction-based models, which assume two sources of thematic structure (the verb and the construction), rather than a single source (the verb).

How are the semantic contributions of verb and construction combined? The mechanism proposed by Goldberg involves fusion: the identification of the verb's participant roles with semantically compatible roles licensed by the construction (Goldberg, 1995: 50–66). Goldberg proposes a limited set of semantic integration relationships that may hold between verb and construction (Goldberg, 1995: 65–66). One such integration relationship is the instance relationship, as exemplified in (2). Here, the event denoted by the verb *give*, and correspondingly the valence of *give*, is identical to that of the ditransitive construction, which similarly designates a transfer event. Other integration relationships entail valence augmentation. Among these is the manner relationship, as exemplified by (6): the verb *pant* designates an activity that occurs during the course of an event of directed motion, the latter of which is denoted by the construction. In this case, the valence of the single-argument verb *pant* is augmented up to that of a directed-motion event, which entails both an agent and a goal argument (see also Goldberg and Jackendoff, 2004). An additional integration relationship proposed by Goldberg is the means relationship, as exemplified in (7): barking is the means by which the agent causes the theme argument to move. As in the case of *pant* in (6), the valence of the one-argument verb bark is augmented up to that of the construction: in (7), the construction, which designates an event of caused motion, has added both a theme argument and a directional argument to the valence of *bark*.

Additional Arguments for Construction-Based Grammar

The arguments that we will consider here are based on: the existence of formal idioms and relations of 'family resemblance' among such patterns (Lakoff, 1987; Fillmore *et al*., 1988; Michaelis and Lambrecht, 1996; Culicover, 1997; Goldberg and Jackendoff, 2004), paradigmatic effects in morphosyntax (Michaelis, 1998; Ackerman, 2003), the inadequacy of parameter settings as a model of typological variation (Pullum and Zwichy, 1991; Van Valin and LaPolla, 1997; Croft, 2002), and the failure of

derivational rules to capture generalizations over the putative 'input' forms (Goldberg, 1995; Bybee, 2001; Michaelis and Ruppenhofer, 2001; Croft and Cruse, 2004).

Idioms and Inheritance

It has long been observed that complex expressions in a given language can mean what they mean in the same way that words do – by convention rather than composition. Such complex expressions are called *idioms*. Fillmore *et al.* (1988) point out that while a great deal of attention has been paid to substantive, or lexically filled, idioms (e.g., *hit the nail on the head*, *light a fire under x*, *take x to task*), less attention has been paid to formal idioms, syntactic patterns that are grammatically irregular with regard to either their interpretation or their syntactic composition. An example of a syntactically irregular formal idiom that has been discussed in the CxG literature is the correlative conditional, e.g., *The faster we run, the slower they run* (Fillmore, 1986; Michaelis, 1994; Culicover and Jackendoff, 1999). While the construction has conditional semantics, no phrase-structure rules of English allows paired comparative phrases of exactly this type. An example of a syntactically regular but semantically irregular formal idiom is the WXDY construction, e.g., *What's that fly doing in my soup?* (Kay and Fillmore, 1999). While a naıve speaker might interpret this pattern as questioning the purpose of an activity, it is actually used to ask why a given state exists.

Fillmore *et al.* (1988) and Culicover and Jackendoff (1999) argue that formal idioms are highly productive patterns, and that they therefore constitute aspects of linguistic competence that a generative grammar must account for. As Zwicky (1995) observes, CxG is uniquely well suited to this task, because it eschews two assumptions common to competing phrase-structure grammars: local licensing and head-driven category determination. Since constructions have daughters, and daughters may have daughters, constructions can be used to represent what Zwicky refers to as niece licensing: a situation in which a construction's daughter calls for a sister with a daughter of a particular type. The spoken English sentence type referred to by Brenier and Michaelis (2005) as hypotactic apposition illustrates the role played by niece licensing in the representation of formal idioms. An example of this construction is given in (14):

(14) That's the real problem is that you never really know.

Hypotactic apposition is a nonstandard presentational pattern that consists of a 'set up' clause containing a cataphoric demonstrative pronoun (e.g., *that*) followed by a 'counterweight' clause introduced by a finite form of the verb *be*. The pattern qualifies as an idiom because the phrase-structure rules of English do not permit the adjunction of a nonsubordinate finite clause and a finite VP. Representing hypotactic apposition requires appeal to niece licensing because the construction requires not simply a VP daughter but one whose head daughter is, in turn, a finite form of the copula.

Other formal idioms violate head-driven syntactic category determination, according to which the head of the phrase determines the syntactic distribution of the phrase. An example of such a violation is provided by adjective phrases containing the correlative degree word *as*, e.g., *as competent as she was*. While such expressions constitute adjective phrases in contexts like (15a), they have the external distribution of concessive clauses in contexts like (15b):

(15a) She was as competent as she was.
(15b) As competent as she was, she wasn't able to find work.

In addition to providing representational conventions appropriate to formal idioms, CxG also captures semantic and syntactic relationships between idiomatic patterns and more regular patterns. For example, Fillmore (1986) observes that the English correlative conditional, despite having numerous idiomatic properties, partakes of general syntactic and semantic properties of the conditional sentence type, including having an antecedent clause that is a polarity context. Relationships of this nature are represented in CxG by inheritance networks, in which like constructions have partially overlapping representations (Goldberg, 1995: Chap. 3). Inheritance networks have been used to capture syntactic and semantic commonalities among deictic and existential *there*-constructions (Lakoff, 1987), exclamatory constructions (Michaelis and Lambrecht, 1996), subject-auxiliary constructions (Fillmore, 1999), and resultative constructions (Goldberg and Jackendoff, 2004).

Paradigmatic Effects in Morphosyntax

Inference based on oppositions in a language is central to the Gricean model of conversational logic (Horn, 1984). For example, if a speaker asserts *Leslie caused the train to stop*, the hearer can reason, via Grice's second maxim of quantity ('Do not say more than you must') that since the

speaker chose not to use the less prolix formulation *Leslie stopped the train*, the default situation (direct causation) did not apply. In such cases, the interpretation of the periphrastic form depends upon the existence of a synonymous unused form. Proponents of construction-based syntax have also identified paradigm-based inference as a source of morphosyntactic constraints and affordances. For example, Michaelis (1998: Chap. 5) argues that the constraint that prevents past-time adverbial reference in present perfect sentences (e.g., **I have visited Rome **in 1999***) is an effect not of semantics but of a discourse-pragmatic opposition between the present perfect and the simple past in English: the present perfect functions to introduce a past-time interval rather than invoking an already established past interval. Paradigmatic effects have also been used to motivate constraints on argument-structure constructions. Goldberg and Jackendoff (2004: 540–541) observe that the constraint barring the intransitive resultative construction (16a) from expressing accompaniment to motion (16b) can be attributed to the existence of a nearly synonymous construction, the *way*-construction (16c), which can:

(16a) She skipped into the garden.
(16b) *She whistled into the garden.
(16c) She whistled her way into the garden.

Paradigmatic effects of the nature require a model in which the grammar consists of a structured inventory of form-meaning pairings analogous to the lexicon, i.e., a 'constructicon.' It is only in such a grammar that constructions may enter into usagebased oppositions. Because CxG is such a model, it appears uniquely equipped to describe paradigmbased constraints in syntax.

The Inadequacy of Transconstructional Filters

In an early paper in the CxG tradition, Pullum and Zwicky (1991) argue that the so-called double-*ing* constraint cannot be a general morphosyntactic constraint of English. Examples that were used to motivate the constraint include that in (17), but, as Zwicky and Pullum observe, there are systematic exceptions, exemplified in (18, 19):

(17) Robin was starting going to concerts more frequently.
(18) Robin was enjoying going to concerts more frequently.

(19) Robin was not starting, nor did she intend to start, going to concerts.

Pullum and Zwicky propose that the double-*ing* constraint is not therefore a transconstructional filter but instead a constraint on a single constituent-defining rule: ''[The VP constituency construction] is inapplicable if its head Vand an immediately following head of a complement VP are both in Present Participle form'' (Pullum and Zwicky, 1991: 254). The significance of such findings is that they vitiate a model of typological variation based on parameter settings and support one based on constructions. Construction-based typological models include those of Croft (2001), who argues that grammatical-function coding is derivative of constructionally determined semantic relations, and Van Valin and LaPolla (1997), who argue that the pattern of semantic neutralization that characterizes the pivotal syntactic argument in the clause varies not only from language to language but also from construction to construction. For example, while English is widely analyzed as a nominative-accusative language, there are highly productive constructions of English that require other patterns of semantic restriction and neutralization. For example, in English imperatives, the null instantiated element represents an agent rather than a subject. Further, in English resultative sentences the argument of the secondary predicate can be either a subject or an object, as shown by (20, 21), but it must be a patient-type argument, as shown by (22):

(20) The cake fell flat.
(21) She hammered the metal flat.
(22) She ran *(herself) tired.

What this suggests is that the murkily defined 'ergative undercurrents,' sometimes identified in nominative-accusative languages, are simply reflections of the fact that different constructions in a given language require different pivotal arguments. By the same token, split-case systems need not be seen as trending in one direction or another (e.g., away from ergative-absolutive organization and toward nominative-accusative organization). That a given language should use different patterns of semantic neutralization for different syntactic purposes is expected if constructions are the basis of syntax, but not otherwise.

Product-Oriented Generalizations

In Bybee's (2001) schema-based model of inflection, the rule-rote distinction is replaced by a 'superpositional memory' in which like forms overlap, e.g., the irregular past tense forms *sang*, *rang*, and *drank*. Affixes, roots, and stems do not have independent representations; they exist only as similarity relations among words. These relations are captured by product-oriented schemas. Product-oriented schemas represent similarities among forms of a specific category, but do not derive one category from another. In this model, the main determinant of productivity is the type frequency of the schema – the number of different words that represent the schema.

While it might appear that product-oriented schemas would miss source-oriented generalizations, Bybee shows that template can be used to capture similarities among schemas that participate in an opposition. For example, the template [sVN] could be used to capture the phonetic and semantic similarity among the members of the ablaut relation exemplified by the triad *sing-sang-sung*. Further, Bybee shows (2001: 126–127) product-oriented schemas are superior to source-oriented schemas in that the former are not derailed when we cannot find generalizations across the putative source forms. She bases this argument on English past tenses in [L] (*string, cling, fling*). The addition of new members to this class (e.g., *struck, stuck, dug, snuck*), made a source-oriented generalization impossible: the present tense counterparts of the newly added past tense verbs lack a nasal coda and have a variety of vocalic nuclei, among them ([i], [ai], and [ɨ]). However, a product-oriented generalization is possible, as captured by the schema CLC[velar].

Construction grammarians (e.g., Goldberg, 1995 and Michaelis and Ruppenhofer, 2001) also use the lack of valid source-oriented generalizations to argue for product-oriented ones. In particular, they argue that verbal linking patterns are produced by constructions rather than by lexical rules. As discussed in 'Argument Structure,' lexical-rule-based approaches to verbal argument structure assume that thematic structure is unaffected by the application of a lexical rule, but the word that constitutes the 'input' to a putative lexical rule may (a) lack the necessary thematic roles (as do verbs of creation with respect to the ditransitive pattern; see 'Argument Structure' above) or (b) lack thematic structure altogether, as do nonce denominal verbs. Example (23), taken from Michaelis and Ruppenhofer (2001: 4–5), illustrates the latter problem with respect to the German applicative pattern, in which a locative argument is linked to a

nonoblique grammatical function (either subject or object) and the inseparable prefix *be-* is attached to the verb:

(23) Es mag ja lustig sein, zwei hartgekochte Eier wie Clownsko¨ pfe mit angekeimten Sojabohnen zu behaaren und sie auf Gurkenscheiben zu stellen [. . .].
'It might be funny to be-hair two hard-boiled eggs like clowns' heads with germinating soy beans, to stand them up on cucumber slices [. . .].'

In (23), an active voice, trivalent applicative predication, the base form is the noun *Haar* ('hair'). This word is inherently nonrelational, as it has no verbal counterpart outside of this context: German lacks a transfer verb **haaren* ('hair'). The applicative predication in (22) designates a transfer event of the type denoted by trivalent applicative verbs like *beladen* ('load'), and yet the thematic roles present in (23) are evidently not licensed by the stem *Haar*, because *Haar* is not a verb, let alone a transfer verb. Instead, as Michaelis and Ruppenhofer (2001) argue, the applicative pattern imposes its own thematic structure, and therefore it is a construction rather than the output of a lexical rule.

In addition, proponents of argument–structure constructions have argued against lexical-rule-based approaches on the grounds that such 'rules' may have no uniform 'product' (Goldberg, 1995: 31–39). For example, German applicative verbs designate a variety of image- and force-dynamic schemas, including coverage, intensive action, repeated action, and benefaction (Michaelis and Ruppenhofer, 2001). Because constructions, like words, are potentially polysemous (Michaelis, 1994), the construction-based model of verbal argument structure can readily accommodate this semantic variety (Goldberg, 1995). In such accounts, distinct senses of a given argument-structure construction are related via inheritance, as described in 'Idioms and Inheritance.'

Conclusion

Because constructions, like words, freely combine semantic constraints (like event representations) with pragmatic constraints (like use conditions), describing constructional meaning requires us to combine cognitive and discourse-functional explanation. This integrated approach characterizes much of the current research on language and mind: studies of language acquisition and sentence processing increasingly emphasize the role of

usage factors, in particular the relativity frequencies of words and morphosyntactic patterns. Such studies have shown, for example, that the onset of verb overregularization errors in early child language is triggered by an increase in the proportion of regular to irregular verbs in the child's vocabulary (Marchman and Bates, 1994) and that the likelihood of a gardenpath 'detour' during sentence processing is a function of the prior probability of a given constituent structure (e.g., reduced relative vs. main verb) combined with the transitivity bias of the lexical verb (Narayanan and Jurafsky, 1998). Such studies support the view that linguistic knowledge is the knowledge of routines (Langacker, 1987; Bybee, 2001; Tomasello, 2001, 2003; Croft and Cruse, 2004) and that language acquisition is the ''mastery of artifacts and conventions'' that children ''may adapt for creative uses as their mastery progresses'' (Tomasello, 2001: 160). If these theorists are correct, knowledge of language is the product of acculturation, and grammatical constructions are the basis of syntax.

Навчальне видання

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